



Security through Cooperation

**Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly  
on the Security Policy of Switzerland**

of 7 June 1999

---

97.667e

## Summary

The political and strategic developments since the change of 1989/90 in Europe, the analysis of the range of threats, and the need to make best use of scarce resources call for a new concept for our security policy.

The core question is how Switzerland can best protect itself, in today's geo-strategic environment, against the use of force threatening the state and our existence, regardless of its source, and taking into account that a proportion of such forces, or violence, are taking new forms and do not stop at national borders.

Accordingly, this report analyses the present and likely future dangers and risks. It also assesses the opportunities resulting from numerous efforts by the international community to increase the security of our continent. Not least, it takes into account our own possibilities and limits.

The comparison of these findings with our national objectives and interests leads to a specifically Swiss strategy of security policy which can be summarised by "Security through Cooperation". This strategy derives from the recognition that two kinds of efforts are required for the preservation of our values and the protection of the nation and its people.

On the one hand, it concerns the comprehensive but compared to the past more flexible, cooperation between all civilian and military assets serving our interests in security policy. This cooperation must enable us to take the necessary measures in a given situation and to set priorities for defence. The objective of this co-operation is to achieve a maximum of synergies and to ensure the option is available to expand our capacities and assets should this be required. At the same time, it shall allow us to avoid a costly permanent orientation towards the worst case.

On the other hand is an enhanced collaboration with international security organisations and friendly states in order to contribute, through mutually reinforcing co-operation, to stability and peace in our extended geographic sphere. This serves not only to strengthen the solidarity that is expected from us; it is also a judicious investment in our own security.

The two other strategic options often discussed in debates on Swiss security policy - self-assertion with the maximum of autonomy, or the joining of a military alliance - are for general political reasons, as well on the grounds of security policy, unsatisfactory because they are, in an overall view, incomplete or not an imperative today.

In the implementation of this co-operation strategy, the three strategic missions already identified in the Report 90 remain valid, although with a new and stronger emphasis: promotion of peace and crisis management; prevention and management of existential dangers and defence.

To fulfil these missions, we maintain proven traditions as long as they serve our present and foreseeable security needs, but we introduce new concepts, structures and elements as far as such prove necessary. Thus, we maintain our traditional neutrality while simultaneously making full use of the freedom of action provided by the law of neutrality. We re-examine the whole range of civilian and military security assets and adjust them, where necessary, by reforms to the new requirements. In particular, the armed forces continue to be based in principle on the militia system; but with a larger

professional element, in keeping with the necessities resulting from their newly formulated missions. The concept presented in this report is the authoritative guideline for the general direction and the objectives for all these adaptations.

Reforms are also necessary in the strategic leadership. The cantons are given additional responsibilities, particularly in civil protection. The Federal Council, the supreme authority in security policy, will receive additional support by a permanent Security Steering Group which unites representatives from all strategically relevant areas and in particular ensures the co-ordination of the intelligence services. Not least, this group also has the task to periodically review this strategy taking into account new dangers and other developments relevant to security policy.

# 1 Introduction

Tendencies that were already recognisable but not defined at the end of the Cold War have in the meantime become more tangible. It is now easier to define the threats, dangers and risks. New opportunities have emerged to strengthen stability, security, and peace. Social developments have intensified. Correspondingly, the pressure for change and reform in security policy has increased, especially with regard to the armed forces and civil protection. Although the present report shall serve as the basis for reform projects in these two areas, this does not mean that the assessment of the situation and of the need for action would be limited exclusively to these two instruments of security policy. The latter is a responsibility cutting across various sectors involving the state, the economy and society. Only an integral analysis, based on a *comprehensive definition of security*, enables us to determine the mission, its place within an overall strategy and the importance of each individual instrument of security policy as well as the interdependence between them.

Such a procedure is also necessary to avoid that the shaping of our security policy is driven by the prescriptive force of existing structures and by resource issues. Only supreme political principles and interests of Switzerland are to be accepted as immutable. Security policy must be directed towards authentic challenges, even if this calls into question traditional views. Only then will we succeed in creating the necessary domestic consensus.

The definition of security policy, as used in this report, corresponds to the changed environment. In the Report 90, security policy was defined as “the area of policy relating to politico-military threats”. For this report, security policy refers to the *prevention and management of force of strategic magnitude*, i.e. force with supra-regional, national or international consequences and thus affecting considerable parts of the state and society. Naturally, politico-military threats remain a factor in defining security policy. However, the new definition permits the inclusion of additional threats and dangers to our security which have become more significant since the last report was published and are not necessarily linked to politico-military developments, e.g., organised crime, and natural and man-made disasters. The fight against force below strategic magnitude is of utmost importance for public security. It is a responsibility of cantons’ security policy. The cantons’ command structures and resources are primarily directed toward large-scale disasters or threats to public security by violence and crime. Therefore, the cantons’ security policy is closely connected, but not identical to, federal security policy.

This report also provides a new emphasis with its leitmotif of “*security through cooperation*”. The situation calls for co-operation in security policy both within Switzerland and with other countries and international organisations. The challenges of security policy can only be met if all available domestic means are employed more flexibly and efficiently and if Switzerland seizes the opportunities of international cooperation for increasing its own security when employing its means beyond the borders - without giving up its neutrality.

The replacement of universal defence shaped by the Cold War by a *comprehensive and flexible security co-operation* at the national level is a particular challenge. As a consequence of the changed security environment, there is considerable latitude for a

decentralisation of missions to the cantons while at the same time increasing the multi-functionality of the federal means of security policy and of the corresponding instruments of command.

The continuing change calls for a *periodical re-examination* of this concept. During the Cold War, with its rigid spectrum of threats, dangers and risks, it could be assumed that a report on security policy would remain valid for a considerable period. Between the report of 1973 and that of 1990, one intermediate report, in 1979, was sufficient. Since then, the pace of change has increased. However, the core of our strategy - security through co-operation – is sufficiently flexible and capable of development to make it easier for Switzerland to cope with rapid and erratic changes. If Switzerland seizes the opportunities for co-operation; it can face the future challenges of security policy with self-confidence.

## 2 Requirement for and purpose of a new report

### 21 What has changed since 1990?

#### 211 Developments in our environment

Since the middle of this century, our political-military environment was defined by the Cold War, and by increasing collaboration between once hostile states, at first in Western Europe. The end of the Cold War raised expectations for a durable peace. These were not all met; but our security within the European environment has improved overall.

The conventional military threat affecting Switzerland has been drastically reduced. Some former member states of the Warsaw Pact have joined NATO, and others have declared their intention to do so. Moreover, further countries within the OSCE area have joined the community of democratic values and the corresponding organisations, which further stabilises our environment. Continued European integration has made the European Union, deepened in substance and geographically enlarged, the most significant economic and political actor on the continent.

Other dangers and risks moved to the fore. Regional conflicts and local civil wars with the potential for escalation have flared up. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems is continuing. Organised crime and the drug mafias are increasing their influence. Terrorism and violent extremism remain a permanent threat. Human rights violations, the unequal distribution of wealth, shortages of resources, and damage to the environment cause migration and flows of refugees. The vulnerability of modern society is constantly increasing. These threats which are not new in themselves but whose intensity and interdependence has increased, and are primarily of a non-military character, can only be countered successfully through sustained multilateral security efforts.

This change in the security environment is reflected in the evolution of European military collaboration, especially within NATO that is increasingly concentrating on crisis management out of area and less on the defence of the territory of its member states, although it maintains its defence capability.

## 212 Development of Swiss security policy

Switzerland is also affected by this development. It shares with its neighbours and other European states the threats and dangers but also the opportunities to master them. The possibility to *autonomously* ensure our own security has decreased due to the cross-border nature of the dangers and risks and our technological and financial limits. At the same time, the potential has increased of strengthening security through *cooperation*. The conviction is also growing within Switzerland that our country has to meet these new challenges in collaboration with other countries in order to strengthen our own security and simultaneously contribute to security and peace on a global and continental level.

Accordingly, since the end of the Cold War the Federal Council's security policy has been marked by an increase of its commitment to, and collaboration with, the international community. The armed forces' primary mission remained preventing war and defending the country; this was not challenged by the Army Reform 95 that included a one-third reduction of personnel. Nevertheless, a number of individual steps towards increased collaboration in security policy indicated a shift of emphasis.

Since 1990, Switzerland has sent *UN military observers* ("blue berets") to the Middle East, to former Yugoslavia, to Georgia and Tajikistan. From 1993, *civilian police observers* have been deployed in Macedonia, South Africa, Rwanda, Zaire, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. In 1992/93, Switzerland placed a *medical unit* at the UN's disposal for the second time, for the West Sahara referendum under UN auspices. Since 1996, Switzerland has supported the OSCE mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a *logistics unit*. (Because of a referendum on blue helmets in 1994 Switzerland can not arm its peacekeeping forces and therefore found it impossible to participate in the NATO-led operations IFOR/SFOR.) In addition, Switzerland places civilian *experts for the promotion of peace and democracy* - in some cases for long periods - at the disposal of international missions, especially of the UN and the OSCE. Within clearly defined mandates, they support the promotion of the rule of law and human rights in trouble spots, e.g. in OSCE long-term missions, and act as election observers.

In the context of our policy of neutrality, the Federal Council has taken a further significant initiative in the area of the *implementation of sanctions*. Since the Gulf War, Switzerland participated autonomously in UN economic sanctions against several states (in particular Iraq, Libya and Serbia-Montenegro) and supported military measures, based on a UN Security Council mandate, linked to the Bosnia conflict including granting NATO ground and air transit rights. In accordance with the guidelines drawn up in the Report 90, Switzerland has, since 1st July 1998, for the first time applied embargoes which were imposed by the European Union on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

By autonomously implementing measures imposed by the UN Security Council, and increasingly participating in the monitoring of sanctions, Switzerland has de facto adopted the contemporary widely recognised view that non-member states also have to apply UN economic sanctions and that the law of neutrality does not inhibit participation in unanimously observed coercive measures imposed by the UN.

Switzerland's own interests define its sanctions policy, which although there is no legal obligation, is nevertheless in accord with the demands of the UN Charter.

Switzerland's assumption of the *OSCE presidency* in 1996 was a significant step towards collaborative security. It resulted in a marked increase of our commitment to multilateral preventive diplomacy. In effect, Switzerland accepted a role in joint leadership and co-responsibility in the area of security policy, thus strengthening its international reputation and increasing confidence in its capability to constructively contribute to the activities of international organisations. Even before then, a similar development could be seen emerging within the UN, whose Secretary-General twice appointed Swiss nationals as his special representatives, responsible for policy in peacekeeping operations (Western Sahara and Georgia).

Swiss participation in *multilateral arms control and disarmament bodies* has also intensified. After becoming a full member of the Conference on Disarmament in 1996, it chaired the Conference for the first time the following year. Switzerland takes part in all multilateral export control agreements for civilian and military goods, in particular the Wassenaar Agreement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australian Group and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It was heavily committed to the negotiations leading to the Convention on Chemical Weapons and supports its implementation. For example, it provides one of seven designated authorised laboratories in the world and participates in the training of inspectors. Furthermore, Switzerland has proposed Geneva to be the headquarters of a new organisation for the verification of the Biological Weapons Convention. Switzerland has also played a considerable role in the UNSCOM missions to disarm Iraq.

Participation in the NATO-launched *Partnership for Peace* (1996) and membership of the *Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council* (1997) were milestones in the development of Swiss security policy. The aim of the partnership - strengthening the community of democratic values and the capability of the partners for peace support operations - is in accordance with Swiss security policy. Experience over the first two years has proved that Switzerland's offers for training are in great demand - despite the legally imposed present limitation of excluding armed peace support operations as an area for collaboration. The record also shows that Switzerland benefits from offers made by other parties to Partnership for Peace. Furthermore, Switzerland benefits from participation in regular exchanges of opinion on security policy at foreign and defence ministers level and in meetings of the chiefs of defence staff within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

In addition to Partnership for Peace, Switzerland takes part in *regional cooperation initiatives* (e.g., to benefit the Baltic States and the CENCOOP initiative launched by Austria for Central European cooperation for peace support operations, especially in the Balkans).

Two centres founded in Geneva have earned Switzerland international respect. The *Geneva Centre for Security Policy* (1996) trains diplomats, military officers and civil servants in the framework of the Partnership for Peace. The *Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining* (1997) promotes humanitarian demining through an electronic communications network now in world-wide use by the UN and various offers of conferences and training. In order to promote the free flow of information

across borders on matters relevant to security policy, Switzerland established on the Internet the *International Relations and Security Network* (ISN). In the nineties Swiss *peace research* has continued to develop and now has pertinent capacities available in the Centre for Security Policy and Conflict Analysis of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, and the Swiss Peace Foundation.

With market globalisation, the *national economic supply* has expanded measures for international crisis management. There already exists institutionalised collaboration in the area of oil supply in which International Energy Agency serves as forum. Its aim is a common resolution of supply problems, by placing an obligation on its members to keep minimal reserves, and by establishing elaborate crisis management systems, and by restricting consumption. Joint efforts to ensure supply are also made within the civilian element of the Partnership for Peace.

In the last few years, *international police and security cooperation* has been extended as far as possible without joining the Schengen Agreement or the European Union. The review has only just started on whether the current division of labour between the federal and the canton authorities in the area of internal security is still adequate to deal with contemporary and, in particular, future challenges.

## 22 Basic conclusions

Developments since the Report 90 demand a re-examination of the Swiss security concept. The decline of the conventional military threat and its importance in relation to other threats and dangers has made it necessary to modify the *definition of security policy* if it is to be responsive to contemporary conditions and possible future developments. In this report, security policy is defined as that area of state activities which aim to prevent and defend against the threat and use of force of strategic magnitude, i.e. force or violence affecting considerable parts of the nation and its population.

Therefore, the *instruments of security policy* have to be modified. Under the umbrella of universal defence during the Cold War, the range of instruments was geared to comprehensively meet all possible threats and dangers, up to and including a major armed conflict in Europe. The main emphasis was on the armed forces and civil defence. The disappearance of the Cold War threat and the emergence of a wider spectrum of imprecise, mainly non-military dangers and risks call for a modification of the concept of a defence structure focused on the worst case. It has to be replaced by a new, more flexible form of collaboration that will counter shifting challenges more quickly and with less effort. The federal and cantons' instruments for internal security - in particular police assets - have to be reinforced.

A third area requiring review and reform is *international cooperation in security policy*. The present and foreseeable threats and dangers, in addition to existing opportunities both demand and allow a strengthening of this collaboration. Only in this way can Switzerland protect its own security interests and actively influence developments in European security policy. Our contribution to European security is not just an

expression of our solidarity, but a significant element of our security policy serving our own interests.

### 3 Risks and opportunities

#### 31 Range of threats and dangers

The range of threats and dangers is characterised by fast change, complexity and a reduced significance of geographical distance. This has to be taken into account in the analysis of the overall threats and dangers.

#### 311 Decrease of conventional military threat factors

A number of arms control treaties (e.g. the Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT, INF, START, CFE, the Conventions on biological and chemical weapons) has brought with them a measure of control of the arms race. However, a sustained reduction in the numbers of weapons of mass destruction and conventional forces, as well as the probability of their employment, only came about with the collapse of the Soviet Union and with it the end of the Cold War. The warning time for large-scale conventional operations has increased and is now quantifiable in years. Nevertheless, this does not apply to weapons of mass destruction. Particular note has to be taken of the danger that they could fall into the hands of non-government groups and be used in terrorist activities without any advance warning.

Overall Switzerland's military position is considerably more secure as a result of the end of the Cold War, despite the existence of well equipped fully operational forces which can be reinforced through mobilisation and advanced weapons which are continuously being developed and updated. We have to recognise that, in contrast to previous decades, armed conflicts are again a feature in Europe. However, they only have a direct impact, particularly in military terms, on individual regions. Escalation over a large geographical area, directly implicating Switzerland, can never be entirely ruled out. But in contrast to the Cold War era, it is relatively unlikely that regional tensions could escalate into a military conflict between major powers.

#### 312 Increase of internal conflicts

Most contemporary armed conflicts do not take place between states or groups of states, but between national governments and groups within the same states. Ethnic tensions, attempts at secession, economic imbalances, ideological and religious differences rank among the most important motives for such conflicts, but the motives also include the political power struggles by individual groups or attempts by criminal organisations to undermine state authority. These groups, who favour their own interests over the common good, thereby destabilising the state and society as a whole, gain power especially where state structures have collapsed due to permanent crisis and economic poverty.

Should there be inadequate crisis management by the international community, local disputes can escalate into international, large-scale conflicts involving the use of armed force, waves of refugees, internal tensions in third countries and the disruption of international trade. The effects of an internal conflict in another country can not only affect neighbouring states, but also countries geographically removed such as Switzerland. A proportion of asylum seekers admitted into Switzerland continue to participate from here in the conflict in their home country through logistic support and political agitation. Leading exponents of groups resident in Switzerland attempting to overthrow the government of their native country can cause political tension between Switzerland and those states concerned. Furthermore, Swiss institutions, or foreign institutions in Switzerland, can become targets of violent demonstrations or even be taken hostage for the purpose of blackmail. Violent clashes between factions of the foreign population resident Switzerland cannot be excluded. A state governed by the rule of law can itself become the target if it tries to prevent illegal activities and the abuse of asylum for acts of violence.

### 313 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of long-range weapons systems

The threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in the form of a global nuclear war has become more remote. However, the proliferation of nuclear weapons continues, to some extent encouraged by the behaviour of nuclear powers. This increases the risk of regional nuclear conflicts. Outside the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, a number of *chemical weapons programmes* continue. An increasing number of states are acquiring the potential to use *biotechnology* for military purposes. Long-range *ballistic missiles* are becoming more significant as a delivery system for weapons of mass destruction. Collaboration with others, and technology transfer from states with a highly developed defence industry, give more states the potential to establish their own missile industry.

The increasing possibility of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorist groups is particularly threatening.

The spectrum of international responses to the threat of weapons of mass destruction includes deterrence, preventive strikes as well as active and passive defence measures. Autonomously, Switzerland only has the option of passive protective measures. Active protective measures (e.g. the threat of retaliation or a ballistic missile defence), is only possible through international co-operation or assistance, because of Switzerland's technological and financial constraints. This applies in particular to the defence against terrorist threats with weapons of mass destruction.

### 314 Restriction of free economic exchange and economic pressure

Economic measures taken by individual states or groups of states in order to reach economic, political or military objectives have traditionally been amongst the political instruments available. This covers a wide spectrum of measures, including selective import and export bans, discrimination in public projects, or the granting of visa, the boycott of particular parts of the economy, and comprehensive embargoes.

During the nineties, the use of economic pressure has increased. Economic coercive measures have been employed in particular by the UN in order to restore peace and impose international law. However, the European Union and the United States have also repeatedly employed such coercive measures in pursuit of their own economic and political objectives. Particularly in the nineties individual states, US states or cities, have tried to make their specific interests prevail by means of economic pressure.

The impact of such economic pressure can be felt acutely by the affected countries. For long time, Switzerland has been affected mainly by collateral effects of economic pressure exerted by other states on third parties. It was in the context of the debate on Switzerland's position during the Second World War that for the first time economic pressure and extensive political attacks were brought to bear directly against Swiss banks and insurance companies. We cannot exclude that in the future similar pressures may be employed against Switzerland.

### 315 Economic, social and ecological developments

#### *Tendencies, opportunities and risks of the development of the global economy*

The global economic system is marked by fundamental change. Individual products are increasingly replaced by comprehensive solutions that comprise not only goods and services, but also finance, maintenance and distribution. Production factors, capital and technology, and to a lesser extent manpower, have become largely mobile. State borders are no longer decisive for manufacture and trade. It is not only the information and communications-intensive markets that have largely become global, but also the markets for heavy and perishable goods. Collaborative agreements and strategic alliances shape the international transfer between specialised manufacturing production units. Mergers and alliances reinforce global networks within or between various enterprises.

The dynamics of the global economy increase the prosperity of many people, but it also carries risks. This increased mobility of capital has also negative consequences, such as the instability of financial markets, the consequences of which are capable of very rapidly destabilising entire national, or even regional, economies. There is a risk of financial crisis as international banking resources concentrate and become interdependent; all of which is complicated by the problem of monitoring extremely rapidly conducted transactions and transfers of liabilities. Safeguarding the continued functioning of the global economy becomes a harder task for the international community. Multilateral approaches to ensure the stability of the economic framework, and thus regional and global co-operation, are becoming increasingly important.

Many countries have so far not, or not sufficiently, been integrated into the global economy. This includes the group of poor developing countries inhabited by a large proportion of the world's population. Some Eastern European economies have profound structural problems that will take considerable time to be overcome. The resulting economic plight can erupt into open crises, causing armed conflict and involuntary migration. Crisis and conflict-prone situations can also be caused by a too rapid structural adjustment, rushed privatisation or an excessive competition among economic

regions if these result in violations of human rights, the non provision of basic social needs or excessive burdens on natural resources.

#### *Interaction between security and social inequalities*

For many in the last few years there has been a significant improvement in living conditions, but poverty is still very common. Many in developing countries live in absolute poverty, but their number is also increasing alarmingly in Eastern Europe. The affect on women is disproportional. Armed conflict is far more likely in those countries or regions where large parts of the population are marginalised, where there is too little investment in people, where government institutions are weak and where there is advanced degradation of the environment or over-use of natural resources.

#### *Global and local environmental dangers*

To date modest progress has been made through international agreements and cooperation in the fight against global environmental damage. Environmental pollution is increasing worldwide, including in Europe, especially due to increasing traffic and energy consumption. There is no immediate danger of a global environmental catastrophe; but by the time that climatic changes take full affect it will be too late for a counter-strategy. Especially in Eastern Europe local environmental disasters with regional effects are possible at any time. Ecological threats can be categorised into six groups: shortage of water, soil erosion, deforestation, change in the climate, a rising of the sea level and environmental pollution caused by toxic waste and the release of toxic and radioactive substances.

In Switzerland, the consequences for security of the triangle economy-society-environment have so far hardly been examined, mainly due to the complexity of the issue. In its strategy paper "Sustainable Development in Switzerland", the Federal Council has announced an in-depth examination of the interdependence between security policy and sustainable development.

### 316 Technological developments relevant to security policy

Technological developments will continue to exert a considerable influence on the security of Switzerland. This is not only due to developments in defence technology; the spread of new technologies in the economy, society and state can also cause new vulnerabilities - as well as new possibilities for protection. Among the vast number of foreseeable technological developments, *information and communication technologies* give particular rise to security concerns. *Biotechnology* also deserves particular attention.

The development of technology will cause profound *changes within the armed forces* and put those forces at a disadvantage that cannot keep pace with this development. Overall, the time factor will become more important, in relation to geographical space and comparison of forces. In particular, we have to expect that reconnaissance capabilities will be improved, that decision-making processes will be accelerated by more powerful information systems, that laser and micro-wave weapons will emerge,

that “stealth“ characteristics will be more widespread, and that the range and precision of weapons systems will increase. Unmanned means or at least smaller crews will probably increasingly conduct operations. Some trends will probably gather pace, e.g., replacing fighting at close quarters by the use of long-range weapons, or eliminating command capabilities and thereby forcing early decisions.

Progress made in biological and genetic engineering accelerates the development and proliferation of *biological weapons*. In future conflicts between highly developed societies and developing countries, biological weapons could play a decisive role. Producing biological weapons is inexpensive and simple compared with the production of nuclear or chemical weapons. Practically all-necessary technology is of a dual-use nature and is available on the market. Pathogens used in medical research can be easily obtained. Currently, about ten states are suspected of having biological weapons programmes.

### 317      The threat to the information and communications infrastructure

Information and communications technologies are becoming part of practically all aspects of every day life. Consequently, users are increasing reliant on the uninterrupted functioning of information systems and critical parts of the information and communications infrastructure. At the same time, systems are becoming more vulnerable to hostile interference. Since the efficacy of such interference depends neither on the strategic or economic potential of the actors, nor on the size or quality of their armed forces, this opens a vast potential for a multiplication of actors and motives for interference.

Such interference can be initiated by governments as well and non-governmental agencies, with limited means, independent of distance, often at little cost, with a small probability of detection and slight risks. Beyond deliberate human or technical operating errors risks range from the possibility of gathering information, manipulating data, saturating systems, engendering malfunctions, destroying data and software, up to the physical destruction of hardware and infrastructure. Motives include in particular espionage for economic advantage, damage to data or malfunctions for blackmail, and the selective influencing of decisions within the economy, administration and the armed forces.

Preparatory activities for information warfare are not usually apparent. Thus there is no warning time, and protective measures or countermeasures cannot be taken in time. As an individual user of an information system under attack, it is seldom possible to rapidly identify the source, motive, beginning, extent or end of such an attack or judge its success or failure. At present, aggressors have the advantage that the vast majority of enterprises and administrations try to ensure their data security alone (stand-alone solutions), thus making it possible for the same methods of attack to be used repeatedly.

Switzerland has the highest density of information technology and networks in Europe, and its economy is strongly inter-linked with foreign economies. Therefore, the Swiss economy is extremely dependent on the functioning of interference-proof data links. As long as no adequate defence measures exist, these complex networks and the subsequent interconnection between various fields of society constitute great vulnerabilities. The

threats range from massive interference with or disturbances of our economy, to the paralysing of our political and military leadership.

Sensitive areas or those where disproportionate damage can be caused must be given priority. This includes critical data and networks of the national information and communications infrastructure: public administration at all levels; industry, trade, banking, insurance companies, social insurance; supply and distribution systems for electricity, gas, oil, water; traffic regulation and transportation (road, rail, air, water); police, security and rescue services, information and communications services; media; and the military command systems. Electronic attacks on these vital areas of our infrastructure must be considered a threat to our national security.

### 318 Terrorism, violent extremism, espionage, crime and organised crime

The politico-military change in our external environment has also changed the internal security situation. Dangers and risks normally classified as “internal” are increasingly cutting across borders. The evolution of electronic communications (Internet) has contributed to this development. Instabilities and conflicts in regions, sometimes remote, have a direct impact on the internal security of Switzerland, making it increasingly harder to distinguish between internal and external security. The fight against terrorism, violent extremism and organised crime, and the maintenance of internal security in general, call for a strengthening of the police and a fundamental examination of new forms of cooperation between the federal and the canton levels. Beyond that, these issues are increasingly the subject of collaborative efforts within the international community. In addition to the obligation to provide protection within its borders, this results in Switzerland having responsibilities with others beyond its borders and thus the necessity to collaborate. Several international agreements indicate the establishment of a “collective internal security” system, e.g. the Schengen Agreements (security area without border controls) and the Dublin Convention (determining the state responsible for examining asylum applications lodged in an EU member state), or the evolving Europol police organisation also within the EU. Collaboration between European states on security matters carries the risks that those countries that do not participate, including Switzerland, will increasingly become a target

The protection of diplomatic missions and international organisations is significant, particularly as Geneva is host to many international organisations and important venue for international negotiations, in addition to the many diplomatic missions in Bern.

#### *Terrorism and violent extremism*

There has been a moderate decrease in government-sponsored and ideologically motivated forms of *terrorism*. The search has been intensified for political solutions to some long-standing regional conflicts. But many causes of terrorism, extremism and fanaticism, such as social injustice, minority issues, ecological problems and religious tensions, still exist or have even become more acute.

Switzerland is for the time being not a primary target of international terrorism. Nevertheless, it has to prevent being used as a logistics base by terrorist groups and as country of residence or transit for terrorists. Apart from its non-participation in the EU security collaboration one main reason for this risk is Switzerland's geographic position at the centre of the traffic and communications systems, finance and world trade. There will always be the risk of attacks on foreign targets based in Switzerland, such as embassies or international organisations, and activities of groups like doomsday sects.

*Violent extremism* is related to terrorism and sometimes difficult to distinguish from the latter. It is often organised into international networks. Right-wing extremism and xenophobia in Switzerland is evident primarily by the activities of skinheads and related groups. While their attacks have diminished in the last few years, they could increase again with growing numbers of foreign people seeking asylum in Switzerland. Groups that are ready to resort to violence also use globalisation and its concrete manifestations as a motive for violent clashes. Extremism amongst foreigners living in Switzerland also presents a significant danger. There are frequent disputes among mutually hostile foreign groups and acts of violence against third parties (especially against official representatives and institutions of the conflict states).

### *Espionage*

Since the end of the Cold War, worldwide there has been an increasing move away from military to political and economic *espionage* targets. In addition to government intelligence services, private companies have emerged as new actors. Frequently, intelligence specialists formerly employed by governments offer such companies their services. The possibilities offered by electronic networks tend to blur the boundaries between legal information gathering and industrial espionage.

Various forms of political intelligence gathering (on exile groups living in Switzerland by their home country, gaining access to analyses, planning documents and lists of wanted persons) are still of considerable significance in Switzerland. However, currently the main targets for espionage are the economy, science, research and technology.

### *Crime*

The population is directly affected by violence and crime and therefore highly sensitive to issues of public security. Statistically, the number of reported offences in Switzerland over recent years has not showed a uniform trend. The downward trend after a peak in 1991, was reversed 1995 until 1998 when the total numbers of crimes slightly declined. The increase in the number of theft and violent crimes indicates a growing readiness to resort to violence. There has been a disproportionate increase in the number of crimes committed by foreigners. This deterioration in public security is particularly marked in cities and their suburbs and increasingly in areas along the main lines of communication. By international standards, however, overall security in Switzerland can be considered satisfactory, in spite of serious local disturbances, particularly in conurbations, and a subjective feeling of vulnerability within the population. Constant

attention has to be paid by the Federation and cantons to maintain this generally satisfactory situation and efforts made to improve crime fighting capabilities.

### *Organised crime*

Organised crime has assumed global dimensions and could develop into one of the most serious threats to society, the state and the economy. Its infiltration into standard commerce through money laundering, corruption and acquisition of companies and property threatens economic and social stability, particularly in the young democracies of Eastern Europe. Even state institutions, especially those determining economic policy, or the police and judicial system are targets for infiltration by organised crime. Some of these groups are interconnected and their main activities include drug trafficking, slave trade, illegal trade in weapons, corruption, blackmail, as well as the accompanying laundering of money. The possibility of links between organised crime and terrorist groups is also a ground for concern. Highly developed economies strongly involved in international trade provide numerous possibilities to organised crime for infiltration and the laundering of their profits. In this regard Switzerland is in the category of the threatened states. The federal system, the shortage of police resources and the non-membership of important European institutions make it more difficult to counter this risk.

### 319 Demographic developments, migrations

Although globally fertility rates have decreased significantly and more than was forecasted, the world's population continues to grow annually by approximately 100 million. Current forecasts estimate that the earth's population will reach 8 billion in 2025, 80% of whom will live in developing countries. In the southern and eastern Mediterranean littoral states, there is already insufficient employment for the rapidly growing population, and this problem will increase. The migration caused by political, economic and social instability in Eastern Europe, in the Balkan states, and in various parts of the former Soviet Union could develop into a mass exodus in case of civil war, violations of human rights, economic emergencies and the degradation of the environment.

Switzerland is a target for migrants from South East Europe, North Africa and South Asia. The rapidly growing number of asylum seekers in Switzerland causes a great strain on our structures and resources to handle refugees and contributes to xenophobic and racist tendencies.

The number of Swiss citizens residing in Switzerland has remained constant for some time and there is no sign of change. Population growth will most likely occur only in the foreign population residing in Switzerland, even with a restrictive immigration policy. Distribution of this foreign population across Switzerland is very uneven. The task of integrating this group of the population is immutable and the dimensions of the challenge will probably increase. This calls for concrete measures to prevent aggravation of potential dangers, e.g. the emergence of "ghettos".

## 3110 Natural and man-made disasters

Among the risks found in nature are earthquakes, floods, avalanches, storms, cold spells and continuing drought. In addition, radioactive contamination caused by accidents, floods resulting from breaches in dams, and epidemics of human or animal diseases putting long-term strains on public health systems, have to be taken into account.

Natural and man-made disasters are relevant to security policy if they result in a situation that overwhelms the structures and resources established for normal situations - e.g., the police, fire brigades, safety authorities of technical facilities and plants, and the public health system. Such events are characterised by vast destruction and a complete breakdown of the normal activity. It can take weeks, months or even years before the social, economic and technical environment is re-established and the affected community has recovered.

In highly developed areas there is a greater concentration of resources of all kinds. The damage caused by a disaster in such an area is therefore proportionally greater than would formerly have been the case. Since modern society depends greatly on networks (energy, telecommunications, logistics), the collateral affects of such damage are not limited to the specific geographical area where the disaster occurred. Disasters that have the potential to put at risk the functioning of larger communities are rare or even very rare. Nevertheless, the possibility of such events has to be taken into account when preparing disaster relief plans and establishing the resources to cope with them.

## 32 International security structures

### 321 The United Nations

Among the motives to establish the United Nations were to safeguard world peace, to guarantee international security by collective measures, and to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts between states. The UN Charter stipulates that the UN is the only legitimate global agency through which the international community can execute a system of collective security. In principle, it is only UN Security Council decisions or resolutions, or decisions taken by regional security organisations (such as the OSCE) but approved by the Security Council, that justify the use of military force beyond self-defence. Between 1989 and 1996 there has been a significant strengthening in the central role of the Security Council and the UN as a whole.

#### **Development of measures taken by the UN under chapter 7 of the Charter**

---


<i>Type of Measures</i>	<i>1945-1988</i>	<i>1989-1996</i>
military peacekeeping actions (blue helmets operations with the consent of the parties to the conflict and restriction of the use of weapons to self-defence)	13	29
authorisation for the general use of military force	1	8
economic sanctions	2	10

---

For some years, the Security Council's conceives its mission to maintain peace as a collective package of measures (i.e., through the entire spectrum of measures in favour of peace, measures that merge into and complement one another). Today this "continuum" ranges from diplomatic prevention and mediation to the rehabilitation of civil society after conflicts, support for democratisation and long-term, sustained promotion and maintenance of peace. "Agenda for peace", published 1992 defines this concept.

International interdependence makes multilateral collaboration an imperative. Therefore, the fundamental work conducted within the UN on security and humanitarian issues, the environment, development and human rights is becoming even more important. It is worth highlighting those topics directly relevant to security policy, such as terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking, which are the subject of UN efforts to establish global conventions, empower mechanisms to implement them, and make arrangements for the exchange of information. At the same time the creation of additional UN structures whose objective is to provide early detection and mount relief operations in the case of mass migration or disasters should not be ignored. The UN has met these additional challenges by initiating a process of comprehensive reforms intended to improve its capabilities.

#### **Membership of European and North-American states in international organisations**



• associated member of WEU    + WEU observer    \* associated partner of WEU

### 322 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the most comprehensive regional organisation for common security and political consultations. It unites North America, Europe and the Central Asian former Soviet Republics in an area of cooperative security. Cooperation within the OSCE, and OSCE activities, are based on shared values, including human rights and basic liberties, democracy and the rule of law. The organisation’s decisions are not binding under international law, but they constitute political constraints and establish standards of behaviour.

OSCE core functions include preventive diplomacy, the prevention of conflicts, crisis management and the strengthening of democratic societies after conflicts. The OSCE has a comprehensive concept of security. Security is considered the result of inter-linked political military, economic and ecological factors. The security of all partners shall be strengthened through cooperation.

OSCE’s civil activities focus on the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and the monitoring of elections. The OSCE has considerably enhanced its operational capabilities. It can intervene in areas of crisis or tension with short-term and long-term missions and thereby contribute to the management of crises or post-conflict normalisation.

Confidence- and security-building measures are cornerstones of the OSCE's military role. They serve to promote openness, transparency and certitude regarding armed forces, to reduce tension, and to strengthen mutual trust by the exchange of information, mechanisms for crisis management and various forms of verification.

Switzerland supports in particular an increase in compliance with OSCE commitments and a further strengthening of the organisation in order to improve cooperation and enable it to cope more successfully with new risks and challenges, in particular minority issues.

### 323 European Union and Western European Union

#### *Common Foreign and Security Policy and Western European Union*

The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) laid the foundations for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the European Union. In the longer term, a common EU defence policy is also envisaged; it could include operational defence structures. This process could result in the integration of the Western European Union (WEU) into the European Union or its replacement by a new structure.

Through CFSP, the European Union intends to complement the role and importance it has achieved in economic matters with a similar importance in foreign policy. *Decisions* are taken in the framework of cooperation between governments with equal rights. The supreme decision making body is the European Council. All decisions on principles or with military or defence implications have to be adopted *by consensus*. The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed 2 October 1997, allows individual states to abstain and therefore strengthens the EU's freedom to act in foreign and security policy since in principle an abstention no longer blocks a decision. A member state abstaining from voting and formally explaining the reasons is not obliged to comply with the decision in question ("constructive abstention"). This mechanism makes it easier to participate in the CFSP, particularly for neutral states. Moreover, the veto power is maintained if one or several member states claim that important national interests are involved.

To date foreign and security policy were national responsibilities of the member states and the transition to a common policy is an extended process. However, the EU can expect its dynamic development to gradually lead to the objective of common policies over the coming years. The political-military challenges in Europe (e.g. Bosnia, Kosovo) are increasing the demands of member states - especially the larger ones - to establish an operational defence structure with the authority and competency for operational crisis management. At the same time, neutral members of the EU and Denmark insist on the preservation of their joint decision-making rights within the CFSP. The debate between these two diverging options will shape the development of the CFSP.

The *WEU* is today both the agency through which the European Union manages its defence affairs and the European pillar of NATO. However, it does not have its own operational structures. Within the framework of Combined Joint Task Forces, and with the consent of NATO, it can employ NATO resources for WEU operations. Ten EU member states also members of NATO are full members of the WEU (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United

Kingdom). Most other European members of NATO (Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and Turkey) are associated members of WEU. Candidates for EU membership Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia are associated partners. Neutral EU states and those that are members both of NATO and the EU but do not want to be full members of the WEU (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) have observer status.

#### *Cooperation in the sphere of internal security*

Based on an exchange of information and experience in countering terrorism and drug-trafficking, the collaboration between EU member states in judicial and home affairs matters has gradually intensified. Thus states that are party to the *Schengen system*, which formerly was not integral to the EU, have realised the free movement of persons without border controls. However, at the same time they agreed to implement protective internal security measures to compensate for the elimination of border identity checks. All EU member states, with the exceptions of Great Britain and Ireland, plus the EFTA and EEA states Norway and Iceland, are part of the Schengen system. Currently, the Schengen system is only partially applied to Greece.

Core elements of the Schengen system are common principles for immigration policy and regulations for residence of foreigners of third countries, a uniform application of a common visa policy, standardised identity checks at the European Union's external borders, the allocation of responsibility for the processing of asylum applications, standard procedures for regulating police and judicial collaboration, and the establishment of the Schengen Information System. The latter guarantees that all Schengen states have access to data relevant for granting immigration or resident permits.

The most important objective of the *Treaty of Amsterdam* is the establishment of an area in which persons, goods and services enjoy free movement and citizens benefit from a high degree of security. The entire *acquis* of Schengen is incorporated into the framework of the EU. This means that since 1 May 1999, when the Treaty of Amsterdam became effective, the collaboration between the thirteen Schengen Agreement signatory states takes place within the institutional and legal framework of the EU.

#### 324 NATO, Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

NATO is the most effective organisation for collective defence. It has survived during half a century all politico-military vicissitudes, ranging from situations of severe political confrontation to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, its adversaries during the Cold War. Since 1990 the Alliance has taken the necessary steps to adapt to changing threats and dangers. This is reflected in the evolution of its missions. It maintains its traditional core mission (paragraph 5 of the Treaty of Washington) to defend its member states against military aggression, although the probability of such aggression has considerably declined. For several years, NATO has assumed the additional mission of keeping or enforcing peace by military means outside

the territory of its member states. Up to the spring of 1999 (Kosovo conflict) such missions were always conducted under a mandate by the UN Security Council. (However, NATO has also announced its readiness to undertake missions under an OSCE mandate). Currently within the international community there is a vigorous debate whether sufficient international legitimacy can also exist in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate (e.g., in cases of genocide).

The intention of numerous Central and Eastern Europe states to join NATO indicates that the alliance is expected to continue to play a significant role. It is in the interest of European stability and peace that the enlargement of NATO, as that of the EU, does not result in new lines of division on a continent that eliminated the Iron Curtain only a decade ago. The conclusion of a basic act on mutual relations, co-operation and security between NATO and the Russian Federation, and the signing of a partnership charter between NATO and Ukraine are particularly welcome, although these relationships will continue to face political challenges.

Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) – tailor-made multinational task forces composed of units from different branches of the armed forces - are important pillars of the new NATO command structure. Their employment can be effective though a very wide spectrum of operations. CJTF also allows states not members of NATO, but within Partnership for Peace; to take part in NATO-led peace operations.

NATO is increasingly active in a variety of civilian issues. It is the most important politico-military organisation that guarantees USA and Canadian political and military commitment to European security. The North Atlantic Assembly also makes a valuable contribution to the same effect.

NATO's permanent defence readiness state during the Cold War also benefited Switzerland. Geographic realities, and the fact that our values are essentially the same as those of most alliance members have led – without active participation on our part - to NATO strengthening the security of Switzerland. Even in the absence of a concrete military threat, NATO's commitment to strengthening peace contributes to overall European security.

With the *Partnership for Peace* (PfP), launched in 1994, and with the *Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council* (EAPC) founded in 1997, NATO created structures and forums to increase political and military cooperation in the whole of Europe and to enhance stability.

Partnership for Peace is designed to enhance the capacity of partners' armed forces to participate in humanitarian, peace support or disaster relief operations – without affecting the sovereign right of individual state to decide on a case by case basis on their commitment to each operation. Thus PfP is making a considerable contribution to enable NATO non-member states to participate in operations such as IFOR/SFOR. Furthermore, PfP aims to increase transparency of defence budgets and to promote democratic control of armed forces. Finally, states participating in PfP reaffirm their commitment to core values such as democracy, respect for human rights and compliance with the principles of international law.

The Partnership's flexibility – particularly the fact that every participating state retains its full liberty to decide on the participation in each individual activity – contributes to the success of this initiative. Equally important is the fact that participation in PfP is not

a first step toward NATO membership. The increase of the PfP activities listed in the annual Partnership Work Programme (now more than 2000 per year), and the large number of states engaged in the Planning and Review Process (PARP) are proof that member states make best use of Partnership for Peace.

The high-level meetings within the EAPC framework – meetings twice a year of both foreign and defence ministers and of the chiefs of defence staff, monthly meetings at ambassadorial level – are a useful platform to voice Switzerland's interests in security policy.

### 325 The Council of Europe

Since its establishment in 1949, the Council of Europe embodies fundamental European values such as a pluralistic and parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility and universality of human rights, the rule of law in addition to respect for a multi-cultural heritage. Its aim is to establish closer links between members on the foundation of justice and international cooperation.

The transition in Central and Eastern Europe has confronted the Council of Europe with substantial challenges and strengthened its political and operational roles. In 1989, it had 23 members - among them Switzerland - today, there are 40. By admitting Central and Eastern European countries, the Council of Europe has made a considerable contribution to the European security architecture. Its pragmatic programmes integrate the new members into the community of democratic values and prepare those remaining who have yet to join for membership. Thus, the Council of Europe lays the foundations for a Europe of freedom and diversity through the creation of a "European legal space" and the comprehensive nature of its activities.

The Council of Europe's contribution to European security cooperation lies in the promotion of democracy through the application of its own normative mechanisms, through its controls making sure that member states comply with their obligations, and through its intergovernmental cooperative programmes. The Swiss Federal Council's policy towards the Council of Europe focuses on the consistent application of the existing standards of human rights. Of decisive importance to maintain these are the European Court of Human Rights, the political mechanisms through which the Parliamentary Assembly exercises control, the European Congress of Municipalities and Regions, and the Ministerial Committee.

### 326 The position of the other neutral states in the European security structure

Other European neutral states – Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden - have recently published documents detailing the basic concepts behind their security policies, that indicate the nature and the extent of the adjustment made necessary by changes in the strategic environment since the end of the Cold War. The rationale for these adjustments are developments that for the most part concern also Switzerland. They are therefore of interest to our own assessment of the current situation.

These four states have much in common: their active role in the OSCE, their EU membership, their participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and their observer status in the Western European Union. Furthermore, they have all from an early stage participated in UN military peace-keeping missions without compromising their neutrality. This longstanding cooperative commitment for peace has facilitated their adjustment to the new strategic environment.

Austria, Finland and Sweden also decided to join Partnership for Peace at an early stage and have assumed a very active role in it. Finland and Sweden are coordinating their policies with the intention of achieving a full say in the planning and implementation of NATO-led peace missions to which they make military contributions and with the intention of co-shaping and promoting CFSP in “Petersberg Missions” (“humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”) that are commensurate with the law of neutrality. In contrast to these two states, the government of which are so far not considering membership, the Austrian government coalition is debating the possibility of joining NATO.

It is also worth noting that Finland and Sweden have, together with a number of NATO members, launched and shaped the initiative for regional military cooperation with the Baltic states, and that Austria has launched an initiative for Central European cooperation in peace-keeping. Both initiatives are based on the “à-la-carte” principle that already exists in Partnership for Peace, thus enabling Switzerland to take part.

Finland, Austria and Sweden demonstrate that a collaborative commitment to peace is compatible with neutrality and beneficial to their security.

### 327 Disarmament agreements and international control measures

The most important post-war arms control and disarmament agreements Switzerland adheres to concern: nuclear weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed in 1968, and in force since 1970; the Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Tests, signed in 1996); biological and toxic weapons (Convention on Biological Weapons signed in 1972 and in force since 1975) and chemical weapons (Convention on Chemical Weapons signed in 1993 and in force since 1997).

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an important role in the implementation of the *non-proliferation treaty*. Non-nuclear powers have to conclude an agreement with the IAEA on the control of source material and special fissile material. These controls are to ensure that a diversion of material to the production of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices would be quickly discovered. After the uncovering of the Iraqi nuclear programme, member states decided to strengthen the IAEA verification regime.

The *Convention on Biological Weapons* of 1972 for the first time prohibited a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. An additional protocol on verification measures, structured in a similar way to the Convention on Chemical Weapons, shall complement the convention by 2001.

The *Convention on Chemical Weapons*, signed in 1993, has been in force since April 1997. This prohibition of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction is for the first time supported by verification measures. The International Organisation for the

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague is entrusted with inspections and verification.

Three international bodies overseeing control measures on weapons of mass destruction complement these disarmament measures: *the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australian Group* (for biological and chemical weapons) and the *Missile Technology Control Regime*. These bodies share responsibility for determining control measures on the export of specific commodities. These measures are not legally binding, but politically commit the participants. The Wassenaar Agreement supplements these three export control regimes. By increasing transparency and harmonisation of export regulations, states posing a serious threat to regional and supra-regional security due to their arms build-up should be prevented from acquiring conventional weapons, other military goods and dual-use goods for the production of conventional weapons. Switzerland participates in all four export control regimes.

Arms control and disarmament agreements applicable to a restricted number of states, but not to Switzerland, also contribute to the security of our region. Among these are primarily agreements between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on strategic weapons, and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe both of which are of the utmost importance to maintain global and continental stability.

**Disarmament and arms control agreements Switzerland is party of (selection)**

<b>Agreement</b>	<b>Opening for signature</b>	<b>Ratification by Switzerland</b>
Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (partial test ban treaty)	1963	1963
Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies (outer space treaty)	1967	1969
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons	1968	1977
Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof (seabed treaty)	1971	1973
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction (biological and toxin weapons convention)	1972	1973
Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques (Enmod convention)	1977	1988
Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (inhumane weapons convention)	1981	1982
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction (chemical weapons convention)	1993	1994
Comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty	1996	pending
Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction (Ottawa convention)	1997	1998

### 328 Further structures relevant to security policy

Political, social and economic stability are closely interconnected. Democracy is at risk if the economic and social environment is precarious. In turn the development of a market economy is also at risk in states without adequate provisions and institutions to maintain the rule of law. Various international organisations, particularly those of the UN and those resulting from Bretton Woods, make important contributions to the general prevention of conflict.

For instance, the UN Development Programme supports a programme in Eastern Europe to strengthen democracy, good government and the citizens' involvement in public affairs. Environmental issues are tackled by the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE/UN). Its "Environment for Europe" programme is intended to overcome the appalling environmental legacies of former regimes. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) contributes significantly to the restructuring of the relationship between employers and employees, and the concepts of vocational training in the transition from a planned to a social market economy. The World Health Organisation (WHO) is particularly active in public health, and thus in the struggle against declining life expectancy and quality of life.

Major international financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank Group and the regional development banks such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), contribute greatly to economic stabilisation, the development and the reconstruction of countries and regions.

### 33 Risks and opportunities for the security of Switzerland

There is now a wide and complex range of threats and dangers. In the past, the threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty was pre-eminent; today it is primarily the functioning of society and the state as the institution providing protection that is threatened. These risks can no longer be met autonomously. However, currently multiple and to some extent very flexible multilateral security structures enable Switzerland to safeguard its interests more efficiently than it could do so by relying on autonomous measures.

Switzerland's increasing collaboration with European and global security structures creates new opportunities to safeguard our interests. The slight loss of freedom of action due to a membership is more than compensated for by the security benefit. Even for those organisations that Switzerland does not belong to in certain respects it adheres to their principles and applies their measures. Moreover, Switzerland contributes financially to them. However, we cannot fully participate in policy making. Full membership and commitments would obviate Switzerland's increasing dilemma of being excluded from multilateral decisions while at the same time having to bear their consequences. It is less and less satisfactory to autonomously implement measures that have been decided upon and adopted by other states. Cooperation in security policy with friendly states also facilitates getting closer to the European Union without prejudicing the issue of EU membership.

The concrete benefits which Switzerland derives from the international community's politico-military activities designed to enhance global and European stability would suggest Switzerland making a greater contribution, commensurate with our ability to do so. Recently it has become obvious that a country's overall international solidarity record is taken into account by its partners; a country will not be exempted from responsibility in other areas just because of its good record in one specific area (e.g. Switzerland's humanitarian record). The only convincing argument for an exception to be made is when the entire "solidarity balance sheet" is satisfactory. Outstanding achievements in a specific area are only then favourably taken into account.

Concerning security policy, we are in distinctive circumstances. The conventional military threat has decreased. At the same time other, partly non-military, threats and dangers have increased. To counter these requires that we add our contribution to those of the international community. At the very time that international cooperation in security policy has become more necessary than ever, political developments have opened numerous opportunities for Switzerland to realise such cooperation. Strategic necessity and strategic opportunity complement one another perfectly.

#### 4 Interests and objectives

Article 2 of the Federal Constitution states that *the Swiss Confederation shall protect the liberty and the rights of the people, and shall ensure the independence and security of the country*. It shall promote the common welfare, the sustainable development, the inner cohesion, and the cultural diversity of the country. To the extent possible, it shall ensure equal opportunities for all citizens. *It shall strive to secure the long-term preservation of natural resources, and to promote a just and peaceful international order*.

National interests are decisive in shaping our security policy. These include the maintenance of democratic values and peace in Europe, stability throughout the whole strategic geographically relevant region, the minimum use of force within or outside our borders, and secure resources for our population through the continued functioning of vitally important systems in Switzerland, in Europe and globally.

From the Constitution and these interests, we derive the following objectives of security policy:

- *Our objective is self-determination of our own affairs in liberty, without the threat or use of direct or indirect force.*

In normal situations, maximum independence and freedom of action should be ensured by political means. This is entirely compatible with entering into international commitments if, after careful consideration and by democratic procedure, we are convinced that these commitments serve the interests of the population and the state. However, we exclude relinquishing the right to decide on our own affairs under pressure or force. If direct or indirect force is threatened or used against Switzerland or its democratic institutions, we shall defend with all adequate means at our disposal the integrity of our territory as well as the further national interests.

- *Our objective is to preserve and protect our population and its essential resources from existential dangers.*

We have to protect the population from adversity on a large scale, e.g. resulting from natural and man-made disasters, and should it happen provide relief. In addition, we have to protect the long-term supply of resources and systems that sustains the population. This includes the provision of food, energy and raw materials, an economy that maintains the welfare of the entire population, unimpeded access to international markets as well as integral national and international infrastructures and a healthy environment. The preservation and protection of these resources are largely dealt with by other policies (e.g., economic, social, environmental, transport, energy and communications policy) and not by security policy.

- *Our objective is to contribute to stability and peace beyond our borders and to the building of an international community of democratic values in order to reduce the risk that Switzerland and its population could be affected by the consequences of instability and war abroad, and in order to demonstrate our international solidarity.*

Stability and peace are best guaranteed if the values that Switzerland supports are shared and put into practice by the international community and the institutions that reflect these values play an important role. They include democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and the rights of minorities, in addition to a just economic order conducive to general prosperity. It is therefore imperative for us to vigorously promote these values, structures and institutions and - in cases of threats menacing stability and peace - to support attempts to arrive at permanent resolutions to conflicts. The criteria that define our commitment are legitimate self-interest and international solidarity.

## 5 Strategy

### 51 Core strategy and strategic guidelines

Strategy in Swiss security policy covers the basic thinking and behaviour adopted towards issues of security policy. This embraces the exploitation of our whole potential to prevent the employment of force as well as the use of all civilian and military resources to counter the threat or use of force which may affect our state, population and essential resources to a significant (strategic) extent. In this context, we do not envisage just the worst case of direct attack, but make use of all opportunities to contribute towards the prevention and management of crises within our strategic environment and the defence of our values and interests.

An analysis of this environment, and of the range of current and foreseeable dangers and risks, shows that democratic states have both broadened and deepened their effective security efforts and their collaboration within international organisations to strengthen peace and stabilise regions of tensions. The persistent readiness to resort to warlike or criminal violence, even in Europe, within a single state, as well as internationally, causes concern. Moreover, we have to acknowledge an increase in

violence, new in terms of magnitude and actors, that is impossible to deter and can seriously endanger highly developed Western societies such as Switzerland. Against the background of this diverse threat spectrum, an entirely national counter-strategy is insufficient, including “niche” strategies of small states.

Therefore, our strategy focuses on increasing our security by contributing our specific qualities and capabilities towards effective initiatives taken by the democratic community of states to strengthen security, manage crises, and stabilise regions. Investment in making our region more secure is worthwhile even if simple solutions for the prevailing problems at a given time are elusive. By increasing our international commitments, we improve the conditions for the pursuit of our general interests. At the same time, we reduce our vulnerability to blackmail. We also fulfil the expectations of our partners and display our solidarity with them that corresponds to our traditions.

A similar approach applies to coping with the threat to use, or the actual use of force affecting us within our borders. Here, as elsewhere, an international system of countermeasures is essential. It is of equal importance that Switzerland has its own security structure commensurate with the new situation; a structure that enables the timely preparation, deployment and integration of civilian and military resources to meet the intensity and nature of developing threats. This is also a contribution to our neighbours’ legitimate security interests in Swiss stability.

Switzerland therefore pursues its security policy objectives by a *strategy of national and international security cooperation*. On the one hand this cooperation is based on having the political will and capability to face up to threats that endanger our country and its population by the efficient and flexible use of the entire spectrum of our own appropriate military and civilian means. On the other hand, this strategy is aimed at intensifying security cooperation with friendly states and international organisations where our own assets are insufficient because of the nature of the threat, geography or resources required.

- *Cooperation at home* consists of assigning to the various domains of security policy at federal, canton and commune levels specific missions and corresponding resources and where it is required coordinated operations.
- *International cooperation* consists of preferably preventive, but if necessary reactive involvement beyond our borders. In coordinated multinational cooperation we will contribute to crisis management, the stabilisation of regions of tension and a general mutual reinforcement of security measures.

Both elements of this cooperation; that between our own instruments of security policy and that with foreign partners, impose the need to maintain our own instruments at the appropriate level. Maintaining our own capacity is not in contradiction with international cooperation; on the contrary, it is a prerequisite for effective collaboration and for a confident assertion of our own interests.

This strategy requires a partial revision of the previous priorities set for our security arrangements, and consequently the allocation of resources, in favour of preventive measures, a geographic extension of the area of security interests, and defence against violence below the threshold of war. That the situation will deteriorate such that a military threat will again have to be faced can never be fully excluded. It is therefore

necessary to ensure a continuous analysis of the situation and maintain important core functions of the armed forces and civil protection, various planning options and the capability to expand.

## 511 Strategic missions


Three strategic missions are necessary to our national security. Compared to the Report 90, there is a change of relative emphasis attributed to each of them. They are listed below in order of their probability of having to be executed.

### *Strengthening of peace and crisis management*

*In adequately committing its instruments of security policy, Switzerland seizes the opportunities to strengthen peace in its strategic environment and to contribute to the management of international crises, whenever possible by peaceful means, as well as to the reconstruction of war-torn regions.*

Diagram of our strategy of security policy

# Security through Cooperation



The strengthening of peace and crisis management take place in a framework set by diplomacy and based on legal treaties and politically binding agreements. However, increasingly other instruments are being employed, e.g. personnel or material assets of foreign policy and armed forces, civilian police, humanitarian operations, assistance for reconstruction and various expertise and material relating to security policy or military technology. For the long-term strengthening of peace and prevention of conflict, the instruments of development assistance oriented to eliminate the causes of conflict play an important role.

As a rule, Switzerland collaborates with other states, groups of states and organisations to accomplish this strategic mission. It makes good use of global and regional multilateral structures, both as member of such groups or organisations or by ad-hoc cooperation. Switzerland also launches its own initiatives within this framework. In addition, Switzerland is open to beneficial bilateral contributions. In these activities, Switzerland exploits its experience of providing “good offices”.

The criteria used to determine Swiss commitments include: national interests, its status in international law, its effect on promoting democracy, human rights and humanitarian values, its preventive rather than reactive nature and sustained effect, the use of Switzerland’s particular skills and equipment, and where projects fit into the priorities unavoidably set on the use of limited resources. Obviously, such commitments must also coincide with a genuine demand from the international community.

#### *Prevention and management of existential dangers*

*The instruments of security policy contribute to the prevention and management of existential dangers, particularly in cases of natural and man-made disasters and disturbances of internal order of strategic magnitude.*

Potential risks to our interests and objectives must be identified at an early stage, and their possible consequences for our population and its essential resources have to be analysed, so that the necessary measures can be taken in time using a combination of all assets at our disposal.

This assessment prompts an increase in the use of security policy instruments to prevent and manage existential dangers. They shall not only be used for protecting vital and risk-prone facilities, but also for coping with natural and man-made disasters. Furthermore, we have to counter large-scale organised crime, sabotage, terrorism and violent internal security disturbances of strategic magnitude, and we have to ensure that strategically important information networks do not fail or that there is sufficient redundancy. We have to find international solutions to threats traversing state borders. In the future, as in the past, assistance by the armed forces in this area will be of a subsidiary nature, i.e. it will be rendered at the request and under operational control of civilian authorities.

## *Defence*

*Switzerland maintains its capability to protect and safeguard its sovereignty, its territory, its airspace, and its population against the threat and use of force of strategic magnitude.*

The manner in which this task is fulfilled has to take into account the development of multi-faceted threats and dangers and will therefore not focus exclusively on military threats. Despite today's significant reduction of the military threat, we cannot exclude relapses into major politico-military confrontations in the long term. We must therefore maintain a credible military capability for protection and defence, even though a gradual shift from full readiness to smaller armed forces with varying degrees of readiness is justified on the grounds of security policy and advisable for demographic, economic and financial reasons. The temporal parameters of this shift – concerning both reaction time and the time necessary to expand our military assets in case of need – have to be based on realistic assumptions of advance warning and take into account the time needed for political decision-making.

It is primarily the armed forces and civil protection that maintain a credible protection and defence capability. By having an operational capability at a high-readiness state and reserve elements, they both provide protection and defence and are also relevant to international peace support operations. Thus, in normal times they strengthen security and stability within Switzerland. In periods of tension or when Switzerland is directly threatened they can be employed in centrally-led operations or in subsidiary protective measures. They contribute not just to the security of our country but also benefit neighbours, e.g. by ensuring that the latter have continued access to the strategically relevant Swiss infrastructure (internationally important lines of communication, transportation, telecommunications, energy networks, etc.).

Switzerland's neutral status becomes invalid in the case of a direct military attack. In such a situation, Switzerland would defend itself on its own or together with allies, depending on the level of aggression. Early preparations for a possible cooperation with foreign armed forces for such a contingency are entirely possible as long as we avoid irreversible commitments and do not become dependent on them for our defence. The development of a joint defence capability is time-consuming, and the speed of modern warfare, particularly in the air, makes it impossible to improvise allied cooperation only when the emergency has become a reality.

## 512 Maintenance of neutrality while making full use of the freedom of action provided by the law of neutrality

Neutrality carries a number of legal obligations. They are defined by the Hague Accords of 1907 on the Rights and Duties of Neutral States in land and naval warfare and the precedents set in international law. However, the law of neutrality only applies in *limited* legal scenarios. It governs essentially the behaviour of neutral states in *armed conflicts between states*. A neutral state is not allowed to participate in such international armed conflicts or to provide military support to one of the parties. The obligations of a neutral state *in peace* derive exclusively from precedent in international law. Originally, the most significant restriction on a permanently neutral state was the

obligation to renounce war as a means to pursue its political objectives. However, since the foundation of the United Nations, this prohibition on the use of force now applies to all states. Today, the legal obligation of permanently neutral countries is limited to not entering in peace time into any irreversible commitments that would make it impossible to honour its obligations of neutrality in case of conflict. This implies in particular the proscription to the establishment of foreign military bases on neutral territory and the prohibition of a neutral state joining a military alliance. It is entirely up to each individual permanently neutral state which policies it adopts to maintain the credibility of its neutrality.

The context in which Switzerland maintains its neutrality has greatly changed. The frequency of traditional inter-state military conflicts, which underlie the concept of neutrality, is declining to the extent that a system of collective security is effective in accordance with the UN Charter. In addition, most of the violent conflicts directly or indirectly affecting the security of Switzerland no longer take place *between* states, but *within* states. The law of neutrality is not tailored to such conflicts. The *perception* by the Swiss population over a very long period that neutrality conveyed with it *security* has thus become *deceptive*. Neutrality alone is not sufficient to guarantee the security of Switzerland, especially if it is equated to an abstention from international cooperation in security policy. Furthermore, it does not provide any guidance for our policy concerning conflicts where the law of neutrality is not applicable.

It is important that neutrality does not in future become an *obstacle* to our security. Even if we *comply unreservedly with the law of neutrality*, there remains considerable *room for manoeuvre*. This shall be used more resolutely than in the past to implement a foreign and security policy in the spirit of participation. The Report on Neutrality of 29 November 1993, contained in the Report of the Federal Council on Swiss Foreign Policy in the Nineties, sets the parameters: permanent neutrality is not an obstacle to active participation, in the spirit of solidarity, in measures against common threats or in the establishment of a stable international security system. As a small state, Switzerland has an overriding interest in a functioning system of collective security. However, a renunciation of its neutrality in spite of the existing uncertainties, or a change in the practice of neutrality causing major powers to consider Switzerland no longer neutral, would be dangerous in the absence of alternatives (EU, NATO) that could be realised rapidly.

Both, UN membership and institutionalised cooperation with regional security organisations and structures, such as the OSCE and Partnership for Peace, are compatible with Swiss neutrality. Neutrality is no obstacle to Swiss troops participating in international peace operations abroad or to collaboration with friendly states in the areas of military training or defence research and development. In these areas, the law of neutrality also permits contractual agreements with NATO or the WEU outside a membership, e.g. for the implementation of mandates issued by the UN Security Council.

Even with the resolute use of the room of manoeuvre provided by the law of neutrality, we cannot ignore that at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century there are still limits to the foreign policy of a permanently neutral state. The events of the Kosovo conflict 1999, when the NATO states decided on military intervention to contain and end the most severe violations of international law and human rights, are a case in point. Switzerland is

sometimes obliged by the law of neutrality to refuse support for measures taken by other states, even if these measures are compatible with the objectives of Swiss foreign and security policy. To this extent, the status of *permanent* neutrality does not allow a *comprehensive* consideration of all interests at stake where the law of neutrality is applicable.

Non-compliance with the law of neutrality by Switzerland in respect of a specific conflict would result in a break with permanent neutrality. However, this would not exclude maintaining the status of a common neutral state (*ad hoc* neutrality) similar to that of Sweden and Ireland. Even if we make maximum use of the room for manoeuvre provided by the law of neutrality, we must also in the future critically question whether maintaining permanent neutrality corresponds to an optimum safeguarding of Swiss foreign and security policy interests in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Neutrality precludes joining a military alliance. However, a decision which is valid in perpetuity cannot be made on whether our security is better protected by neutrality or by a membership in a defence alliance - especially in view of our own technological and financial limits. This issue has to be kept under review taking into account current and foreseeable threats and dangers. Maintaining the option of membership in an alliance is part of preserving our freedom of action.

## 52 Main components of the strategy

### 521 Comprehensive and flexible security cooperation at home

A comprehensive and flexible security cooperation between our own instruments of security policy will replace the organisation of universal defence. This cooperation has to be *comprehensive* because it requires the employment of and cooperation between various organs, domains and elements of several federal departments and at varying levels (federal, canton, communal, private organisations) for the prevention of, and defence against, force of strategic magnitude, including coping with natural or man-made disasters and other emergencies. It must be *flexible* because only the most appropriate combination of measures and assets should be employed, based on the real needs.

In principle all agencies make the necessary preparations in their respective areas of responsibility for the prevention of, and defence against, force of strategic magnitude. They are ready to be employed individually or in joint or combined operations. All government bodies, domains and elements as well as designated private organisations that make up the comprehensive and flexible security cooperation system are obliged to *cooperate* with one another. They support and inform each other. They answer inquiries from other responsible parties inasmuch as is necessary to discharge their responsibilities and cooperate as far as is useful in training.

A clear *allocation of tasks and command responsibility* is a prerequisite for the functioning of this cooperation. Preparations and operations have to be coordinated in order to ensure effectiveness and efficiency. The federal, canton and communal levels maintain their responsibilities and competence. However, the flexibility required imposes a review of these arrangements with all concerned parties, and where necessary modifications will be made.

*Operations* are conducted on behalf of the Federal Council or canton authorities by the most suitable organs at the federal or canton level. For operations extending beyond the territory of Switzerland and in case of emergencies of national scale, the federal authorities will assume the overall lead.

A *Security Steering Group* established at the federal level will ensure the effective functioning of the comprehensive and flexible security cooperation. When necessary it shall also include points of contact for the cantons for civil protection and for internal security, or canton representatives from these areas. The Security Steering Group advises the Federal Council in the organisation of the comprehensive and flexible security cooperation and in the transformation from the former universal defence.

Up to now, the organisation of “coordinated services” was responsible for coordinating preparations and measures in important areas for special and extraordinary situations at the federal, canton and communal levels. In principle, the normal administrative and organisational structures shall be utilised, and the conventional responsibilities respected, to a greater degree in the future. Under review is to what extent there is a continuing requirement for specific coordinating bodies (committees).

## 522 International security cooperation

The present and foreseeable threats and dangers do not respect borders. They are of equal concern to our neighbours and partners and can only be countered successfully by international collaboration to which we will contribute our capabilities. This necessitates an intensification of security cooperation between Switzerland and foreign partners. Switzerland will increase its effective contributions, beyond its borders, to strengthen international peace and crisis management, to preserve essential resources, to cope with the effects of wars and disasters and to foster sustainable development. This will reinforce the efforts made by other states and the international community to establish an effective system of collective security. At the same time, Switzerland expects that parallel activities of other states will also benefit its security. This is therefore a matter of mutually reinforcing efforts towards ensuring security in our strategic environment.

In the past, Switzerland has often rendered good offices as individual state, but such good offices are now increasingly provided within multilateral structures. In this context, Switzerland will continue to launch own initiatives. Their chances of success rise if they can gain the support of the EU or an other influential group of states. This is also true for measures regarding internal security (fight against organised crime and terrorism).

We can make use of a whole range of global and European multilateral collaborative structures. UN, OSCE, NATO, EAPC, PfP, EU, WEU, the Council of Europe, or other organisations and forums and non-governmental organisations are engaged in security policy related activities. Switzerland is already making or intends to make a substantial contribution to many of these activities as a member or on an ad hoc basis. But only membership of an organisation will give Switzerland the right to full participation as an equal partner, including in decision-making.

Joint training is a prerequisite for mutually beneficial international cooperation. Such training shall be intensified within the framework of the Partnership for Peace. Building on this experience, a coalition could be more rapidly and effectively organised, should new threats emerge for which the present and envisaged level of cooperation would be insufficient.

Switzerland also uses every opportunity for *bilateral* cooperation with friendly states and armed forces. This cooperation covers primarily the exchange of information, training in security policy and technical matters, joint exercises and cooperation in other areas – e.g. disaster relief – of interest for both partners. Well-defined troop contributions to peace support operations are also a possibility, provided these operations have an unambiguous legitimacy and are in the interest of Switzerland.

The limits of our security cooperation are set by two factors. A prerequisite for Swiss participation is that any peace support operation must have a clear legitimacy in international law (normally a UN Security Council or an OSCE mandate). In addition, the restrictions ensuing from the law of neutrality have to be observed. The Kosovo conflict of 1999 demonstrated graphically the restrictions Switzerland has to observe as long as it is neutral.

## 53 Justification of our strategy, compared to alternatives

### *Return to an autonomous self-assertion of Switzerland?*

Even with an excessive effort, it would not be possible, or at least unreasonably expensive, to prevent or counter present and foreseeable threats and dangers exclusively within our own borders without any international collaboration. For technical and financial reasons it would be impossible to provide the degree of security our population is entitled to. It is not just the prevention of and defence against direct threats and dangers that can no longer be ensured single-handedly; the same is also true for the promotion of our general security interests.

Our contribution to joint efforts aimed at strengthening security provides also tangible proof of solidarity that our partners expect from us. Consequently, it must be convincing. Continuing at the present level, or a very cautious opening – offering only what we could provide without any particular effort, and not being willing to share common risks – would no longer be sufficient. We can expect assistance in case of need only if Swiss contributions are already currently being provided to security, contributions of value to all our partners and commensurate with the new spectrum of dangers.

### *Swiss membership of NATO?*

It is not necessary to join NATO in order to ensure our security and the stability of our region. Our commitment to cooperative security, but without joining the euro-atlantic collective defence, is appropriate for the current and foreseeable threat situation. To the extent that we desire to cooperate with NATO, and are able to do so taking into account the law of neutrality, such cooperation takes place through our membership of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and our participation in Partnership for Peace. Without in

any way forcing them to join the Alliance, NATO is increasingly prepared to offer those partner states willing and able to do so, e.g. Finland and Sweden, options for extensive participation in the preparation and execution of peace support and humanitarian operations. If it so desires Switzerland can hence also make its own contributions to, and preserve its interests in, NATO operational activities. Considering the nature of today's threats and dangers there are no negative repercussions on our security that result from Switzerland not being a member of NATO and therefore being excluded from the protection under article 5 of the Washington Treaty (collective defence).

## 54 Consequences of a European Union membership

### 541 Consequences for security policy

Switzerland is surrounded by states which with regard to issues of security policy largely share its values, objectives and interests. The community that shares these democratic values is gradually establishing the foundations for a common area of security. Under these circumstances, an autonomous Swiss defence policy based on the defence of its borders is obviously of limited use; it would not make the best of opportunities available. Therefore, close cooperation with the European security system, evolving particularly within the EU becomes an imperative. Depending on Switzerland's position in relation to European integration there will be opportunities to cooperate in specific areas as non-member or to participate as a full member.

*As member of the EU*, Switzerland could fully participate, including in the decision-making, in the shaping of the European security policy. Conversely it would have to support common policies. However, by means of constructive abstention it could prevent the dilemma of having to take part in joint measures that would be incompatible with its policy. As non-member of NATO, Switzerland would – if desired – be granted observer status in the WEU. In general, EU membership would tend to enhance our security, especially in respect to economic pressure, uncontrolled migration and organised crime. Moreover, it would enable us to pursue our interests in security policy more effectively since we would have a say in the EU's foreign and security policy.

The *issue whether neutrality is compatible with EU membership* has already been examined in the Report on the Membership in the European Union dated 18 May 1992, the Report on the Foreign Policy of Switzerland in the Nineties dated 29 November 1993, as well as its annexed Report on Neutrality, and the Integration Report 1999. They all arrive at the same assessment: a state desiring to join the European Union has to make the necessary adjustments in its foreign policy, but the status of neutrality is not an obstacle. Switzerland would not violate any obligation deriving from the law of neutrality by joining the European Union because EU membership does not involve military obligations. The principle of consensus for decisions in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy guarantees that no neutral EU member becomes an involuntary party to a conflict that would jeopardise its neutrality. Moreover, EU membership does not involve any legal obligation to join a possible future European defence community.

Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden have demonstrated that EU membership and neutrality are mutually compatible. Neither other EU member states nor EU bodies call

on these states to give up their neutrality. EU law even takes the particular situation of neutral countries into consideration by stating in article 17, paragraph 1, of the EU treaty: “The policy of the Union (...) shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States”.

The *credibility and predictability of our neutrality policy* would remain unchanged in case of EU membership. Switzerland could continue the policy of neutrality it has practised since the end of the East-West confrontation in Europe. As is currently the case, Switzerland would associate itself in principle with economic sanctions imposed by the European Union, if such concrete measure serve to strengthen international peace or prevent or punish a severe violation of international law. Participation in these measures reflects our overlapping interests in foreign and security policy as well as our close economic interrelationship with the European Union. In the area of export controls for defence equipment, in particular military and dual-use equipment, Switzerland is already currently making efforts to harmonise, wherever possible, its regulations with those of the European Union. Export controls, like economic measures, are efficient only if they are internationally coordinated and harmonised.

However, EU membership implies a mutual *political* commitment to support all measures to strengthen the security of the Union and its members. The basic rules of loyalty and solidarity among the members of the European Union also apply in the efforts to increase security. Should stable arrangements for security in the framework of the European Union prove successful, offering Switzerland more security than neutrality, then Switzerland could renounce neutrality in favour of such a system. Switzerland would in any case be able to take such a decision autonomously.

At the request of the neutral EU members Finland and Sweden, the recent amendment to the EU treaty enables each member states to take part in decisions on *peace support operations* (disaster relief, humanitarian operations, military peace support) within the framework of the EU. Participation in such operations is voluntary for EU states that are not WEU members. Thus, Switzerland could, as EU member, and even as WEU observer, freely decide whether and to what extent it would participate in such peace operations. Such missions are central to NATO’s Partnership for Peace that Switzerland participates in since 1996.

As *non-member of the European Union*, Switzerland would retain a somewhat larger freedom of action in foreign policy. However, it would also forego the security benefit of membership and the ability to influence, or employing for its own interests, the common foreign and security policy platform currently being built by the European Union. This would be a disadvantage insofar as Switzerland and the European Union are in many areas pursuing the same objectives in foreign and security policy. We would have to continue to identify opportunities for cooperation on an ad hoc basis.

## 542 Consequences for justice and home affairs

Switzerland is an island in the middle of the EU. This has negative consequences especially for internal security, as it is excluded from European security cooperation in the framework of the Schengen agreement and the European Union. In order to prevent remaining permanently on the periphery Switzerland has initiated since 1995 bilateral

negotiations with all neighbouring states to strengthen, and put on a new basis, cross-border judicial and police cooperation. In addition, agreements on the re-admission of illegal immigrants should be adapted to changed circumstances. Agreements to this effect with France and Italy have already been ratified and those with Germany and Austria were signed in April 1999.

However, all these efforts will not yet allow Switzerland to be integrated into the collaborative Schengen system or that of EU states. In particular border controls, visa policy, asylum policy, and access to the Schengen Information System remain excluded from bilateral cooperation. These areas cannot be the subjects of bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the Schengen or EU states. This results in significant disadvantages. A homogeneous international security area is essential for internal security.

Switzerland's intensive efforts to participate, at least in certain areas, in multilateral European security collaboration have not yet been an unqualified success. For example, Switzerland proposed starting negotiations on a parallel agreement to the Dublin Convention, attempted to establish cooperation with Europol and even examined the possibility of an institutionalised collaboration with the Schengen group, especially in the areas of visa policy, border controls, consular cooperation and access to the Schengen Information System.

EU membership would imply the acceptance of the EU "acquis" in judicial and home affairs. This would serve our interests in security and immigration policy. In close cooperation with other EU states, Switzerland could employ its assets to counter the causes of migration. Switzerland would for example have access to specific EU legal instruments and would be integrated into the Dublin Convention jurisdiction (Convention determining the state responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the member states of the European Communities). This would also result in the abolition of identity checks at Swiss borders with EU states (EU internal borders). Controls at external borders at international airports would remain for travellers from non-EU/EEA states. There would be no obstacle for an unrestricted participation in Europol.

## 55 Consequences of UN a membership for security policy

By joining the UN, Switzerland would become a full member with all rights and obligations that membership implies. Thus, Switzerland would be involved in decisions on security issues. However, being a member also means accepting the UN Charter and supporting decisions taken by the Security Council. Economic sanctions would automatically have to be implemented, as a legal obligation resulting from membership, and no longer as an autonomous act. Membership alone does not commit any state to contribute armed forces to peacekeeping missions or other military operations. However, UN membership would entail an obligation to contribute the mandatory financial levies towards the budget for peace operations.

As a UN member, Switzerland would benefit from better opportunities in various areas. It could take part in the decision-making process on peace missions, and more Swiss nationals might be employed in operations (members of UN missions, special

representatives of the Secretary General and other envoys for good offices). It would have better access to key positions in the UN. Switzerland could also become member of the Security Council and thus have direct influence on decision-making regarding military operations, peacekeeping and peace support measures and economic sanctions. On average western states comparable to Switzerland were elected to the Security Council for a two-year term once or twice within a 25-year period.

## 6 Instruments

### 61 Foreign policy

#### 611 Role and mission within security policy

Foreign policy is a central instrument for the active pursuit of our interests in security policy and for achieving the corresponding objectives. It contributes to the strengthening and lasting preservation of peace, to conflict prevention and crisis management. It strengthens the respect for human rights and basic liberties and seeks to ensure compliance with the provisions of humanitarian international law. With regard to arms control and disarmament negotiations, foreign policy defends the interests of our country, supports measures to increase military transparency, supports the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the control of proliferation of long-range delivery systems and essential associated technologies, and participation in the verification of agreements. Furthermore, our foreign policy assists developing countries and Eastern European countries in their endeavour to improve the living conditions of their populations, and provides humanitarian assistance in case of disasters or armed conflict. Within the framework of Swiss foreign policy, a policy of neutrality is pursued, allowing Switzerland to actively participate in the establishment of stable security structures.

The end of the Cold War has significantly increased the importance of foreign policy as factor in our security policy. The 1993 Report of the Federal Council on Swiss Foreign Policy in the Nineties, and its addendum on neutrality are still valid.

#### 612 Strengthening of peace, preventive diplomacy and crisis management

As a rule, operations for the lasting strengthening of peace are conducted within *the framework of international organisations*, because this allows the contributions of individual states to be aggregated and coordinated. Switzerland supports in particular OSCE and UN measures for the strengthening of peace, preventive diplomacy and crisis management. It focuses on tangible contributions by supplying experts and election observers, by participating in projects for the establishment of democratic structures and by providing material and logistic support. Switzerland puts a particular emphasis on the protection of minorities, e.g. by promoting free media, by strengthening local administration and the judicial and police system in addition to education and training.

In order to increase the effectiveness of UN non-military coercive measures and to reduce their negative humanitarian consequences, Switzerland supports in cooperation with the UN the further development of these measures, so that they can be employed selectively against an irresponsible elite and be implemented efficiently by the member states (“smart sanctions” initiative).

These contributions to the strengthening of peace in the framework of international organisations are complemented by *bilateral activities*. Switzerland participates in efforts towards the peaceful resolution of conflicts and in this context focuses on the promotion of confidence-building measures and dialogue between hostile parties, on mediation efforts, reconciliation and the build-up of democratic structures. For these purposes it cooperates with non-governmental organisations, such as relief organisations, humanitarian and human rights organisations and academic institutions.

In addition Swiss cultural policy contributes, through mutual exchange, to the promotion of a better understanding between different cultural groups, and thus also of peace.

### 613 Human rights policy

Durable peace and security can only be guaranteed in a community of states where human rights and basic liberties are respected, where there is recognition of the priority of the rule of law over political arbitrary power and where political power is placed under democratic control. Strengthening the respect for human rights is therefore in our own interest. This is not interference in the internal affairs of other states because human rights are an element of international law, and their respect a legitimate interest of the international community. Accordingly Switzerland employs political, diplomatic, legal and economic means to strengthen respect for human rights and to counter human rights violations. This includes in particular the instruments of development cooperation and cooperation with Eastern Europe.

### 614 Disarmament and arms control

With its policy on disarmament and arms control, Switzerland supports the efforts in favour of non-proliferation or the complete elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical *weapons of mass destruction*. Regarding *conventional weapons* Switzerland promotes transparency and supports stable and balanced force ratios.

In accordance with this policy, Switzerland has entered into all relevant multilateral *agreements*. Switzerland supports the conclusion of, and compliance with, balanced, non-discriminatory, universal and verifiable treaties. It actively participates in *negotiations* in various international forums, in the Conference on Disarmament, in the OSCE, in the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, in the preparatory commission for the future Organisation for the comprehensive nuclear test ban, in the Special Group of States Signatories to the Biological Weapons Convention as well as in the framework of ad hoc initiatives (e.g., the Ottawa process which led in 1997 to the Convention on the

prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction; and in the area of small arms).

In the framework of the UN and the OSCE, Switzerland also supports efforts for *transparency*, aiming at creating more clarity regarding political and military intentions and actions of states and thereby reducing the risks of unexpected military activity. To prevent weapon proliferation, to promote the control of dual-use goods as well as to encourage transparency, Switzerland is active in various *export control regimes* (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, Wassenaar Agreement).

## 615 Humanitarian international law

Humanitarian international law, i.e. the entire body of legislation with the purpose of guaranteeing respect and protection of the human being in armed conflicts, has for a long time occupied a particular position in the activities of both the Swiss government and Swiss non-government organisations at the international level. This is frequently perceived, in Switzerland as abroad, as an integral part of the "Swiss identity".

Beyond the primary interest in preserving some basic moral values, the Swiss commitment to humanitarian international law is closely linked to the preservation of peace and international security. In the event of armed conflict it is in the interest of states that the behaviour of armed forces is regulated with regard to a minimum respect for human life. If such rules are massively and systematically violated, there is a great risk that the conflict in question will destabilise neighbouring states through flows of refugees. Should large-scale war crimes not be punished the seeds are planted for future conflicts and violations of humanitarian international law. For this reason, Switzerland resolutely supports the establishment of an international tribunal for war crimes.

Present developments pose new challenges to humanitarian international law with regard to the emergence not only of new weapons, but also of new types of conflicts: over identity, relating to the dissolution of state structures and command authorities, and especially internal conflicts for which humanitarian international law, tailored for armed conflicts between states, was originally not conceived. Switzerland can draw on its considerable experience to strengthen these rules to take into account these new challenges.

## 616 Development cooperation, cooperation with Eastern Europe and humanitarian assistance

With development cooperation, the cooperation with Eastern Europe, and humanitarian assistance, Switzerland has at its disposal significant instruments promoting stability and sustainable development. On one hand, these instruments have a stabilising effect with their measures oriented towards the longer term (technical collaboration, financial assistance, trade and economic measures) by alleviating structural causes of conflict, such as poverty, unemployment, the destruction of the environment or bad governance. On the other hand they serve to reduce the potential for escalation of simmering

conflicts or the resumption of fighting after a conflict (humanitarian emergency assistance, reconstruction assistance, technical cooperation, financial aid).

Development cooperation and cooperation with Eastern Europe are directed to counter the causes of conflict (*general prevention*). They support the establishment of stable structures and conditions in the partner countries through contributions to economic, social, political and institutional stability and the protection of the environment. Among the principles of international cooperation that prevent conflict in the long term are that the affected population should systematically be included in the shaping of all development projects, the strengthening of the capability of disadvantaged sections of that population to voice their interests, and consideration of the special role of females in the development process.

Conversely, Switzerland is aware of the fact that interventions in a society and a state can also have negative effects. A high sensibility in this regard, a profound knowledge of the local environment and the relevant parties, and a bond of trust developed in long-term collaboration with partners at national and local levels reduce this risk.

Measures that Switzerland can take in its international cooperation for the purpose of reducing acute potentials for conflict (*specific prevention*) include assistance for refugees and displaced persons, aid for reconstruction, the strengthening of human rights, the rule of law and democracy, assistance for reforms in the security area (e.g., demobilisation and re-integration of combatants, police reforms), police cooperation (of particular importance with regard to Eastern Europe), and the promotion of locally-based forms of conflict resolution. All these measures require effective coordination among the numerous actors on the spot.

## 617 Policy of neutrality

The *policy* of neutrality comprises all measures which Switzerland takes of its own accord to maintain the *credibility* of its neutrality. Depending on the international situation, neutrality can be more or less relevant. Consequently, the policy of neutrality is subject to permanent change, in line with our political and military environment: In the post-war era, up to the end of the Cold War, Switzerland had a very restrictive policy of neutrality. The historic changes connected with the end of the East-West conflict created the preconditions for a correction of course. The latter is necessary not least because neutrality has become less and less relevant as a means to cope with dangers and risks.

As a neutral state in the middle of Europe, we have traditionally fulfilled the functions of enhancing stability and promoting peace. As a permanently neutral state we already had the obligation in peacetime to ensure that we would not be involved in an international conflict. Today there is also a requirement for active and *joint preventive* action. The solution lies in a *policy of participation*, permitting us to cooperate actively and in solidarity in the establishment of stable structures for security as well as to intensify bilateral cooperation with friendly states. The room for manoeuvre in our policy of neutrality must resolutely be used to this end. From the point of view of the policy of neutrality, our cooperation with the OSCE, in the Partnership for Peace, and in

the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council can, without hesitation, be expanded and consolidated.

Passive or active support for international measures involving the use of force, in Europe or anywhere else, is possible for Switzerland only if the measures in question have an unambiguous status in international law.

## 62 Armed forces

### 621 Role and mission within security policy

The missions of the armed forces include *to contribute to international peace support and crisis management; area protection and defence; and subsidiary operations for the prevention and management of existential dangers*.<sup>1</sup> All three tasks are of central importance for the security of Switzerland.

By adequately participating in international *peace support and crisis management*, the armed forces become a central instrument for the active preservation of Swiss interests and for solidarity in the strategic environment relevant to our security. This includes the dispatch of military personnel and troop contingents for stabilisation and international crisis management operations under mandates covered by international law and the preparation for such operations in multinational or bilateral collaboration with other armed forces. In every case the Federal Council will decide on the participation in such operations, on its nature and duration as well as the rules of engagement, after consultation with the armed forces' leadership. These decisions are subject to subsequent approval by parliament.

The armed forces' mission of *area protection and defence* consists of protecting the population and the state against the use of force of strategic magnitude. Already below the threshold of war, our armed forces protect strategically important areas and facilities and contribute thereby to security and stability within Switzerland and in our region. In case of a military threat to Switzerland, the armed forces defend the population, the territory and the airspace and provide maximum freedom of action for the government. If necessary, the armed forces will be authorised by the federal authorities to conduct defence within an alliance with other states.

The armed forces contribute to the *prevention and management of existential dangers* by participating in disaster relief, operations of assistance (e.g. welfare), and protective operations (e.g., protecting specific installations, easing the burden on the police or the Frontier Guards Corps). In all these cases when armed forces assets are employed they will have a subsidiary role, i.e. operational responsibility will remain with the civilian authorities and appropriate armed forces resources will be used primarily then when

---

<sup>1</sup> This order of the armed forces' missions differs from the order of strategic missions referring to the entirety of the instruments of security policy (see 5.1.1.) The reason is that the mission „contribution to the prevention and management of existential dangers” is assumed by the armed forces – unlike the other two missions – only in a subsidiary role.

civilian assets are insufficient. In this framework, the armed forces become part of the comprehensive and flexible security cooperation.

The armed forces thus move from a strategy of deterrence (dissuasion) by defence capability and sustainability to a multiple strategy of cooperation. They do this by cooperating with the other instruments of Swiss security policy as well as through mutual reinforcement of security arrangements with partner states and stabilisation efforts in the common strategic environment. In addition, they permanently assume all tasks that ensure area protection and are prepared to increase their defence capabilities if there are indications of an increasing military threat to Switzerland. At the same time the armed forces prepare themselves for an even closer cooperation with foreign armed forces. Such cooperation could become necessary should the politico-military situation radically change.

This concept, based on an integral capability of our armed forces, and on their ability to cooperate, is a consequence of the present European security situation and its likely development in the medium-term, increasingly marked by international risks and dangers that cannot be countered by one state alone.

## 622 Implementation of the missions

### *Principles and preconditions*

The armed forces are the instrument of power through which the confederation ensure the country's self-determination and defence, in keeping with the Constitution. Under political control, and given legitimacy through a democratic process, this institution provides a decisive contribution to peace, security, and stability, by its very existence and capabilities. Because the armed forces are in principle based on a militia system they strengthen social cohesion.

The execution of the three missions requires that all armed forces personnel receive good basic military training, and an improvement of the armed forces' multi-functionality and of their international interoperability, as well as far-reaching structural and qualitative reforms. Not least, the armed forces' capability to fulfil their missions depends on the resources put at their disposal.

*Multi-functionality* implies the ability to accomplish several different missions. The armed forces as a whole are multi-functional. However, multi-functionality covering the full spectrum of missions is neither possible nor necessary at individual soldier or unit level.

In adopting the concept and increasing the degree of *interoperability*, the armed forces create the necessary preconditions for multinational collaboration. They acquire and strengthen this capability by adjusting their organisation, structures, equipment and staff training; by joint field exercises within Partnership for Peace and from operational experience.

The nature of the threat and developments in technology allow for further reductions in the personnel strength of the armed forces. At the same time, part of the armed forces will have a higher readiness state than in the past, in order to be employed at short notice for peace support and crisis management, area protection, and the prevention and

management of existential dangers. Those parts of the armed forces with a higher readiness state will consist mostly of conscripts under longer terms of service and of professional soldiers, NCOs and officers. To ensure the ability for rapid engagement of forces there will be a continuous assessment of the strategic situation, the capability for gradual force generation and the ability for timely political decisions to be taken to initiate such force generation.

Equipment and training methods of the armed forces are continuously being modernised. For at least for parts of the armed forces weapons systems and other equipment must be procured that are interoperable and meet the highest European technological standards.

### *Armaments*

Arms procurement must be aimed at the timely provision to the armed forces of equipment, in sufficient quantity and quality necessary to accomplish their security policy missions. Arms procurements are long-term transactions and call for continuity and consistency in planning. The quantity of individual weapons systems procured will depend on where it fits into the overall equipment table of the armed forces and the required force generation capability.

Our industrial potential enables us to maintain weapons and equipment with a high degree of autonomy. In specific areas we shall maintain the necessary industrial expertise and know-how for maintenance, updating, upgrading and disposal. With regard to ammunition, an adequate production capacity will be kept.

The “cost/value equation” over the total life span is becoming increasingly important in the evaluation of procurement projects. Procurement should allow for broad competition and aim at solutions which are tried and tested and available on the market. Components should meet commercial and international technical standards.

International cooperation at company level and extensive exchange of information gained from experience covering the whole area of armaments are important to maintain the credibility of the armed forces. They enable the maintenance of a domestic, competitive industrial capability and to manage arms procurements effectively and efficiently.

## 623 Performance required from the armed forces

### *Contributions to international peace support and crisis management*

The armed forces will be able to accomplish their peace support and crisis management tasks if they can deploy modularly organised units, after a short preparation period, into crisis regions, especially in Europe, and in cooperation with other armed forces.

To this end the armed forces will in the coming years expand their capability for international security cooperation by intensifying, within the framework of Partnership for Peace, their participation in multinational staff and field exercises, as well as similar bilateral activities. A Federal Council decision – which has to be subsequently approved by parliament – determines the armed forces commitment to an international peace

support operation, in accordance with our security interests and their readiness state at a given time. Units designated for such purposes will, if necessary, receive additional training and will be adequately equipped and armed for the given mission.

To further Swiss interests the armed forces will contribute to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations, thereby promoting transparency, predictability and the verification of military activities and potentials. They will support measures that aim to prevent or limit proliferation of weapons and projects that promote upholding humanitarian international law and the democratic control of armed forces. Furthermore, they provide training, expertise and material to verification missions. Switzerland will increase the amount of training offered to PfP.

### *Area protection and defence*

The armed forces are able to fulfil their area protection and defence tasks if they can simultaneously conduct, after a short preparatory period, several area protection operations, such as: control and protection of the airspace, protection of major segments of the border, protection of key areas, keeping open continentally important transit routes (road, rail, energy, communications) permanently, and protection of warning, information and command facilities. The armed forces will, using only their own resources or within a coalition authorised by the federal authorities, defend against any military aggression. They have permanent control of the air space, preserving its sovereignty, defending it and, as far as necessary and compatible with the law of neutrality, cooperate with partner states already in peacetime for these tasks.

### *Contributions to the prevention and mastering of existential dangers*

The armed forces accomplish their mission in the framework of the prevention and mastering of existential dangers by having the necessary capabilities to conduct simultaneously, after a short preparatory period, several subsidiary operations for extended periods. Operational responsibility lies with the civilian authorities. Within Switzerland, the armed forces conduct such operations within the framework of the comprehensive and flexible security cooperation. They strengthen the freedom of action of political authorities, guard important areas, locations and key installations, protect the population from large-scale use of force, and provide assistance in case of disasters or other emergencies. The focus is on subsidiary protective operations. They serve primarily to ease the burden, and in support, of police forces. In case of large-scale disasters, having a devastating effect on the population, there continues to be a requirement for military disaster relief.

At an international level, the armed forces provide disaster relief mainly in the framework of the Swiss Disaster Relief Chain. In addition, the armed forces are prepared to assist in the protection of Swiss citizens and facilities abroad.

## 63 Civil protection

### 631 Role and mission within security policy

Civil protection is a civilian structure for management, protection and assistance in special or extraordinary situations. It protects the population, its essential resources and cultural assets in case of natural or man-made disasters and in other emergencies as well as in the case of a politico-military threat. It copes with such events primarily with the structured modularly assets of cantons, communes and private institutions. It is part of the comprehensive and flexible security cooperation. Abroad, based on bilateral accords, instruments of civil protection can be used for disaster relief in regions close to our borders. At the international level, civil protection also contributes to crisis management in the framework of Partnership for Peace.

### 632 Organisation and mode of operation

At the canton and commune levels, civil protection covers the following *areas of responsibility*: rescue, fire-fighting, reconstruction, safeguarding technical facilities, protection and welfare, health and medical services, and logistics. These tasks are assumed in the first instance by assets available in normal situations acting on their own responsibility: fire brigades, technical services or facilities, the public health system, medical rescue services and logistics elements. Added to these are resources for the protection of, and care for, the population and the protection of cultural assets.

In large-scale emergencies, disasters or in the event of armed conflict, *competent command organs* that have political legitimacy become active at the canton, regional and commune levels. They have priority over the individual instruments, ensure communications with superior authorities, related organs and the administration, and coordinate the employment of resources. *Command support elements* are available e.g. to inform, alert and disseminate rules of behaviour to the population, to assess the situation, to provide communications as well as nuclear and chemical protection. In special and extraordinary situations, police assets may also be employed in this context to maintain security and order.

The *structure* of civil protection enables it to be deployed in case of need in a modular format. This applies to the command organs and command support elements as well as the instruments for the individual areas of responsibility and cooperation across these areas. The assets of today's civil defence will be integrated into the future civil protection organisation. Private institutions will also be involved, especially in the area of public health and medical services. The structure is shaped primarily by requirements in normal situations, and only then takes account of requirements in the event of a large-scale emergency, disaster or armed conflict. The focus of operations, and therefore also training, is on the management of disasters and emergencies. Regarding politico-military threats, the comparatively long warning periods, compared to earlier times, allows the adaptation of civil protection readiness states.

As a rule *cantons* are *responsible* for all civil protection assets. They are responsible for the management, organisation and readiness state of these assets. The *federal government* regulates by legislation issues of principle (e.g. compulsory service in civil

protection). In some areas, it sets common standards (e.g. for shelters) or actively takes part (e.g. in training).

The *federal level of coordination and management* is activated should several cantons, the entire country, or neighbouring states be affected to such an extent that a higher level of management becomes necessary. This applies to earthquakes, radioactive contamination, migration problems, epidemic diseases of humans or animals, and in particular in the event of armed conflict.

For maximum effectiveness civil protection is represented in the Security Steering Group and is therefore continuously informed of the development of threats and dangers. In this way the preconditions are met for a timely warning of the command organs, for the appropriate alert of the population, for determining the necessary readiness states of the assets, and for collaboration to take place with other actors.

Taking into account the possibility of the threatened use of weapons of mass destruction and/or of armed conflict, the *protection infrastructure* will in the main be retained. This applies particularly to population shelters. Furthermore the existing network for alert and for the dissemination of rules of behaviour, as well as the communications system will be updated.

## 64 Economic policy

### 641 Role and mission within security policy

Economic policy strengthens the international competitiveness of the Swiss economy and in this way contributes to Switzerland's prosperity and political stability. To this end the conditions are encouraged for sustainable economic growth, including the preservation and creation of jobs, environmental considerations, social equilibrium, all of which contribute to social cohesion.

The global aim of economic policy is to promote the conditions that encourage investment in Switzerland's economic area. The Swiss National Bank's stability-oriented monetary policy supports these objectives. Foreign economic policy attempts to diversify the destination of exports and origins of imports through improved market access, thereby creating favourable conditions for the supply of Switzerland in extraordinary situations. As trade is usually mutually advantageous to the states involved, foreign trade also reduces economic discrepancies that are a significant source of problems in the area of security policy.

Thus the economic policy, and in particular the foreign economic policy, has a specific role in the area of security policy. It reinforces world-wide stability by deepening international economic collaboration, by ensuring an open world trade system, by improving market access, especially for developing countries or those in periods of transition, and by supporting international contractual agreements and a judicial arbitration system to avoid or settle economic disputes.

## 642 Organisation and mode of operation

The international division of labour and the global economic interrelationships are becoming more complex, resulting in new risks and increased interdependence. These may affect the security of our country, and new instruments are called for to cope with them. On an international level after the Mexico and East Asia crises in 1998, there have been increasing efforts to correct imbalances and to establish the conditions for a stable world economy. Switzerland supports these endeavours as member of international organisations, e.g. within the WTO, the OECD, and the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.

The rapid growth of the world economy necessitates a sustainable use of the available resources and increases the pressures to preserve the ecological balance by harmonised measures at a global level. Switzerland supports undertakings of this nature, e.g. for the protection of the atmosphere, the preservation of biological diversity or the control of transfers of dangerous waste materials.

The *defence industry* is also affected by the globalisation of markets. The concentration of the armaments market and the international division of labour have made considerable progress over the past few years. In parallel, there has been an increase in international pressure to harmonise and create greater transparency in the control of the arms trade. Such controls have been extended to the area of strategically sensitive commodities. Internationally harmonised export controls are today an important instrument in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Wherever free trade is limited for reasons of security policy, Switzerland wants to ensure that measures adopted are as efficient as possible, implemented in a non-discriminatory way and in such manner that they do not cause distortions in economic competition.

Finally an economic policy intended to strengthen peace implies the continuation of the rapprochement to the European Union. Integration into Europe is indispensable for Switzerland to ensure stability and opportunities for development for our economy. In a global economy, with a small number of powerful trading blocs, standing aloof could make Switzerland vulnerable to all kinds of economic pressures. This also applies to monetary policy, an area where continued European integration and the introduction of the Euro create challenges for a stability-oriented Swiss monetary policy. However, it is not just cost-benefit considerations, but also common values and solidarity that guide Swiss policy. Thus Switzerland must also contribute to the most important endeavour of ensuring a durable peace in Europe, e.g. by continuing the technical and financial collaboration with Eastern European states.

## 65 National economic supply

### 651 Role and mission within security policy

The national economic supply is part of the economic policy. Given Switzerland's extensive dependence on other countries for the supply of raw materials and energy sources, the lack of self sufficiency in food supplies, and lack of access to a sea port, it is the national economic supply's responsibility to ensure the country's supply of essential commodities and services when the normal economic system can no longer do

so because of circumstances beyond its control. A consequence of intensive international competition is that only minimum stocks are held by commerce, industry or within agriculture. The focus of the national economic supply is therefore on redressing disruptions to supply caused by economic, political, and technical reasons, sabotage, terrorism, and natural disasters. Conversely, ensuring that supplies are maintained in case of a war directly affecting Switzerland, or in the event that Switzerland is surrounded by hostile forces, has receded into the background, commensurate with longer warning time.

## 652 Organisation and mode of operation

The economy ensures market supply. This is true not only for normal times, but also during crises, since as a rule the state neither produces and distributes commodities, nor provides everyday services. The state intervenes, in a subsidiary fashion, only if and when the preconditions for a normal functioning of the private economic structures no longer exist, causing the risk of serious disturbances in supply. By selective intervention the state seeks to create conditions allowing the economy to maintain a balanced supply at reduced level, so that economic imbalances and social tensions are avoided.

The administrative and political responsibilities in the area of ensuring the economic supply call for collaboration between the state and the economy. This is reflected in the particular militia system of the national economic supply. This organisation includes at the federal level representatives of the economy, in addition to a small permanent staff of civil servants. For the implementation of extensive measures, directly affecting the consumer, canton and communal institutions are involved, also partially organised through the militia system.

During periods when there are no supply problems, the national economic supply focuses its activity on: a continuous assessment of the situation in cooperation with the economy, on ensuring that appropriate stocks of vital commodities are kept (compulsory stock-keeping) and that critical means of transport and routes are available, on ensuring communications, on securing the release of vitally important manpower from the armed forces and civil protection, and on the preparation of interventions to cope with disturbances of supply (crisis management). In case of a crisis, supply and demand have to be brought into balance by interventions which must be as selective as possible. If the supply of commodities is disturbed, compulsory stocks are used in the first instance to redress supply to balance demand. At the same time assistance will be provided for imports and finally domestic production will be increased where practicable. Restrictions on consumption are considered only when demands excessively exceed supply. In line with changes in the security environment it is no longer the aim of this supply policy to assure extensive autonomy from foreign supply sources, but rather the aim is to overcome shortages in individual sectors.

Due to increasingly global markets and the world-wide division of labour, supply crises more frequently assume international dimensions. Because the Swiss economy is heavily involved in global markets, crisis management at the international level is called for, wherever possible. Such crisis management is for the time being institutionalised only in the area of mineral oil, where the International Energy Agency (IEA) is the relevant forum.

Within the framework of the civilian element of Partnership for Peace efforts are being made for joint action to promote supplies to the civilian sector. Since 1997, the Swiss national economic supply takes part in PfP forums for land transport, ocean navigation, civil aviation, supply of mineral oil, food, industry and communications. The main emphasis is placed on the exchange of information and on efforts for the coordination of interventions in the market (rationing).

## 66 Protection of the constitutional order and police

### 661 Role and mission within security policy

The protection of the constitutional order and the police are the instruments for maintaining internal security. They are relevant to security policy to the extent that their objectives are to counter violence of strategic magnitude, affecting a considerable proportion of the state and the population. Police activities in the fight against crime and for the maintenance of law and order are of utmost importance and shall be strengthened at all levels. They must be given the necessary means which may involve a redistribution of resources. The fight against violence of *sub-strategic* magnitude is part of the *cantons' security policy*.

In its intermediary report to the Federal Council an inter-ministerial working group, established by the Head of the Federal Department of Justice and Police in which the cantons are represented, noted that the state's federal structure in the area of police has reached its limits, particularly in the fight against international crime and in coping with immigration problems. The entire system of internal security, especially the division of labour between the federal and canton authorities, will therefore be reviewed to determine whether today's structures are still appropriate in view of the current and future threats. The future role of the Frontier Guard Corps will also be reviewed in this context.

A whole range of events connected to conflicts abroad have demonstrated that the Swiss police corps find it difficult to cope simultaneously with several major incidents requiring operations over extended periods. This must be taken into account - in cooperation with the cantons - during the current review of the Swiss internal security system.

The protection of the constitutional order comprises the measures for the preservation of internal security, in particular for ensuring the democratic principles and the rule of law in Switzerland and the protection of the people's liberties. The protection of the constitutional order collects information on potential threats to security or criminal actions and takes, or proposes, appropriate countermeasures. It is strictly regulated by law and subject to close political guidance and control. Some investigative police responsibilities delegated to the federal level (offences against the constitutional order, crimes involving explosives, illegal intelligence activities, etc.) are closely linked with the protection of the constitutional order and are for this reason dealt with within the same organisation.

The missions of the protection of the constitutional order and of the police in security policy are the following:

- The *protection of the constitutional order* takes preventive measures to detect, at an early stage, dangers posed by terrorism, violent extremism, illegal intelligence activities, the illegal trade in weapons and radioactive materials, and illegal transfer of technology. The protection of the constitutional order assists the responsible police and criminal prosecution authorities by providing intelligence on organised crime.
- The *police*, that is mainly under canton authority, ensures public security, law and order and the fight against crime. The federal government coordinates the fight against force or violence of strategic magnitude, especially operations for the management of incidents exceeding the cantons' capabilities. If required, the federal authorities assume command.

## 662 Organisation and mode of operation

In close collaboration with cantons, federal authorities direct the protection of the constitutional order. The exchange of information between the federal and canton authorities is of decisive importance. Federal authorities conduct the exchange of information with other states. Prevention and the activity of juridical police are closely linked with the protection of the constitutional order. Prevention includes all administrative and police activity to detect, observe and prevent behaviour that may endanger the internal and external security of Switzerland. The juridical police at the federal level investigates federal crimes. The information gained in prevention provides the foundation and precondition for the effective fight against crime and the prosecution of criminals.

The primary mission of cantons' police forces is to ensure public security, law and order and to fight against crime. That federal forces are used only in a subsidiary role, according to the responsibilities laid down in the Constitution, is commensurate with the requirement that policing remain a community activity. Cantons have primary responsibility in the fight against crime. Federal authorities establish the legal framework, facilitate coordination and international liaison, and provide information and operational support when required.

If in particular circumstances (e.g. a disaster) the potential for a canton to deal with it is exceeded, or when an individual canton has insufficient resources to preserve or restore public order, cantons will provide mutual support within the framework of inter-cantonal police agreements, or of a inter-cantonal police operation organised and coordinated by federal authorities. In exceptional circumstances, the civil authorities can, at their request, be supported by elements of the armed forces in a subsidiary role for the maintenance of public security (in the framework of the comprehensive and flexible security cooperation). However, recent experience has proved the limits of such operations. There exists, therefore, a clear requirement for a federal police instrument that has a wide operational capability.

Specialised canton judiciary and police authorities have the primary operational responsibility in the fight against organised crime. In particular circumstances this can be delegated to the federal police. Organised crime can only be fought efficiently if all measures and organs involved are closely coordinated – notably prevention, policing

and prosecution. Coordination and intelligence are the primary functions of the federal authorities.

The federal government and the cantons agree that the assets of individual cantons are often insufficient to counter extensive international criminal networks. The international character of this kind of crime renders efficient investigation more difficult. For this reason federal authorities shall be given additional responsibilities for prosecution in this area. Moreover, the functions of coordination and intelligence, assumed by the relevant organs of the federal police, shall be expanded and the service provided to the cantons shall be increased. A review of the possible creation of a police operational capability directed by the federal level has been made necessary by recent developments.

It is also valid for internal security that it can increasingly only be ensured by close international collaboration. Standing aloof from collaboration would give rise to serious risks. Police and judicial cooperation with the European Union, which lies in the Swiss interest, is being developed.

## 67 Information and communications

### 671 Role and mission within security policy

Accurate, timely and easily understood information supplied to the public is of utmost importance in all situations. The role of the information and communications as a preventive tool to strengthen peace is increasing in importance. Both in Switzerland and abroad government information services have to effectively communicate decisions and measures taken by the authorities in the area of security policy. They must satisfy the population's requirement for information on risks and opportunities, and counter in a timely fashion the potential for misinformation by providing appropriate and factual information. Particularly in special situations, a foreign information dominance directed against Swiss interests must be prevented, and Swiss interests must get a fair hearing. In addition Swiss interests have to be communicated abroad in normal situations, and Switzerland's reputation abroad has to be actively promoted abroad. Switzerland's credibility is an asset that has to be continually nurtured. To this end, the establishment and maintenance of robust networks is important, networks that can be activated in favour of our country in a crisis, e.g. should pressure be exerted on Switzerland.

The information revolution and globalisation have created a new situation which governmental communication has to take account of. In general, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the state to communicate the factors involved in government decision-making, instruction and information without them being re-interpreted. New technologies facilitate the mutual information networking by non-government actors. If this is done in the pursuit of narrow self-interest, it can contribute to the alienation between state and society, politics and the economy. Moreover, new technologies offer additional opportunities for well-targeted campaigns directed against the national interests.

However, the modern means of information also open up new opportunities. In some countries, government control over the media was used to keep the level of public

awareness low and to suppress the plurality of opinions. The new technologies render such political interventions more difficult.

## 672 Information organs

In *normal* situations, the civilian media are the primary means to disseminate government information on security policy. This information is based on pronouncements by the Federal Council, Heads of individual Departments and the Vice-Chancellor responsible for information. In particular cases, the federal government, the cantons and the communes may also directly provide information. The Federal Council Staff, Press and Broadcast Division, may also be called upon to advise the Federal Council on information policy. The Federal Department of Justice and Police administers this unit, but it is subordinated for tasking directly to the Federal Council.

In *special and extraordinary situations*, information becomes one of the most important instruments of leadership. This calls for timely decisions, a careful assessment of the national and international political and psychological environment, and explanations that are both astute and convincing. If there is a particularly urgency to disseminate information, the Federal Council disposes of the means to directly address the population as well as of the Federal Chancellery's information centre and - for warning and the communication of technical measures - the National Alert Centre. Should the civilian media no longer be in a position provide full service, or should they break down completely, the Federal Council can mobilise its Press and Broadcast Division. Depending on the situation, it may be necessary to nominate special Federal Council and/or armed forces information representatives (spokespersons).

For special and extraordinary situations the cantons have also access to appropriate means of information, in particular regional studios and transmitters of the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation. There have already been numerous examples of effective collaborative with private broadcasting companies.

## 673 The security of the information technology and communications infrastructure

Switzerland's information technology and communications infrastructure permanently exposed to many threats and risks, not just in crises. The Federal Council's primary objective regarding the security of this infrastructure is to maintain the Switzerland's ability to decide and to act, and to create the conditions ensuring the functioning of the Swiss "information society".

All members of this "information society" are, in the final analysis, themselves responsible for the security of their *own* information technology and communications infrastructure. However, the high degree of interconnection and mutual dependence between systems, and the partial joint use of infrastructure, imposes a global strategy; it is insufficient to strive for the necessary security within the confines of a single system. Because of the overall strategic importance to Switzerland of the information technology and communications infrastructure, it is the Federal Council that takes the necessary measures in this area. However, the Federal Council has to rely on

coordinated action by the state, the economy and science if the objective is to be attained. This is made more complicated by the fact that the borders of information and communications systems do in many cases not coincide with national borders. In these areas, enhanced security necessitates international collaboration.

Nationally coordinated action calls for a central authority charged with this mission. The necessary structures have yet to be established by the state, the economy, and science. Coordinated action is imperative, in particular to identify critical parts of the national infrastructure, to raise awareness, to continuously monitor and assess the risks, to identify threats and issue warnings at an early stage, to rapidly assemble decision-makers and to construct a joint security infrastructure.

However, such overriding activities and measures shall be initiated only where this is judged to be judicious and the overall effect proves to be an improvement in security. Individual participants or sectors within the “information society” (e.g. associations) will be encouraged to improve the security of the information technology and communications infrastructure. However, *complete* protection cannot be reached at reasonable expense. We must take *adequate* security measures, based on a sound analysis of the risks.

## 7 Resources

### 71 System of compulsory service

The *aim* of compulsory service is to ensure that in special and extraordinary situations services are provided to enable the state and society to function in those areas where this can not be ensured in other ways (employment contracts, voluntary actions).

Compulsory military service and civil protection exist at the *federal* level. Federal law allows also *cantons* to invoke compulsory service. This is mostly done in the fire-fighting service and it can partially also apply to women. Additionally, in some cantons, compulsory service can be applied to disaster relief and medical services. The system of compulsory services also includes an *obligation to continue in the same professional activity* (e.g. in the medical services). Lastly, it remains possible to order compulsory service based on emergency decrees. No circumstances are foreseen which would justify the introduction of *comprehensive and general compulsory service* that would apply in every social domain.

The reform of the armed forces and of civil protection will lead to significant structural changes and *reductions in personnel strength*. The age limit for discharge from compulsory service will be lowered. However, concrete decisions to this effect must be taken on the basis of (yet to be elaborated) guidelines for both, the armed forces and civil protection. The future system of compulsory service will have to be defined taking into account the needs of the armed forces and civil protection, general political and social, demographic, legal and financial aspects. The necessary level of personnel strength must be ensured with the maximum of equity.

### *Elements to be maintained*

The *militia principle* will be maintained for overriding political reasons, but equally because of its functional nature. It ensures that Switzerland will continue to have forces of sufficiently high quality and quantity, commensurate with our financial resources, to attain our security policy objectives. Conversely, this requires that society, the economy and the instruments of security policy remain compatible with the militia system, and that the necessary number of qualified cadres can be enlisted within the framework of the militia system.

*Compulsory military service* is to continue. How this will be defined in practical terms will be detailed in the Armed Forces XXI project. Individuals who cannot reconcile military service with their conscience are assigned to an alternative civil service.

*Compulsory service in civil protection* is also maintained. How this will be defined in practice will be elaborated in the Civil Protection project.

It will remain possible to be *exempt* from military service and civil protection in order to continue important activities in the public interest

The right to introduce *compulsory services at canton level* will remain.

### *Reform measures*

Changes in the security environment not only permit reforms to be undertaken; they compel Switzerland to make reforms in its defence and security policy. The reform elements outlined below will be elaborated further in the framework of the Armed Forces XXI and Civil Protection projects. Decisions on the specific structure of the future system of compulsory service cannot be taken until critical factors (missions, structures, personnel strength, recruitment of personnel, training concept) have been clarified for both, the armed forces and civil protection.

Readiness states and the technical know-how required for some functions makes it impossible to cover all the missions and functions of the armed forces applying the militia principle alone. An appropriate *increase of the professional component* is therefore advisable.

In addition to the armed forces' present system of compulsory service, comprising basic training and refresher courses, the possibilities of *doing the entire military service in a single period* and of *employing soldiers on fixed-term contracts* shall be introduced. Soldiers on fixed-term contracts are soldiers, NCOs or officers who have completed their compulsory service and enter a contract to continue their service for a limited period.

It would be desirable that future compulsory service could be discharged either in the armed forces or in civil protection. A minimum objective is to ensure that soldiers, NCOs and officers having completed their compulsory military service will no longer be obliged to serve in civil protection. In composing the guidelines for the Armed Forces XXI and Civil Protection, the following three options will be examined. However, an amendment to the Constitution is required for any of them to be implemented:

- Variant A: On induction, citizens unfit for military service for health reasons, but still able to serve in civil protection, would be assigned to the latter, in line with past and current practice. All citizens fit for military service would attend basic training (recruit school), based on military training for the armed forces. However, part of them would subsequently be assigned to civil protection. If necessary, later re-assignments from the armed forces to civil protection would be possible – as long as the individual in question had not fully completed compulsory military service.
- Variant B: On induction, recruits would be assigned to the armed forces or to civil protection, priority being given to the armed forces. Inductees would not have the freedom of choice between the armed forces and civil protection. However, their preferences and abilities would be taken into account. Training for the armed forces and for civil protection would subsequently take place separately. The main responsibility of training for civil protection would be with the cantons and communes.
- Variant C: Assignment to the armed forces or to civil protection would be made at induction, with freedom of choice for the inductees, provided that both the armed forces and civil protection could in this way meet their personnel requirements. Military training and that for civil protection would subsequently take place separately. The main responsibility of training for civil protection would be with the cantons and communes.

### *Service for women*

Women make a considerable contribution to the public good in education, in the care of elderly and handicapped persons, and in other activities of benefit to society. As in the past, they are not liable to compulsory service at the federal level. At canton level, they do have some fire-fighting duties.

On a voluntary basis, women can assume some engagements to serve. All organisations based on compulsory service must encourage participation by women – not to maintain personnel strength, but because the specific experience and professional knowledge of women are indispensable to accomplish security policy missions. Women engaged in such service enjoy the same status, rights and duties as men.

### *Civil service*

Citizens liable to compulsory military service are admitted into the civil service on the basis of an application stating why they cannot reconcile military service with their conscience. The civil service is a federal institution. A central federal office manages it, but the implementation is privatised as far as possible. Precedence is given to individual rather than collective employment.

In normal situations, the civil service contributes to enhancing the performance of institutions and to support individuals who act in the public interest. In special and extraordinary situations, the civil service supports civilian authorities to provide essential services and to restore normal conditions. However, readiness states within the

civil service will continue to be low. As is the case now, call-up for individuals liable to serve in the civil service will take weeks, not hours. Therefore, in case of disasters the civil service will be employed for rehabilitation activities only after rescue services and in some cases even after civil protection and armed forces assets have been committed. Civil service assets are committed upon a request from civilian authorities, and under their direction can undertake long-term operations.

## 72 Finances

The allocation of sufficient resources to security policy and its instruments is of critical importance to the success of this policy. The first step is to examine the allocation of resources to match the missions given to them. Although they are important parameters, the availability of financial resources, additional costs borne by the economy as well as employment and regional considerations, must not prejudice the identification or prevent a systematic analysis of the resources required to implement our strategy of security policy.

Furthermore, to implement the security policy outlined in this report there will have to be an appropriate distribution of resources within the security sector, including internal security. To successfully implement the “security through cooperation” strategy – both comprehensive and flexible security cooperation at home, and international security cooperation – a certain redistribution is inevitable. The allocation of resources must be commensurate to actual threats, risks and dangers – to obtain a consensus, as well as to ensure the necessary level of security.

For a new financial settlement between the Confederation and cantons, it will be necessary to take a fresh look at financing the instruments of security policy. The allocation of responsibility and the funding obligation should in principle coincide, even if this cannot always be realised in practice. In every case, the allocation of tasks and the financial concept must permit an efficient accomplishment of the missions. Internal security and civil protection raise particular questions. The envisaged changes, especially in respect to internal security and civil protection, will necessitate a review of the allocation of costs between the Confederation, cantons and communes.

## 8 Strategic leadership

To preserve our internal and external security requires the coordinated use of a number of instruments, located in various departments and at different levels. Therefore, it is necessary to coordinate our actions and use of own assets, and our collaboration with other states and international organisations.

At an early stage, trends relevant to our security policy must be identified and, having made a global appreciation, priorities set on the use of resources. Should there be a requirement, specific measures to overcome a crisis or an extraordinary situation have to be taken to ensure that the available assets are employed according to real needs and in a timely manner.

Therefore, a, *unified strategic leadership* coordinates the employment of the state's instruments to prevent and fight against threats of strategic magnitude. This leadership will permanently oversee the cooperation between the instruments, initiate adjustments if necessary, and employ the instruments as required. At the federal level, the *Federal Council* assumes this strategic leadership, within cantons it is provided by the *canton governments*. Should the situation require, Parliament will elect a commander-in-chief of the armed forces – as the Constitution allows for – who will, with regard to strategic authority, be legally and constitutionally subordinated to the Federal Council.

At this stage it is impossible to clearly identify the necessary adjustments to our system of strategic leadership in relation to further steps towards integration with the EU. A full participation in the relevant bodies in Brussels and a full integration into the European Union (CFSP, justice and internal affairs) would require additional reforms. The adjustments outlined below would facilitate such reforms.

The success of crisis management depends largely on the mental and professional preparation of the governments and organs concerned to deal with special and extraordinary situations. It is therefore necessary to conduct, as part of the strategic training, small, modular, command exercises at regular intervals, to train senior cadres implicated in crisis management should the need arise. For crisis management below the threshold of war, and natural and man-made disasters, realistic training can only be provided if the governments of cantons and communal authorities are included in the preparation and execution of exercises.

## 81 Establishment of a Security Steering Group

Several rationales call for improvements in the way the Federal Council provides leadership in the area of security. The challenges have become more varied and complex in the area of security policy as well as the area of justice and police beyond security policy, involving the security of the individual. An early identification of potential threats, dangers and risks has increased in importance and with it has increased the demands on effective and efficient intelligence services and other offices with access to information relevant to security. The replacement of the previous universal defence by a comprehensive and flexible security cooperation demands close coordination at a high level, to ensure that the reduction in coordinating authorities at a lower level does not lead to a degradation of performance.

A permanent staff has to exist to support the Federal Council's strategic leadership role; it would therefore not be wise for this staff to be outside the administration. Any internal changes within the administration must respect the chain of command and responsibility of Federal Departments and ensure that political leadership remains with the Federal Council.

For these reasons, a Security Steering Group will be established, as staff unit of the Federal Council. The Security Steering Group will be subordinated to the Federal Council's security committee. It will include, as permanent members, the top officials of the departments primarily responsible for security affairs and a coordinator for intelligence cooperation within the federal administration. An assessment and early

detection bureau will support the coordinator, and he will ensure that the Security Steering Group receives key information timely.

Non-permanent members will sit in on meetings of the Security Steering Group on an as required basis, principally senior officials from Departments not permanently represented within the Security Steering Group and officials ensuring liaison with cantons in the areas of internal security and civil protection. Experts from the federal administration, cantons, the economy or with specialist scientific knowledge may also be invited to sit in on the Security Steering Group.

The *chair* of this Security Steering Group will be held for one year rotated between the highest-ranking permanent members from the Federal Departments of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Police, and Defence, Civil Protection and Sports. The chair has the right to request direct access to the Federal Council.


The Security Steering Group has the following tasks:

- The permanent monitoring of all areas relevant to security; analysis and assessment of the possibility of the use of force within Switzerland and in its strategic environment;
- early identification of opportunities and early warning regarding new kinds of threats, risks and dangers;
- elaboration of scenarios, strategies and options for the chair of the Security Steering Group, making the maximum use of synergies from inside and outside the administration.

Proposals put to the Federal Council for concrete measures to be taken will continue to be submitted by federal departments in order to guarantee an orderly sequence of operations. This will not affect the effectiveness of the Security Steering Group, because the top-level officials of the federal departments are permanent members of the group.

Following the establishment of the Security Steering Group, it will be possible to dissolve the Council for General Defence, the Staff for General Defence, the Steering Group of the Security Committee of the Federal Council, and the Situation Conference.

The establishment of the Security Steering Group will enable the Federal Council to obtain a better strategic overview and improve its capability to act. Firstly the ability for *early detection and the early warning* will be enhanced by the appointment of a coordinator for intelligence cooperation with access to intelligence in the whole federal administration. A comprehensive assessment will rapidly be communicated to top-level officials, and developments relevant to our security will, in a timely fashion, be drawn to the federal government's attention. At the same time, the Security Steering Group's global overview will reflect the fact that the distinction between internal and external security has become increasingly artificial, due to the cross-border character of most of today's threats.



The *potential to react, and speed* at which strategic leadership will be given will also be improved. The composition of the Security Steering Group guarantees that its options prepared for the Federal Council have a firm basis and can be implemented immediately. Principally this applies to setting priorities and concentrating assets through ad-hoc structures tailored for the particular situation. In this way, the Federal Council avoids both permanently devoting assets and a structure that is too rigid – a necessity to deal with the rapidly changing nature of threats and dangers.

## 82 Normal, special and extraordinary situations

In order to be able to react adequately to threats and dangers, it is useful to classify them according to how imminent they are, probability of occurrence and the effort required for their management.

So far, the following terms have been used: *ordinary situation* (normality); *crisis* (disturbance with a considerable strategic potential for danger and damage, which can not be mastered by conventional procedures); and *extraordinary situation* (situation perceived as threatening by a large proportion of the population, extensively disturbing normal life or even rendering it impossible, and hence possibly justifying emergency law).

Such categories will in future also be necessary to elaborate security policy strategy, make plans for and execute specific measures. However, there has been a fundamental change since the end of the Cold War. The end of the large-scale military threat in Europe and the increase of individual and often non-military, threats and dangers, has

reduced to such an extent the likelihood of an extraordinary situation occurring that the latter can no longer be the yardstick for the structure, leadership and management of security policy. The so-called *special situation* has gained in importance, at the expense of the extraordinary situation. This refers to situations where normal administrative procedures are no longer sufficient for some government functions. However, in contrast to extraordinary situations, government activity is affected only in individual sectors. Such situations are characterised by the requirement for a tightening of procedures and a rapid concentration of assets.

Therefore, the terms *normal situation*, *special situation* and *extraordinary situation* will be used in the future to classify threats and dangers, as well as the means (or combinations of means) and approach to adequately manage them. The structures extant in the normal situation are to be maintained as long as possible. The Security Steering Group will elaborate suggestions for preparations and structures pertaining to special and extraordinary situations.

## 83 Role and significance of cantons and communes

Our federal system requires *collaboration based on partnership* between the federal government, the cantons and the communes. The division of responsibilities between the Confederation and the cantons is determined by the Federal Constitution; cantons are sovereign in all matters not limited by the Federal Constitution. Cantons decide on the organisation of the communes and their autonomy.

Cantons perform an important function in security policy since they constitute, together with the communes, the link between the federal level and the population. An effective commitment on their part is imperative for the success of security policy measures. Security policy at canton level is closely related, but not equivalent to, federal security policy. Cantons focus on such threats as disasters and dangers to public security. The employment of their assets, as well as their organisation, is oriented accordingly.

The low probability of a large-scale European conflict has reduced the role of central national leadership for operations within Switzerland. Dangers and risks unrelated to politico-military causes, with primarily local and regional impact, have come to the fore. Centrally-led military or civilian operations to defend against strategic threats have become less likely, while subsidiary operations for canton, regional or communal authorities have become more probable. This makes possible an increase in the devolution of responsibilities to cantons and communes.

Conversely, there exists a simultaneous requirement, at the national and international level, to increase consistency, coherence and centralisation of strategic leadership. The demands on the Federal Council to be able to act externally have increased. The time scale available for decision-making and the frequency of decisions to be taken are rapidly increasing, with or without new institutional ties.

In order to ensure political authorities' freedom of action in special and extraordinary situations, a clear *division of tasks* is necessary between the Confederation, cantons, and communes. The criterion for allocation of tasks and responsibilities are the nature and dimension of the threat. However, if called for by extraordinary circumstances, the allocation of responsibilities must be adaptable to the situation. This is made possible by

emergency law. The following allocation of tasks applies to the most important instruments of security policy:

<b>Level of responsibility</b>	<b>Area</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
<b>Federal government</b>	Strategic leadership at national level	
	Foreign policy and foreign economic policy	Cantons are involved if their responsibilities or their interests are concerned.
	Armed forces	Given the militia system, there are general political and psychological reasons for maintaining cantons' co-responsibility. Concrete arrangements will depend on the reform of the armed forces.
	National economic supply	Cantons and municipalities have executive tasks.
	Protection of the constitutional order (internal security, federal level)	Police support by the cantons.
<b>Cantons</b>	Civil protection	The Confederation is responsible for general legislation. In some areas it also sets standards and/or cooperates. For some incidents, coordination or leadership is assumed by the Confederation.
	Police (internal security, cantonal level)	Coordination by the Confederation for the prevention of, and defence against, strategic force or violence.
<b>Each for its own area</b>	Economic policy	Cantonal economic policy has to respect the framework set by the Confederation.
	Information policy	The basic concepts are drawn up by the Confederation.
	Communications systems	The exchange of information is an essential precondition for the joint management of extraordinary situations.

As a principle, the command structure is the responsibility of those areas that have operational jurisdiction.

In summary security policy measures are as a rule implemented through collaboration between various agencies. The lead will be assumed by the most competent and suitable agency, and there is latitude for increased devolution of tasks to cantons and communes. The federal level assumes leadership in all events and situations of a national and international scale.

## 9 Outlook

The title of the 1990 Federal Council report on Switzerland's security policy is "Swiss Security Policy in Times of Change". It was a reaction to the then very recent strategic changes in Europe. The situation and the prospects of future developments were summarised in four basic scenarios. The scenario "security through understanding and cooperation" was then little more than optimism. The scenario "relapses into confrontation and emergence of new dangers" seemed considerably more realistic, and it called for the maintenance of an adequate defence readiness state. Nevertheless, Switzerland rapidly initiated steps to break out of the defensive posture and isolation of the Cold War, which was appropriate and necessary until 1989. We took part in peaceful initiatives of the international community for crisis management and stabilisation in areas of conflict. Without ignoring the possibility of relapses into confrontation, a massive reduction of our military potential was initiated by Armed Forces 95.

Today, we are taking a significant further step. It is induced by the development of threats and by the economical use of resources, but also by the opportunities offered by the new strategic environment. It is with conviction that in the area of security policy we are increasing the cooperation with international organisations and other states as far as our neutral status will allow. This course is adopted primarily because the risk of violence emanates from trans-border sources which a single state acting alone, even should it devote large resources, can only partially resolve.

Seizing opportunities that exist, and the actions that result, must not lead us to neglect the important task of maintaining security on a national level, which we can accomplish on our own. This objective can be reached by a comprehensive and flexible cooperation between all the appropriate civilian and military instruments. The Cold War universal defence system, elaborated to the last detail, has to be replaced today by a system that provides the most appropriate resources in sufficient quantity to counter authentic dangers in every particular case.

Both components of the future security policy, cooperation within Switzerland and international cooperation, call for a reassessment, and also to some extent a reorganisation of part, of our instruments of security policy. Within the framework set by this report, and on the basis of the assigned missions, reforms already initiated will be re-examined, new guidelines will be elaborated, and the necessary readiness states will be reached as rapidly as legislation process and circumstances allow. We must not hesitate to counter threats and risks, identified by improved early warning, with new methods of leadership, technologies, and a shift in the allocation of resources.

The Federal Council is aware that these changes in the intellectual process and in the allocation of resources will take considerable time. In particular the cantons, who will assume more responsibility in security policy than in the past, will have to resolve difficult problems. The Federal Council is also aware that today's rapid changes make the elaboration of sustainable solutions and structures more difficult. It is apparent that aspects of security policy, previously immutable, must continuously be re-examined. All the more reason why the Federal Council is confident that the entire population, men and women, will support the transition to a new and modern Swiss security policy, and accept the challenges of contributing according to their individual share of

responsibility to meeting these challenges. A resolute commitment is justified to preserve the security of our country and its population in view of the diverse and unstable nature of risks and dangers and to gain the maximum benefit from the opportunities that now present themselves.

## List of abbreviations

CENCOOP	Central European Peace-keeping Initiative
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy (of the European Union)
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECE	Economic Commission for Europe
EEA	European Economic Area
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IEA	International Energy Agency
IFOR	Implementation Force (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
ISN	International Relations and Security Network
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SFOR	Stabilization Force (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
WBG	World Bank Group
WEU	Western European Union
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

## Description of key terms

### **Area protection and defence**

One of the missions of the armed forces within security policy. Below the threshold of war, our armed forces already control Swiss airspace, protect vulnerable segments of the border, strategically important areas, vital transit routes and key facilities. This contributes to security and stability within Switzerland and in our region. In case of a military threat to Switzerland, the armed forces defend the population, the territory and the airspace and provide maximum margin of manoeuvre for the government. If necessary, the armed forces will be authorised by the federal authorities to conduct defence operations in conjunction with other states.

### **Civil protection**

Civilian structure for management, protection and assistance, protecting the population, its resources, and cultural assets in case of natural or man-made disasters or in other emergencies. Civil protection is primarily a responsibility of cantons and covers the following areas: rescue, fire-fighting, reconstruction, safeguarding of technical facilities, protection and welfare, health and medical services, and logistics.

### **Combined Joint Task Forces**

Term for armed forces contingents, tailored to the needs of specific operations and comprising elements from several states and branches of the armed forces (ground, air, maritime). In the framework of Combined Joint Task Forces states not members of NATO or the WEU can also take part in operations led by NATO or the WEU.

### **Common Foreign and Security Policy**

Those parts of the Treaties of Maastricht (1993) and Amsterdam (1997) on the European Union, aiming at harmonising and integrating the foreign and security policies of the individual EU member states. Eventually the framing of a common defence policy is envisaged in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.

### **Comprehensive and flexible security cooperation**

One of the main components of the Swiss strategy in security policy. It denotes the case-by-case cooperation and coordination of Switzerland's own instruments of security policy, required to meet a specific threat situation. Within the comprehensive and flexible security cooperation, the preventive or reactive employment of all adequate instruments, commensurate to the situation, against force of strategic magnitude shall be coordinated. For this purpose, federal authorities, cantons and communes will act in concert, and where useful, economic measures will be integrated.

### **Continuum of peace policy**

A set of mutually complementary measures that states or the international community can adopt to prevent armed conflicts, manage crises, bring armed conflicts to an end or prevent the escalation of armed conflicts. This particularly includes preventive diplomacy, good offices, mediation, the deployment of military observers, civil police and election observers, military peace support operations, support of democratisation and the rehabilitation of war-torn societies.

### **Crisis management**

Sum of all political, economic and military measures that are taken to manage a critical situation or serious tensions between states.

### **Danger**

A danger to the interests and objectives of our security policy, caused by natural, technological, politico-military or developments within our society or events liable to damage states, human beings and their resources. Dangers may exist without any hostile intention being present.

### **Dissuasion**

Strategy of deterrence by defence capability and sustainability. It is intended to make it clear to a potential adversary that envisaged advantage of an any attack on Switzerland would be greatly outweighed by the risks incurred. Switzerland pursued this strategy in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, implicitly before the Cold War, and then explicitly.

### **Existential dangers**

Serious dangers to the identity, the interests and the very existence of the state, its population and its essential resources.

### **Force generation capability**

Capability to increase the presence, readiness, availability and sustainability of the operational capability, especially within armed forces, in a flexible and timely way when the situation demands. Force generation can be selective, graduated, or it can take place in one step.

### **Force of strategic magnitude**

The subject of Swiss security policy. It denotes that kind of force or violence that affects considerable parts of the state or society. Characteristically this includes military operations against Switzerland, the exertion of economic and political pressure, organised crime on a large scale, terrorism and violent extremism, but also natural and

man-made disasters. Acts of violence against individual persons (e.g., murder, burglary, theft) are not defined as force of strategic magnitude (as long as they do not affect considerable sections of the state and society) and belong to the separate policy area of policing.

### **General prevention**

Normally long-term efforts, designed to eliminate the causes of conflict. This includes development cooperation.

### **Globalisation**

Originally an economic term to define the increasing international interconnection of international commodities, capital and manpower markets. However, the terms is increasingly being used to define for the increasing interconnection and mutual dependence in other areas. For example, globalisation as it applies to security policy is demonstrated by the fact that geographically distant armed conflicts can have direct repercussions on Switzerland, e.g. by a growing number of asylum seekers or by disturbances in the supply of goods.

### **Human rights**

Human rights apply to every human being. They encompass the respect of the dignity and freedom of choice of every individual. Traditionally, a distinction is made between civil and political rights on the one hand, economic, social and cultural rights on the other. However, all these rights are recognised as universal, indivisible and mutually related.

### **Interoperability**

Capability of the armed forces to collaborate with the armed forces of other states. This capability is important to facilitate joint operations. Interoperability refers in particular to command, training, equipment, structure and procedures.

### **Militia armed forces**

Armed forces raised predominantly by universal compulsory military service usually spread over a certain time, whose servicemen act not in a professional capacity.

### **Multi-functionality**

Capability of an instrument to master several and different tasks.

### **Neutrality**

Non-participation of a state in international armed conflicts. A state's permanent neutrality has a particular status in international law. It commits the state already in

peace time in its foreign policy to remain detached from warlike conflicts. Permanent neutrality is incompatible with the membership of an alliance that requires military assistance or the admission of foreign bases in prescribed circumstances.

### **Peace support**

Comprises a wide range of civilian and/or military measures conducive to consolidating peace, ending armed conflicts and preventing the renewed outbreak of armed conflict.

### **Petersberg missions**

Range of EU missions in security policy, that encompasses humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The spectrum of Petersberg missions is commensurate with those specified in the Amsterdam Treaty of 2 October 1997, article 17, paragraph 2, which allows the WEU to provide to the EU access to an operational capability for missions specified in the treaty. The term originates from a WEU ministerial meeting in Petersberg near Bonn on 19 June 1992.

### **Preventive diplomacy**

Diplomatic measures aiming at preventing the emergence of disputes between individual parties and the escalation of existing disputes to open conflicts, and containing such conflicts should they occur.

### **Risk**

Risk is the product of a possible damage (caused by a danger or threat) and the probability of its occurrence.

### **Schengen Agreements**

Treaty named after the town of Schengen in Luxembourg, signed in 1985 by Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The Schengen Agreements stipulate the gradual phasing-out of identity checks along the joint borders and the introduction of the free movement of nationals from signatory states, all nationals of EU member states, as well as from third countries. Italy (1990), Spain and Portugal (1991), Greece (1992), Austria (1995), Sweden, Finland and Denmark (1996) have joined the agreement. The Treaty of Amsterdam stipulated that these agreements will be integrated into the EU's responsibility, i.e. they will become a community matter.

### **Security**

A distinction is usually made between internal and external security. Internal security is affected should there be a threat to the stability and reliability of constitutional government institutions, the state's liberal democratic fundamental order and the proper functioning of these institutions, or the security of the Swiss population is put in danger.

External security is affected should there be a threat to: the stability and integrity of the state's independence, to its capability to defend its borders and its constitutional order against interference from outside, and its good relationships with other states. However, issues of internal and of external security increasingly overlap. This results in a growing complexity of security affairs and a need for effective coordination.

### **Security policy**

The whole range of measures taken by the state to prevent and cope with direct and indirect threats and use of force of strategic magnitude against Switzerland, its population and its essential resources.

### **Security Steering Group**

A staff responsible to the Federal Council dealing with security matters that has the following specific tasks: permanent monitoring of all aspects relevant to security; analysis and assessment of the range of force and violence and of possible developments within Switzerland and in its strategic environment; early identification of opportunities and early warning of emerging threats and potential dangers to Switzerland, our strategic environment and our interests; elaboration of options in the security area for the Federal Council; coordination of security policy issues within and outside the federal administration (especially cantons), particularly in special situations; evaluation of the necessity, extent, efficiency and success of preparations, measures and activities in the area of security.

### **Situations**

*Normal situation:* Situation in which normal administrative procedures are sufficient to cope with the problems and challenges at hand.

*Special situation:* Situation in which certain tasks of government can no longer be fulfilled by normal administrative procedures. In contrast to extraordinary situations, however, the governmental activity is affected only in certain sectors. Characteristic for such situations is the need for a rapid concentration of assets and for a tightening of procedures.

*Extraordinary situation:* Situation in which normal administrative procedures are no longer sufficient in a number of areas and sectors to master problems and challenges, e.g. in case of natural disasters that severely affect the whole country, or in the case of war.

### **Special prevention**

Measures to reduce the potential for conflict in critical situations. The measures applied for this purpose include, inter alia, aid to refugees and displaced persons; reconstruction assistance; the reinforcing of human rights, of the rule of law and of democracy; demobilisation and re-integration of combatants; and police reforms.

**Strategy**

The basic thinking, action and behaviour in respect to security policy issues. Our new strategy of the comprehensive and flexible security cooperation within Switzerland and international security cooperation is determined by our general political principles and our objectives and interests in security policy.

**Subsidiarity**

The principle of subsidiarity implies that within Switzerland the employment of instruments of security policy should take place at the lowest level possible (e.g., at canton or commune level, rather than the federal level) and, as far as the armed forces are concerned, wherever possible through a civilian agency. In particular, justification of the use of the armed forces will always be carefully considered in light of alternatives provided by other national, canton or communal alternatives. Subsidiarity is linked to the principles of proportionality and necessity. Thus, military units can be employed at the request of the civilian authorities if and when the available civilian assets, of all levels, are – through lack of personnel, material or time– not able to cope with a given threat.

**Threat**

A danger to the interests and objectives of our security policy caused by the intentions or activities of persons, groups of persons, states or groups of states. They may be based on hostile intent (e.g. a military attack) or on the intent to utilise our infrastructure without regard for negative consequences (e.g. organised crime).

## Table of contents

<b>Summary</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>2 Requirement for and purpose of a new report</b>	<b>4</b>
21 What has changed since 1990?	4
211 Developments in our environment	4
212 Development of Swiss security policy	5
22 Basic conclusions	7
<b>3 Risks and opportunities</b>	<b>8</b>
31 Range of threats and dangers	8
311 Decrease of conventional military threat factors	8
312 Increase of internal conflicts	8
313 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of long-range weapons systems	9
314 Restriction of free economic exchange and economic pressure	9
315 Economic, social and ecological developments	10
316 Technological developments relevant to security policy	11
317 The threat to the information and communications infrastructure	12
318 Terrorism, violent extremism, espionage, crime and organised crime	13
319 Demographic developments, migrations	15
3110 Natural and man-made disasters	15
32 International security structures	16
321 The United Nations	16
322 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe	18
323 European Union and Western European Union	18
324 NATO, Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	20
325 The Council of Europe	21
326 The position of the other neutral states in the European security structure	22
327 Disarmament agreements and international control measures	23
328 Further structures relevant to security policy	24
33 Risks and opportunities for the security of Switzerland	25
<b>4 Interests and objectives</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>5 Strategy</b>	<b>27</b>
51 Core strategy and strategic guidelines	27
511 Strategic missions	28
512 Maintenance of neutrality while making full use of the freedom of action provided by the law of neutrality	31
52 Main components of the strategy	33
521 Comprehensive and flexible security cooperation at home	33
522 International security cooperation	34
53 Justification of our strategy, compared to alternatives	35
54 Consequences of a European Union membership	36
541 Consequences for security policy	36

542	Consequences for justice and home affairs	37
55	Consequences of UN a membership for security policy	38
<b>6</b>	<b>Instruments</b>	<b>39</b>
61	Foreign policy	39
611	Role and mission within security policy	39
612	Strengthening of peace, preventive diplomacy and crisis management	39
613	Human rights policy	40
614	Disarmament and arms control	40
615	Humanitarian international law	41
616	Development cooperation, cooperation with Eastern Europe and humanitarian assistance	41
617	Policy of neutrality	42
62	Armed forces	42
621	Role and mission within security policy	42
622	Implementation of the missions	44
623	Performance required from the armed forces	45
63	Civil protection	46
631	Role and mission within security policy	46
632	Organisation and mode of operation	47
64	Economic policy	48
641	Role and mission within security policy	48
642	Organisation and mode of operation	48
65	National economic supply	49
651	Role and mission within security policy	49
652	Organisation and mode of operation	49
66	Protection of the constitutional order and police	50
661	Role and mission within security policy	50
662	Organisation and mode of operation	51
67	Information and communications	53
671	Role and mission within security policy	53
672	Information organs	53
673	The security of the information technology and communications infrastructure	54
<b>7</b>	<b>Resources</b>	<b>55</b>
71	System of compulsory service	55
72	Finances	57
<b>8</b>	<b>Strategic leadership</b>	<b>58</b>
81	Establishment of a Security Steering Group	59
82	Normal, special and extraordinary situations	61
83	Role and significance of cantons and communes	61
<b>9</b>	<b>Outlook</b>	<b>63</b>
	<b>List of abbreviations</b>	<b>65</b>
	<b>Description of key terms</b>	<b>66</b>