Switzerland’s Security
2015
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Secure freedom

The terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen at the beginning of this year showed countries in Europe two things: firstly, that the jihadist campaign has the potential to threaten people here, too, in specific and unexpected ways, and secondly, that even states with highly developed legal and human resource capabilities are unable to detect all terrorist activities at an early stage and to prevent them. Both are reasons to reflect on how we handle these findings and what conclusions we draw from them.

As far as the threat is concerned, it is clear that we can reduce it only by working together with other affected parties. These include especially those countries in which jihadism is rife, and above all Muslims, who are suffering particularly from the actions of their criminal fellow believers. They play an important role in the early detection and prevention of radicalisation. They can ensure that a stop is put to radicalisation. Western societies, and also Muslim countries, will therefore in the next few years have to develop strategies in order to jointly bring an end to radicalisation and to support an enlightened Islam.

At the same time, we must protect the freedoms of our societies both against fanatical murderers and against excessive restrictions due to security measures. The latter, in particular, is part of the strategy of terror: it aims, through the use of violence, to make governments resort to such sweeping security measures that their populations ultimately turn against them.

However, anyone looking at the moderate, democratic and judicially supervised measures of the new Intelligence Service Act in this light, is wrong. While they represent a new development for Switzerland, they have been standard in other countries around the world, especially European countries, for some time. They increase in a responsible way the opportunities for detecting at an early stage any terrorist activities and other activities which pose a threat to security and for investigating these without interfering with the civil liberties of the majority of the population. They will also, as is the case in other countries, leave loopholes open which shrewd terrorists or intelligence agents will continue to be able to slip through in future. However, they increase the likelihood of detection and make preparations for attacks that present a security threat more difficult.

I will thus leave it to the readers of this situation report to decide whether they wish to interpret the title of this foreword – ‘Secure freedom’ – as an exhortation, with an exclamation mark, as a question, with a question mark, or as a statement, with a full stop. One thing at least seems clear to me – that in the fight against threats to internal and external security, we want to succeed as often as possible. To protect us all.
The situation report in brief

How safe is Switzerland? Who poses a threat to us and what are the dangers we face? What are the issues that Switzerland’s inhabitants should be addressing in this regard? In response to these questions, the FIS’s situation radar gives an overview from the security-policy point of view; it gives the intelligence service’s perspective on what Switzerland’s security concerns are at present.

- The conflict in Ukraine represents a new phase in the historically rooted East-West conflict. This new phase will bring lasting change to Europe’s security landscape. An era in which conflicts between states in Europe were decreasing has come to an end, and a new era of strategic confrontation on the political, economic and military levels has begun.

- In Europe’s southern neighbourhood, the outcome of the upheavals sparked by the Arab Spring remains uncertain. A number of central governments are having difficulties asserting themselves, and extensive territories are slipping from government control. The most likely scenario in Iraq and Syria is the continuation of the struggle between the terrorist group ‘Islamic State’ and its opponents, during the course of which ‘Islamic State’ will consolidate its territory.

- The emergence of the ‘Islamic State’ terrorist group as a jihadist player in Iraq and Syria, with its military successes, its acts of brutality, its professional media presentations and its consequent appeal and ability to mobilise support in jihadist circles, has sent shockwaves through Western public opinion. It is vying with core al-Qaeda for leadership of the jihadist movement. This rivalry has also increased the risk of spectacular attacks in the West. The risk of attacks in the West is also increasing due to the phenomenon of indoctrinated, trained and battle-hardened returnees from jihad areas, as well as due to lone perpetrators and small groups who have been radicalised from afar. While Switzerland is not a direct target of jihadist groups, as part of the European danger zone it remains under threat. Currently, lone perpetrators and small groups pose the greatest terrorist threat.

- Illegal intelligence activities in Switzerland continue. As demonstrated by the Snowden affair, they have reached a new dimension in the sphere of information security, one which Switzerland cannot avoid.

- Proliferation remains one of the great problems of our time. It is still unclear whether it will be possible to seize the opportunity for a comprehensive agreement with Iran; a nuclear-armed Iran would shake the foundations of international efforts to curb proliferation still further and could also intensify the conventional arms race in the region.
The situation in the areas of right-wing, left-wing and animal rights extremism as well as ethno-nationalist-motivated terrorism and violent extremism has been easing for some time. However, the potential for violence among these groups persists, and violence can sometimes erupt quickly, particularly in response to events.

On the whole, the challenges facing the security authorities in Switzerland have become even more complex. This is as true for the intelligence services as it is for the police, crime prosecution and border authorities and civil protection organizations. The army is facing a trend toward reductions in the previously stable long advance warning times.

**Situation radar tool**

The FIS uses a situation radar tool to depict the threats affecting Switzerland. A simplified version of the situation radar, without any confidential data, has also been incorporated into this report. The public version lists the threats that fall within the FIS’s remit, together with those classified under the categories of ‘migration risks’ and ‘organised crime’, which are also relevant from the point of view of security policy. This report does not go into detail about these two categories, for more information on which readers are referred to the reports of the relevant federal authorities.
Strategic environment in a state of flux

Switzerland’s strategic environment has been in a state of flux for some years and has now entered a new phase. The war in Ukraine is an indication that Europe’s security landscape is undergoing lasting change. In addition to this, developments in the Middle East, which are as hard to predict as ever, remain a major challenge.

New phase in the East-West conflict

Although the potential for conflict has been there for many years, Ukraine has, within a space of less than two years, gone from being co-organiser of the 2012 European Football Championship to being a war zone, a country whose territorial integrity has been violated and which is on the verge of splitting apart. The main reason for this development is that Russia has overcome a period of weakness which it entered 25 years ago and which was considered to be a national disaster. The country is now consciously defining itself as an entity that lies outside the West European framework of reference, and does not accept the current division of power in Europe. The vehement reaction to the shift of power in Kiev makes it clear that Russia sees Ukraine as a key arena in the struggle with the West for zones of influence. Conversely, resistance to the expansion of Russian influence is beginning to make itself felt in the West. This has paved the way for a new phase in the historically rooted East-West conflict on the European continent.

The expansion of Russian influence has become clearly apparent for a number of years. As previously noted by the FIS in its 2013 report on Switzerland’s security, Russia has succeeded in halting the eastward expansion of the EU and NATO and in altering the momentum in the western countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to its own advantage. Following the annexation of Crimea and the signing of a first part of an Association Agreement with the EU in March 2014, the East-West conflict is now being waged as an armed conflict in Ukraine.
Since President Vladimir Putin’s keynote speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 and the Georgian war of 2008, Russia has taken significant steps to strengthen its influence in Eastern Europe. In 2010, it achieved a breakthrough with Belarus’ accession to the customs union with Russia and Kazakhstan. In 2012, it supported the election in Georgia of the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who is receptive to Russian interests and continues to this day to exert an influence on Georgian politics. In 2013, Russian pressure pushed Armenia into the customs union and also deterred Ukraine under President Viktor Yanukovych from signing an EU Association Agreement. Russia’s growing strategic influence is also manifesting itself in the expansion of e.g. Russian energy companies and financial institutions and in the build-up of capable armed forces. The latter can now be deployed in an efficient and controlled manner in Russia’s ‘near abroad’, as can be seen in the case of south-eastern Ukraine.

**Lasting Change in Europe**

The increase in Russian power on the European continent is a process that will have long-term effects. The core of the Russian power structure, established by Putin and a small circle of trusted advisors over the last 15 years, is very robust. The middle-class opposition movement which demonstrated on the streets of several Russian cities at the end of 2011 has been contained, and the centralisation of the system and the internal controls are continually being consolidated. Furthermore, the Russian leadership’s power politics in Europe are approved of by the population at large. While Western sanctions and even more so the sharp fall in oil prices have put additional strain on the Russian economy, the pressure will only be sufficient to threaten the stability of the system if the oil price persists at a low level for a prolonged period of time. Russia’s policy of opposing the expansion of the EU and of NATO in central and eastern Europe and of reconsolidating its own sphere of influence is in all probability not a temporary phenomenon, but a lasting change of Switzerland’s strategic environment.
In the West, resistance to the expansion of Russian influence is stirring. The long-term position taken by the USA will be of particular significance to how developments unfold, given that since the end of the Cold War it has clearly focussed its global engagement on regions outside Europe and has greatly reduced its military presence in Europe. The response of the Obama administration to the altered situation in Europe currently seems to be aimed primarily at ensuring a credible military deterrent and adequate NATO capabilities to secure its eastern border. Using mostly political and economic means, it also aims to prevent as far as possible the reconstitution of a dominant Russian influence in Ukraine and in the other successor states to the Soviet Union which are not NATO members. At the same time, the Obama administration wants to maintain some pragmatic cooperation with Russia, notably in the areas of counter-terrorism and nonproliferation.

**Struggle for zones of influence in Switzerland’s environment begins**

The Russian leadership has begun to mount a genuine challenge to the existing conditions in eastern Europe. The USA will want to secure the eastern borders of NATO as part of its global system of alliances. This has set in motion a process which over time is likely to lead to the formation of competing zones of interest on the European continent. A return to a situation like the one which has prevailed over the last two decades, in which movement toward the goal of a common security area from the Atlantic to the Urals was at least a long-term prospect, has now become unlikely. Realistic development scenarios fall into two broad categories: firstly, one in which some kind of demarcation of interests between East and West limits the conflicts along the edges of the emerging zones of interest at an early stage, and secondly, an alternative under which escalation gradually continues to spiral upward over the next few years.

The new situation may also usher in changes of strategic import for Switzerland and its neighbours, especially if the transition to formal or informal strategic demarcation lines between Russia, the USA and its European partners does not go smoothly. A 25-year-long era during which inter-state conflicts in Europe decreased has come to an end. The new era will in all likelihood be characterised by a sustained period of strategic confrontation between the West and Russia at the political, economic and military levels. How these developments will unfold in detail and where they will lead is still far from certain. They could lead to serious crises not just in Ukraine, but in various other areas of Switzerland’s strategic environment. On the fault line across Europe between East and West we find the Baltic region, Ukraine (together with Belarus and Moldova) as well as the Balkans, where East-West rivalry could be superimposed on conflicts in a region which has not yet come to terms with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
Military threats
In the context of rising tensions between Russia and NATO in Europe, military assets will once again become more important. In the emerging conflict zones, it is to be expected that Russian and Western interests will overlap and that claims will be tested and not be relinquished without a fight. In these regions, there is a particular risk of growing destabilisation compared with the situation at present, and this may take a variety of forms: the exertion of political pressure, the use of propaganda tools and shadowy networks, economic blackmail and the use of force – in crisis situations possibly even the deployment and use of armed forces and the violation of states’ territorial integrity. Such an approach, coupled with the use of armed non-state actors, is also referred to as ‘hybrid warfare’. This is not a completely new phenomenon, but it has been transformed by the use of new technologies, for example in the cybersphere. In the context of the struggle for influence, destabilisation will probably in turn entail greater militarisation of these areas: investment in the capabilities of armed forces, intelligence services and propaganda tools, in the development of paramilitary forces and in activities in cyberspace, with the aim of being able to enforce interests, if necessary by violent means. As a consequence, the long advance warning times which army planners previously had at their disposal to plan for a potential conflict in central Europe are being shortened.

Consequences of the Arab Spring
At the same time, there is no discernible sign of conditions quietening down in Europe’s southern neighbourhood. In Egypt, historically the leading power in the region, the first freely elected government following the transfer of power was removed in a coup in 2013. Since that time, the military has resumed power and has forced the Muslim Brotherhood back underground. Internal security remains precarious, and now the new rulers are facing mounting economic challenges. Numerous other countries in the region are also beset by problems of internal security, decreasing economic room for manoeuvre and the unresolved issue of integrating political Islam. The dominant impression is one of failing states, Libya and Yemen being the most striking examples at present. Nonetheless, in Syria most of the large stocks of chemical weapons were removed from possible access
by the warring parties in 2014, and in Tunisia the parliamentary and presidential elections successfully marked another step on the long path toward the goal of stabilisation of the new situation. Moreover, the wave of revolts has not affected any further states since 2011, and particularly the Gulf monarchies, which are vital to global energy supplies, have (with the exception of Bahrain) so far scarcely been affected. However, the shockwaves from the events are being felt beyond the region’s borders. For example, the Sahel region has been further destabilised in the wake of the transfer of power in Libya. Following on from the military intervention in Mali in 2012, since August 2014 France has been conducting a new military operation to combat the threat from terrorist groups (Operation Barkhane), with troops in Chad, Mali, Mauretania, Niger and Burkina Faso.

2014 was dominated by ‘Islamic State’’s spectacular campaign of expansion in Iraq and Syria. ‘Islamic State’ is a terrorist organisation, but at the same time it is more than that. Recognising this is key to handling the phenomenon correctly without conferring unnecessary legitimacy on ‘Islamic State’. The claim to have established a caliphate goes hand in hand with the quest for statehood. Physical control of territory and of the resident population creates the preconditions for the capacity to act economically and militarily, and permanent control over an area is the measurable expression of success. The impact of ‘Islamic State’ is far-reaching and will endure for at least the next twelve months in a region that is around six times the size of Switzerland and has a population of around five million. The group is exploiting the lingering weaknesses of the Iraqi state and the loss of influence of the Syrian state in large parts of the country. Its demonstrations of power, from Lebanon to Iraq, are calling into question the precarious legitimacy of state borders and with them the almost century-long post-Ottoman order in the Middle East. Finally, it has also provoked a new and possibly long-drawn-out round of military interventions in the region. The USA is leading these interventions, supported by a coalition of Western and regional states.
Risks to Switzerland

The outcome of this upheaval in Europe’s southern neighbourhood remains uncertain. A consolidation of ‘Islamic State’ in Syria and in Iraq would be a change of strategic dimensions for the Near and Middle East. The regime in Syria is fighting on. It may possibly survive, but with its society in ruins, largely discredited domestically and abroad, and without firm control over many provinces. The loss of state control across large areas of Syria and Iraq will make it necessary for the West, in the fight against ‘Islamic State’, to sustain yet another prolonged military engagement. Egypt, Tunisia and Libya are struggling to stabilise the balance of power in their own countries, using a variety of strategies and methods. Switzerland is supporting the difficult and lengthy process of transformation in these countries. However, it cannot remain unaffected by the risks in the southern and eastern Mediterranean region: economic development has been set back, and internal security is a problem. Weapons are flowing in and out unchecked, and fresh scope is opening up for terrorist or criminal organisations. The phenomenon of jihad-motivated travel is a serious security problem for Western states, including Switzerland. The authorities in Switzerland will need to continue to pay close attention to numerous problem areas: the threat to the security of our citizens and diplomatic missions in the region, terrorist threats and kidnappings, disruption of trade and of energy supplies, coping with sanctions regimes and dealing with the funds of politically exposed persons, and migration from the crisis areas.

Energy security

In times of economic crisis and political disturbance, the public becomes more acutely aware of dependence on imported raw materials and energy. As far as Switzerland’s energy security is concerned, the risks have not changed. In terms of oil imports, security is guaranteed, even in times of increased uncertainty in the crisis regions of the Middle East, thanks to a well-functioning international crude oil market. The situation as regards imports of natural gas is structurally rather different: there is as yet no integrated international market, and due to its reliance on fixed pipeline systems, Switzerland is heavily dependent on Russia. This situation will not improve in the near future: the EU-backed Nabucco project, the largest non-Russian alternative pipeline system on the continent of Europe, has been abandoned.
and the future of the major Russian project, the South Stream project, or of an alternative via Turkey is currently uncertain. As a result, the significance of the crisis region of Ukraine for the transit of gas to Europe has been accentuated. In the longer term, the technological revolution linked to the extraction of shale gas has the potential to speed up the development of an international natural gas market and also to have a positive impact on Switzerland’s energy security.

Focus on terrorism

The jihad-motivated attacks in Paris in January 2015 and in Copenhagen in February 2015, as well as the success of the ‘Islamic State’ group’s brutal actions in Iraq and Syria, have alarmed the Western public. This report therefore focuses on terrorism, and in particular, in the light of the current situation, on jihad-motivated terrorism. This is becoming increasingly internationalised, and a large number of groups are engaging in terrorist activities under the jihadist banner. It manifests itself as a contemporary phenomenon in which electronic media play an important role, facilitating the rapid dissemination of large volumes of high-quality propaganda. Linked to this is a clear trend toward the rapid radicalisation of individuals or small groups, who are being incited to perpetrate attacks themselves or to travel to a conflict region as supporters or fighters. Their principal destinations are currently Syria and Iraq. The rise in the numbers of jihad-motivated persons travelling from the West, including from Switzerland, to a conflict region poses a problem, particularly with regard to their return: indoctrinated, trained and battle-hardened jihadists could carry out increased numbers of attacks in Europe.

An overview of further important issues on the FIS’s radar is given below.

Right-wing, left-wing and animal rights extremism

There is still considerable potential for violence in both right-wing and left-wing extremist scenes. However, this does not pose a danger to the state, and the situation has quietened in recent years. Right-wing extremists continue to maintain a low public profile, and there is little sign of acts of violence following a strategic pattern. The intensity of acts of violence by left-wing extremists has diminished. At demonstrations, however, a considerable degree of aggressiveness is displayed, particularly against individuals.

Proliferation

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems is one of the great problems of our time and is the subject of ever closer multilateral cooperation. A number of countries are under observation. However, concern still centres on developments in Iran and North Korea. As regards Iran, the International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly voiced its suspicions that this country is not using its nuclear project purely for civilian purposes, but has for years secretly been working to develop a nuclear weapon. In No-
November 2013, Iran and the five standing members of the UN Security Council plus Germany reached an interim agreement, which has been extended twice since then, as a basis for further negotiations on a comprehensive compromise solution. Switzerland takes a decisive stand against proliferation activities. As an innovative and competitive location for manufacturing and business, it has a particular interest in preventing procurement attempts and transactions aimed at circumventing sanctions.

**Illegal intelligence and attacks on information infrastructure**

The pace of revelations from the Snowden affair has now slowed, but this does not affect the new security aspects of the affair (which extend beyond illegal intelligence to information security, critical infrastructure protection and product safety). Since cyber espionage, in particular, presupposes the infiltration of systems and networks, it also offers opportunities for manipulation and even sabotage. Cyber espionage is continuing to grow in importance but it does not replace traditional methods of espionage – the two types of espionage complement rather than compete with one another. The aim of espionage remains the acquisition of information for a variety of purposes.
Focus on terrorism

Terrorism as a phenomenon
There are numerous definitions of what is meant by the term ‘terrorism’. However, states and international organisations find it difficult to describe the phenomenon in a definitive way. In legal terms, no definitive internationally recognised description, i.e. definition of the phenomenon, exists. No clear differentiation has been made between terrorism and freedom fighters, state terrorism or individual acts of violence (such as killing sprees). The distinction between terrorism and violent extremism, whether politically or religiously motivated, is also unclear.

In Switzerland, descriptions which can be used as approximations when it comes to defining what is meant by terrorism are available. For example, under Article 4 of the Ordinance on the Federal Intelligence Service, terrorist activities are defined as all ‘efforts to influence or change the state and society which are to be achieved or facilitated by the commission or threat of serious criminal acts and by the spreading of fear and terror’. A further description of the term terrorism can be found in Article 260quinties of the Swiss Criminal Code (StGB): the criminal provision against the financing of terrorism defines a terrorist act as ‘a violent crime that is intended to intimidate the public or to coerce a state or international organisation into carrying out or not carrying out an act’.

Causes of terrorism
A key underlying motivation for terrorist actors and groups is disaffection fuelled by the general political, social, economic or ethnic conditions in a particular country or region. In the case of religiously motivated terrorism, the secularisation process in modern societies, in particular, is a breeding ground for the emergence of terrorist views in individuals and consequently for the formation of terrorist groups and organisations. Besides this, membership of a particular ethnic group (ethnicity) or support for political or ideological objectives, for example, can trigger the commission of violent acts in order to achieve goals deriving from such factors.

Secularisation means either the erosion of religion in society altogether or the shift of religious convictions out of the social or political public arena into the realm of individual opinions and thus into the private sphere. Religiously motivated fundamentalists do not accept this shift. Fundamentalism may culminate in terrorism, i.e. lead to the threat or use of violence to frighten the population or to blackmail states. This threat of or use of violence is intended to lend force to demands and ensures that these demands and the actors behind them receive attention from the media and thus also from the public. Terrorism is designed to maximize media impact, and its aim is to escalate the conflict situation. In this sense, terrorism is not an ideology but a – criminal – means of achieving specific goals.
Political Islam and jihadism

As far as religiously motivated fundamentalism is concerned, attention has for years centred on political Islam. This attracted wide support during the final quarter of the 20th century. Its followers view Islam as a clear guidance for the fight against what they perceive as injustice or oppression.

The spiritual sources of political Islam go back centuries and were for the most part developed in the 18th century by Mohammed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and expanded on by 19th century Muslim reformers. These thinkers attempted to promote in their writings the reintroduction of Islamic dogmas and of Islamic religious practices in their allegedly original and pure form. This ideal of returning to the beginnings of Islam is the basis of numerous fundamentalist movements such as Salafism. In the 1920s, the concept of antimodernism, which saw itself as a reaction to the dominance of Western states and globalisation, began to take shape.

The militant form of Salafism that is prepared to use violence is frequently referred to as jihadism. Jihadists believe that they must, if necessary, assert their religious convictions through armed struggle. Contemporary jihadists see jihad as a personal duty. The actual goal of their ambitions is worldwide Islamic rule under which, based on the model of the first generations after the Prophet Mohammed, temporal and spiritual leadership are combined in the person of the caliph. Numerous jihadist groups begin the fight for such a caliphate in their home countries against the governments they consider to be unlawful. It is not until later that some groups and organisations seek to internationalise the armed struggle. Al-Qaeda, one of the most well-known jihadist organisations, was international in outlook from the outset and also played a central role as the ideological sponsor for other groups.

Terrorist groups have long been active in a number of countries in north Africa. One of the consequences of the fall of various governments in north Africa during the Arab Spring in 2011 was that activists prepared to use violence were pardoned and released or were able to escape from prison. The uncertainties and the sharply deteriorating security situation in some of these countries have played into the hands of the jihadists and created fertile ground for the emergence of new networks or the revival of existing groups. Most notable here is Libya, where various terrorist groups are exploiting the unstable situation and using the uncontrolled territory as an area for refuge, recruitment, training and replenishment.
ist threat to the Maghreb and the Sahel region. If the jihadist groups succeed in consolidating their hold, the risk of attacks in Europe would also increase.

**Internationalisation of jihadism**

Al-Qaeda was formed as a network during the Afghan war of resistance against the Soviet Union and really came to the attention of the wider global public for the first time with the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993. On 11 September 2001, members of al-Qaeda carried out the terrorist attacks in the USA in which around 3,000 people died.

The measures taken around the world to combat terrorism after the attacks of 2001 led to the deaths of high-ranking leaders of al-Qaeda, including that of the organisation’s long-standing leader, Osama bin Laden, in May 2011. These losses hit core al-Qaeda hard. Besides core al-Qaeda, the organisation has a number of active affiliates, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. In early September 2014, the head of core al-Qaeda announced the establishment of an al-Qaeda affiliate in India. The Abu Sayyaf organisation, which is active in the Philippines, probably also has links to core al-Qaeda. The group kidnapped a Swiss national and a Dutch national in February 2012; the Swiss hostage managed to escape from captivity in December 2014.

By means of targeted operations, the USA has succeeded in rendering core al-Qaeda practically incapable of conducting operations in the Afghan/Pakistani border region. However, the organisation is still able to plan and carry out attacks in collaboration with local actors or one of its affiliates. It also continues to assert its claim to the ideological leadership and advisory roles in global jihad.

**The ‘Islamic State’ group**

There is growing competition between core al-Qaeda and the ‘Islamic State’ group that is active in Iraq and parts of Syria. The origins of this group go back to 2003. At that time, Afghanistan veteran Abu Musab al-Zarqawi founded the organisation al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad. As far back as early 2004, Zarqawi was pushing for the establishment of an Islamic state. Zarqawi swore allegiance to Osama Bin Laden in 2004 and was appointed by him as the leader of
al-Qaeda in Iraq. In 2006, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was founded. This group declared several provinces and the city of Kirkuk as its state territory, although it did not control these. Up until 2011, the group’s area of operations remained restricted to Iraq. The conflict in Syria that had been smouldering since March 2011 bolstered the group’s efforts to expand its influence. It sent fighters to Syria, who founded the al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra). Within a few months the al-Nusra Front became one of the most powerful armed groups in Syria, but it was unwilling to subordinate itself to the ISI leadership.

The dispute between the al-Nusra Front and ISI led in April 2013 to ISI’s intervention in Syria under the name Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The competing claims finally resulted in core al-Qaeda recognising the al-Nusra Front as its affiliate in Syria and at the same time withdrawing membership of al-Qaeda from ISIS. In early 2014, Syrian opposition groups declared war on ISIS. Since then, several groups in Syria, including the al-Nusra Front, have been fighting against ISIS/‘Islamic State’. In spring 2014, ISIS began its territorial expansion, which culminated in June in the proclamation of the caliphate and in its renaming as ‘Islamic State’. ‘Islamic State’ has considerable financial resources, thanks to its control of oil fields, its plundering of a branch of the central bank in Iraq and its revenues from illegal trading transactions, and is in possession of powerful military and technical equipment. No reliable data on the total number of fighters in the individual units within the group is available; the FIS puts them at several tens of thousands. The fighters are highly motivated, deliberately act in a brutal way and have well-developed military and logistical capabilities. The ‘Islamic State’ group is establishing state-like structures.

**Confrontation between ‘Islamic State’ and Kurds**

The area of influence of the ‘Islamic State’ group affects Turkey and, in particular, territories in Syria and Iraq inhabited by Kurdish people. The political wing of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), known as the Kongra-Gel, has accused Turkey not only of being passive in the fight against ‘Islamic State’ but of supporting the group.

The tensions between PKK supporters and ‘Islamic State’ sympathisers are having a direct impact on the security situation in Europe. At the end of 2014, in the wake of the attack by ‘Islamic State’ on the northern Syrian city of Kobane (Ain al-Arab), which is located on the Syrian-Turkish border and is inhabited mainly by Kurds, demonstrations by Kurdish groups took place in a number of towns and cities across Europe. While the majority of these demonstrations passed off peacefully, in some
cases, e.g. in Germany, violent confrontations occurred between Islamists and pro-Kurdish demonstrators.

The influence of electronic media

The jihadist movement is gaining momentum worldwide through the growing influence of electronic media on communicative behaviour. Due in particular to the increasingly widespread use of smartphones and the resulting increase in mobile access to the internet, the opportunities for interactivity have risen dramatically. The fact that it is so easy to use social media networks such as Facebook or YouTube or even messaging services such as Whatsapp on mobile devices is leading to the intensive use of horizontal communication channels on which it is possible to reach large numbers of people quickly.

Jihadist rhetoric and symbolism are used comparatively openly in social networks. The propaganda issued by ‘Islamic State’, in particular, is notable for its high quality and quantity. One of its features is that it is distributed in several languages. Used for propaganda purposes, such media content can lead to individuals or small groups identifying with the ideas of violent groups and in some cases rapidly becoming radicalised. In Switzerland, it has up until now been young, psychologically unstable, directionless and predominantly male individuals with unsatisfactory future prospects who have found it particularly appealing and let themselves be influenced by jihadists and jihadist groups. As in other countries, large numbers of users of social networks in Switzerland openly sympathise with jihadist ideology.

Jihad-motivated travel to conflict areas

The influence of jihadist propaganda in electronic media may motivate individuals and small groups to plan attacks themselves. The propaganda also incites people to travel as supporters or fighters to conflict areas.

Such jihad-motivated travellers to jihad areas are playing an increasingly important role. These individuals travel from Europe, Central Asia, the Gulf region and north Africa, but also from overseas, to conflict areas in the Near and Middle East as well as to Somalia, Libya or Mali, for example, where they join jihadist groups. As far as jihad-motivated travel from Switzerland is concerned, the principal destinations include Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and Syria. The conflict area in Syria and in Iraq is particularly convenient to travel to, due to its geographical location. Several thousand individuals have already made their way from Europe to Syria. With the rising number of travellers to conflict areas, the number of potential returnees is also increasing. There is thus an increased risk that ideologically indoctrinated and battle-hardened returnees will serve as role models for recruiting more potential jihadists or will carry out attacks in Europe. Freedom of movement and the associated lack of systematic checks on persons at national borders within the Schengen area mean that the entire area is affected.
The motives of the travellers differ widely. They may take part in combat operations in one of the numerous local groups, provide the local organisations with logistics and propaganda support or undergo combat training in training camps. It is not possible to draw up a standard profile of a traveller to a jihad area, as the persons involved and their motives differ too widely.

The FIS has been closely and continuously monitoring trends in jihad-motivated travel since 2001. To counter this threat, the FIS gathers information using all its intelligence sensors and engages in an intensive exchange of information with partner organisations. As part of its remit, the FIS also carries out monitoring of relevant public internet sites, social media and forums which are used by jihadists. If there are specific indications to suggest that the radicalisation of a person will culminate in violence, the FIS conducts preventive interviews and files applications for measures under the law governing foreign nationals, such as entry bans, deportations, revocations of residency status or residence inquiry alerts. If any criminal activities are suspected, FIS hands the case over to the law enforcement agencies.
Jihadist activities in Switzerland

Because the jihadist movement in Switzerland consists predominantly of individuals and small groups, any concrete assertions about the number of active jihadists would be speculative. It can, however, be assumed that the number of people is relatively small. Owing to the significant influence of electronic media on the radicalisation process, the FIS and the Federal Office of Police began monitoring and combating jihadism on the internet around three years ago. This is intended to uncover jihadist efforts, in order to prevent propaganda that incites violence and specific terrorist activities.

Increased threat

There has essentially been an increased terror threat in western Europe since 2001; this has increased further in the last few months. The proclamation of the caliphate in June 2014 and the military action by ‘Islamic State’ against other opposition groups in Syria and in Iraq are interpreted by core al-Qaeda as a challenge to its claim to leadership of the international jihadist movement. This rivalry has increased the terrorist threat to the West and thus also to Switzerland, as the groups might try to raise their profile through attacks in the West or against Western states’ interests in other countries. The greatest threat comes from returnees from conflict areas and from radicalised lone perpetrators and small groups. Currently, however, there are no indications of specific attack plans by jihadist groups or by ‘lone wolves’ or small groups who have been inspired by such groups to carry out attacks.

Specific measures for combating terrorism

On 1 January 2015, an emergency statute banning al-Qaeda, the ‘Islamic State’ group and related organisations came into force; the statute is time-limited until the end of 2018. Switzerland has thus complied with UN Resolution 2178 against foreign terrorist fighters. This resolution calls on Member States to take measures consistent with international law to prevent radicalisation and recruitment for terrorist activities associated with al-Qaeda and ‘Islamic State’. A longer-term arrangement for a possible legal ban on terrorist groups is being examined.

Besides these government measures, it is essentially the resilience of Muslim communities in the countries of Europe that will be able to help prevent the influence of jihadist propa-
ganda and jihad-motivated acts of violence. In addition, integration measures in Western countries are making a key contribution by preventing the marginalisation of members of Muslim communities, which works to counteract radicalisation.
Legal tools for combating terrorism

There are a variety of legal bases governing preventive and repressive aspects of combating terrorist activities in Switzerland. Preventively, the Federal Government, acting in accordance with Article 2 of the Federal Act on Measures to Safeguard Internal Security (BWIS), takes ‘preventive measures to detect and combat threats from terrorism (...) at an early stage’. The Federal Act on Responsibilities in the Area of the Civilian Intelligence Service (ZNDG) comprises provisions governing the specific tasks of the FIS as well as the processing of personal data and the external security information system. The ZNDG and the parts of the BWIS pertaining to the FIS are to be merged with the new Intelligence Service Act (NDG) to form a new statutory basis governing intelligence activity. The NDG is currently at the parliamentary debate stage.

In the Swiss Criminal Code (StGB), Title Twelve comprises inter alia articles on crimes and offences against public peace. In addition to the ban on public incitement to commit a crime or act of violence (Article 259 StGB), Articles 260 ter StGB (Criminal organisation) and 260 quinquies StGB (Financing terrorism) are also particularly relevant from the point of view of combating terrorism. Criminal prosecution of such offences is in most cases the responsibility of the Swiss Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office.

In relation to terrorism, the Criminal Code currently in force contains no rule, other than the provision against the financing of terrorism, that explicitly criminalises terrorism. On the other hand, there are a large number of offences under which terrorist acts against persons or institutions are punishable: offences against life and limb (Article 111 ff. StGB), offences against liberty (Article 180 ff. StGB), offences constituting a public danger (Article 221 ff. StGB) or other crimes or offences (for example Article 258 ff. StGB or 265 ff. StGB). Attempts to commit such acts, as well as incitement to commit such acts and complicity in the commission of such acts, are also punishable. A particularly reprehensible attitude, for example terrorist motives, may be taken into account in sentencing.

Furthermore, for the prosecution of particularly serious crimes (including intentional killing, murder, grievous bodily harm, illegal restraint and kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson), which are typically also committed in connection with a terrorist act, the legislator has set the threshold for punishability before the attempt stage and introduced punishable preparatory actions. Accordingly, a person taking in a planned manner specific technical or organisational measures, the nature and scope of which show that he or she is preparing to commit one of the aforementioned serious criminal offences, is deemed to be acting criminally. Planned measures are defined as being multiple interconnected actions which are directed toward a common purpose. Complicity in and incitement to commit such punishable preparatory actions are also punishable.

The challenge for the authorities here consists in the early detection of preparatory actions, which are practically always carried out covertly, and in proving the associated intent – before the criminal procedural tools can be used or in order that proceedings can be instituted. At the present time, the information procurement methods provided for under the law in relation to internal security are essentially collection from public sources, requests for information, and monitoring in public spaces (Federal Gazette (Bundesblatt) 2014 2105-2236). In addition, the FIS also collaborates with the relevant cantonal offices.
Violent extremism and terrorism motivated by religion and ethno-nationalism

The internationalisation of jihad-motivated terrorism continues and still poses a severe threat to security, including that of Western countries. The armed clashes in the conflict zones of Syria and parts of Iraq are polarising the jihadist movement over claims to the leadership role. A potential threat is posed by individuals who travel to conflict zones as supporters or combatants and then, as further radicalised jihadists, return to the countries from which they came. Radicalisation is heavily influenced by jihadist propaganda disseminated via social media, such as video messages and texts. While Switzerland is not the target of jihadist groups, as part of the European danger zone it remains under threat. Swiss citizens could fall victim to opportunist acts of terror or kidnappings in unstable regions of the world.
Internationalisation of jihadism continues apace

The internationalisation of jihadist-motivated terrorism is continuing and poses a severe threat to security in Western countries as well as elsewhere. The actions of the ‘Islamic State’ group in parts of Iraq and Syria are polarising the jihadist movement over the claim to the leadership role. Core al-Qaeda now sees itself being challenged; it is first and foremost at the propaganda level that it poses a potential direct threat. The core al-Qaeda leadership continues to call for jihadist violence worldwide. It inspires and encourages prospective jihadists.

The threat from jihadists working alone or in very small groups, in particular, is difficult to predict in advance:

▪ In May 2014, a man shot four people dead in an attack at the Jewish Museum of Belgium in Brussels. A few days after the attack, a suspect was arrested. The 29-year-old French citizen and Syrian returnee is thought to have been radicalised during his term of imprisonment in a French jail.

▪ In October 2014 in Canada, two attacks were carried out within the space of a few days. In Montreal, a suspected jihadist ran over two soldiers in his vehicle; following a car chase, the police shot the suspect dead. Two days later, a soldier was killed in a shooting in the government district in Ottawa. The perpetrator was also killed.

▪ Also in October 2014, a jihad-motivated man attacked a group of policemen in New York (USA) and wounded two of them. The 32-year-old convert was shot dead by the police immediately after the attack.

▪ On 7 January 2015, two brothers who were French citizens of Algerian descent carried out an attack on the editorial offices of the satirical magazine ‘Charlie Hebdo’ in Paris and killed twelve people. While fleeing, the perpetrators also shot dead a policeman. They were killed by the French gendarmerie on 9 January 2015; one of the brothers had previously stated that he had links to AQAP. AQAP itself claimed responsibility for the attack, but at the time of going to press it was still unclear whether it had actually been involved.

▪ On 8 January 2015, a Frenchman of Malian descent shot a policewoman dead in Montrouge (France). On 9 January 2015, he took AQAP propaganda regarding the attack on ‘Charlie Hebdo’
a number of people hostage in a Jewish supermarket in Paris, killing four of them. The perpetrator was killed during the storming of the supermarket later the same day; he had professed allegiance to ‘Islamic State’ in a video message.

- In mid-February 2015, a Dane of Palestinian origin carried out two attacks in Copenhagen (Denmark), one at an event in which an author of Muhammad-cartoons was taking part, and then another some hours later at an event in a synagogue. When he was stopped by the police, he immediately opened fire and was shot dead. His attacks resulted in two deaths and injured several people; he is alleged to have pledged allegiance to ‘Islamic State’ three hours before the first attack.

Problems relating to returnees, lone perpetrators and small groups

A potential threat is posed in particular by persons who travel to conflict zones as already radicalised supporters or fighters and then return from there to their home countries having been further indoctrinated, some even battle-hardened. Ideologically-influenced and battle-hardened returnees may serve as role models for other potential jihadists or carry out attacks in Europe. The influence which such returnees have on the radicalisation process in their home countries by sharing their experiences should not be underestimated. In the period since 2011, several thousand people have set out from Europe to the jihad areas in Syria and Iraq. However, other conflict zones, such as Somalia and to a lesser extent Mali, also continue to act as a magnet for potential travellers. It is harder for the police to intervene against people who are willing or at least prepared to die as a result of their actions than against people who want to survive.

The Swiss Office of the Attorney General is conducting a criminal investigation against three Iraqis suspected of supporting the criminal organisation ‘Islamic State’, endangerment by explosives and toxic gases with criminal intent, acts preparatory to criminal offences, pornography-related offences, and supporting illegal entry to, exit from and residence in Switzerland. The case revolves around the suspicion that the men, who are being held in pre-trial detention, had been planning a terror attack in Europe. At the time of going to press, no information about a possible target location was available.
Kurdish groups remain active

The ‘Islamic State’ group’s area of operations includes regions also inhabited by Kurds. In the autumn of 2014, Kurdish diaspora communities in a number of European countries carried out numerous protests in connection with attacks on the northern Syrian town of Kobane, where the majority of the population are Kurds. The PKK was the driving force behind the protest against the actions of ‘Islamic State’ and, despite the ongoing peace process, also against Turkey, which is not only seen by Kurdish organisations as being too passive in the fight against ‘Islamic State’, but is also accused of supporting the group. Violent clashes between Kurdish and Islamist groups have occurred at various locations in Europe; this could potentially also happen in Switzerland.

Developments in the peace process with Turkey also have a decisive influence on the PKK’s activities. If this process stalls or is even aborted, attacks are to be expected, particularly against official Turkish institutions in Western Europe.

Little activity in the Tamil community

There has been little sign of any further activity by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Tamil diaspora community. While the desire for a separate state of their own is still widespread among Tamils, there is no longer much public debate about it.
Deteriorating security situation in parts of Africa

The security situation in some countries in North Africa has deteriorated and remains unstable. In the Sahel and the Maghreb, jihadist groups have formed closer links and established new alliances. AQIM is coming under pressure from state security forces in Algeria, for example, and is trying to forge links with groups in countries such as Tunisia and Libya. The negotiations to stabilise northern Mali have repeatedly stalled; here too, the security situation is fragile. In the Central African Republic, security is guaranteed only to a very limited extent, due to violent conflict between tribal communities and clashes between armed groups. The Boko Haram group has carried out attacks and kidnappings in Nigeria and in Cameroon, and recently also in areas of Chad and Niger close to Nigeria. Al-Shabaab, as the regional affiliate of al-Qaeda, is active in Somalia and Kenya. In large parts of these countries, there is still an increased risk of falling victim to kidnappings or attacks. In Egypt, the Islamist organisation Ansar Beit al-Maqdis has identified itself as part of ‘Islamic State’, which is evidence of the ‘Islamic State’ group’s move toward increasing internationalisation.

Propaganda and kidnappings on the Arabian Peninsula

On the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP has been disseminating propaganda as well as carrying out attacks on a number of mostly Yemeni targets and kidnapping foreigners. Its propaganda is aimed at motivating individuals to engage in terrorist activities in their home countries or countries of residence, and also includes practical instructions. Though under pressure, AQAP has managed to offset the losses suffered in Yemen and replace its leaders.

Social media as a driver

Social networks such as Facebook and YouTube, as well as messaging services like WhatsApp, are playing an increasingly important role in the distribution of jihadist propaganda. Propaganda issued by ‘Islamic State’, for example, is notable for its quantity and quality. Some video messages, pictures and texts are distributed in a number of languages. During the course of the conflict in Syria, the amount of violence depicted in the propaganda has increased hugely.
The propaganda appeals in particular to psychologically unstable, directionless young people with unsatisfactory future prospects, and these allow themselves to be influenced by jihadists and jihadist groups. This often leads to the rapid radicalisation of young and predominantly male internet users. Monitoring of jihadist internet sites is thus an important tool for preventing and countering terrorism.

Jihad monitoring has now identified over 200 users who are distributing jihadist ideas in or from Switzerland and networking with like-minded people in Switzerland and abroad. In December 2013, jihadism monitoring activities led to a conviction for the first time: a 24-year-old Kosovar resident in Switzerland was found guilty of public incitement to commit crimes or violence and of racial discrimination, partly because of statements he had made on the internet, and ordered to pay a fine.
‘Islamic State’ and core al-Qaeda

In September 2014, around 30 countries agreed on a global strategy against ‘Islamic State’. However, it seems unlikely that the group will be destroyed militarily in 2015. Although the air attacks led by the USA are able to weaken the group, its lasting defeat would require the deployment of ground forces to seize and hold the territories claimed by the group.

Political instability in various countries in Africa is creating opportunities for jihadist groups, for example through the emergence of new safe havens with limited government control, the acquisition of sympathisers and supporters, the recruitment of fighters or the exploitation of events for propaganda purposes. The competition between core al-Qaeda and ‘Islamic State’ for the leadership role in the international jihadist movement is increasing the terrorist threat, for Switzerland as well as other countries. Highly publicised attacks in the West could provide sympathisers or members of the two organizations with a suitable means of raising their profile. For example, the perpetrators of the attack on the French magazine ‘Charlie Hebdo’ in January 2015 claimed to have links to AQAP, and AQAP claimed responsibility for the attack.

Returnees, lone perpetrators and small groups pose greatest threat

Individuals returning from jihad areas to their countries of residence may present a threat. If these returnees have been indoctrinated during their time in the conflict area, and at all events if they have gained actual experience of armed conflict, there is an increased risk that they will carry out attacks in Europe or serve as role models for other potential jihadists. Switzerland is not an island in the European threat zone. As shown by the attack on the Jewish Museum of Belgium in Brussels, the country targeted in an attack will not necessarily be the same as the country of which the perpetrator is a national or in which he or she resides. The free movement of persons in the Schengen zone means that returnees prepared to use violence who are from any of the countries in this zone also pose a potential risk to Switzerland.

Latest edition of the ‘Dabiq’ magazine published by ‘Islamic State’
The greatest threat of a jihad-motivated attack comes from lone perpetrators and small groups. Although there is currently no concrete evidence that attacks are being planned in Switzerland, spontaneous acts of violence and acts of violence carried out independently are also possible in this country. Switzerland is occasionally mentioned in the propaganda of ‘Islamic State’ in connection with its neighbouring countries; in one case to date calls were made for attacks to be carried out in this country.

**Jihadists in Africa remain active**

The political situation in the Arab Spring countries in North Africa and the Sahel remains unstable. Due to the resulting vacuum in state leadership, the security situation is precarious. The regional affiliates of al-Qaeda and the factions connected with them have lost very little in terms of mobility and remain active. While some groups consistently target their violent acts at security forces, the risk of terrorist attacks on tourists and of kidnappings of citizens of Western states remains high.

**Several African states marked by insecurity**

In several African states, terrorist attacks by jihadist groups and battles between opposing armed organizations have created a fragile situation. In countries such as Libya, Mali, Niger, Chad, Nigeria, Sudan and the Central African Republic, there is the risk that jihadist groups will exploit this environment of insecurity and instability for their own purposes and expand their influence. The international troops present in the region, including contingents from Western states, have been unable to help bring about long-term stability. In addition, their presence increases the risk of citizens of Western states falling victim to terrorist attacks or kidnappings. Repeated changes in key political positions are contributing further to the insecurity.

**Arabian Peninsula**

AQAP’s publications make it clear that the group is still seeking to attack Western targets and to gain new followers. The organisation is still intent on and potentially capable of carrying out attacks on Western interests, both in Yemen and outside it. AQAP has remained able to make good any losses in its top leadership. For foreigners, the risk of falling victim to kidnappings in Yemen remains very high.

**PKK sees itself as representing the interests of the Kurds**

Events connected with the operations of ‘Islamic State’ are having an impact on the peace process between Turkey and the Kurds. The PKK sees itself as the dominant representative of the Kurdish cause and has been mobilising people to represent its interests in Europe and in Turkey. In Switzerland, its activities are limited to propaganda and demonstrations, which largely pass off peacefully. Funds are also raised – sometimes under pressure – which go to support the PKK. If the situation in the Kurdish areas were to deteriorate, violent rioting could occur even in Switzerland, especially in the event of a clash between Islamists and Kurdish protesters. In addition, the Kurdish organizations still have the ability to mobilize...
rapidly and across Europe, as happened following the arrest of the Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan. The PKK should continue to be viewed as a violent-extremist terrorist group, whose potential for violence has not diminished.

**No signs of violent Tamil movement**

There are no concrete signs to suggest that a violent Tamil separatist movement is being resurrected. However, developments in Sri Lanka, where there is still no solid foundation for trust between Singhalese and Tamils and where the Tamil minority of the population is subject to repression, have a strong influence on Tamil diaspora communities. It is currently still too soon to gauge the impact for the Tamils of the voting out of office of President Rajapakse, who in 2009 succeeded in eliminating LTTE in Sri Lanka, and the election of President Sirisena.
PROSPECTS

Threat remains at a heightened level

It must be assumed that core al-Qaeda and the ‘Islamic State’ group will, over the longer term, remain two of the most influential players in the jihadist movement, although tendencies to divide and splinter are foreseeable in both organizations.

The conflict in Syria and the influence of the ‘Islamic State’ group will continue to shape the security situation in the region and in Europe. The conflict has the potential to continue radicalising sympathizers and supporters. Images and stories of activities in the jihad area could lead to broader acceptance of support for violence and in particular might motivate lone perpetrators or small groups actually to carry out violent attacks. The importance of social networks in the dissemination of jihadist propaganda is likely to increase still further. Virally spread messages on the internet have a huge influence on the radicalisation of individuals.

In the medium term, there is a danger that returnees from jihad areas might join together to form small groups, which could evolve into new jihadist networks. In addition, non-European fighters might attempt to enter Europe by legal or illegal means.

Attacks by radicalised lone perpetrators or small groups (for example acts of violence by returnees from jihad areas) will in future continue to constitute the greatest terrorist threat to the West and also to Switzerland. It is difficult to predict such acts in advance, and in free and democratic societies it is difficult to guarantee comprehensive protection for individuals and institutions. In particular, foreign interests in Switzerland (such as embassies), international organisations operating in Switzerland or Jew-
ish institutions and individuals may be exposed, occasionally or persistently, to an increased level of threat from terrorist or violent extremist groups.

**High risk of kidnapping**

No quick solution to the social, economic, ethnic and regional challenges in numerous countries in north and central Africa can be expected. Although, since the escape of a Swiss citizen from a lengthy period of captivity on the Philippines, there are now only a few hostages from Western states left in the hands of terrorist-motivated kidnappers, there is a very high risk to citizens of Western states of falling victim to an opportunist kidnapping, not only in some of these areas, but also, for example, in the conflict zones in Syria and in Iraq. In this context, the travel advice warnings of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) are extremely important. In all the cases recorded since 2009 in which Swiss citizens have been kidnapped for political or terrorist reasons, the FDFA had advised against visiting the country in question, warning people either to stay away altogether or to avoid particular areas.

**Activities of Kurdish groups continue**

The activities of Kurdish diaspora communities and the PKK will, as before, continue to focus on events in the Kurdish areas, the actions of ‘Islamic State’ and, in particular, developments in the peace process with Turkey. Although violent acts and demonstrations in Switzerland are unlikely, they could happen at any time. The PKK’s potential for violence is undiminished.

These two statements highlight the dilemma facing Western states if, in the fight against ‘Islamic State’, they were to support groups which have links to the PKK.
FDFA travel advice

The FDFA’s travel advice covers 176 countries and is consulted on the FDFA website around two million times a year. It is also available via the smartphone app ‘itineris’. Itineraries can also be registered electronically there. On Twitter, the FDFA provides general travel tips and information on the most important updates to its travel advice.

The travel advice provides a broadly-based assessment of the security situation, with the emphasis on the political and crime situation:

- As travellers are sometimes faced with so much often contradictory information that it is hard for them to sort it out, the travel advice helps them to choose their holiday destination.

- Because the FDFA has good connections through its embassies and consulates abroad and also incorporates information from other federal agencies, for example from the FIS, it is able to make a balanced assessment of the situation for its travel advice.

- Because the FDFA is not pursuing any financial interests, it is considered by the travel industry and the public to be independent and trustworthy.

The travel advice recommends precautionary measures in order to reduce the risks,

- because the Federal Council has given the FDFA the task of drawing people’s attention to the potential risks involved in foreign travel

- because it doesn’t want people’s dream holidays to turn into nightmares

- and because you can only minimise the risks if you know what they are.

In extreme cases, the FDFA advises against travel to a particular region or country,

- because the FDFA assesses travel to that area as being too risky due to the particular threat level

- and because the FDFA often has only restricted or even no access to crisis areas and can therefore provide Swiss citizens there with only limited or no support.
There is still considerable potential for violence in both right-wing and left-wing extremist scenes. However, this does not pose a danger to the state, and the situation has quietened in recent years. Right-wing extremists continue to maintain a low public profile, and there is little sign of acts of violence following a strategic pattern. The intensity of acts of violence by left-wing extremists has diminished. At demonstrations, however, a considerable degree of aggressiveness is displayed, particularly against individuals.
Situation remains calm

In 2014, there were 19 incidents connected with violent right-wing extremism and 218 incidents connected with violent left-wing extremism of which the FIS was aware; cases merely involving graffiti have not been included in the figures. The number of confirmed incidents was thus down by 50 per cent for right-wing extremism and up by around five per cent for left-wing extremism. As these percentages are based on very low numbers, annual fluctuations are not really significant. However, the figures for right-wing extremism have been declining since 2009, and a similar trend has been observed in the case of left-wing extremism since 2010. For years, the figures for right-wing extremism have been at a low level and those for left-wing extremism at a comparatively high one.

Violence was involved in around 50 per cent of the incidents relating to right-wing extremism which have come to the attention of the FIS, while the corresponding proportion for left-wing extremism was approximately 34 per cent. In 2014, the types of violence encountered in both these extremist circles ranged from paint attacks and arson attacks involving improvised explosive and incendiary devices (IEIDs) to physical violence against persons. Where physical violence is used against persons, this generally takes the form of clashes with the police (particularly in the case of left-wing extremists) or brawls. In addition, violent clashes can be expected where the two extremist camps come into contact with one another; the police take this into account in their deployment planning for events organized by either camp of which they have prior notice.

Right-wing extremism

Right-wing extremists continue to maintain a low public profile; where acts of violence are observed, there is no apparent strategic intent. One possible exception was the placing of an IEID in front of the transit centre in Thun BE at the end of May. Various examples of spray-painted graffiti suggest that right-wing extremists were involved, and the arson attack took place one day before residents moved into the asylum accommodation. On the whole, attacks by right-wing extremists on institutions connected with the asylum system are rare, but xenophobia and racism do form part of right-wing extremism. This is evident not only from violations of the criminal law provisions governing racial discrimination (Art. 261bis Swiss Crimi
RIGHT-WING, LEFT-WING AND ANIMAL RIGHTS EXTREMISM | SITUATION

...
Left-wing extremism

The deployment of IEIDs, arson attacks and attacks on motor vehicles by left-wing extremists have remained rare. Despite a butyric acid attack on Zurich’s migration office in June 2014, it has for some time been apparent that serious criminal offences, such as the use of IEIDs or acts of arson, are becoming less common. Physical attacks are also rare, although the potential for aggression, particularly against security forces, remains high at organised events. The currently preferred tactics of left-wing extremists are paint attacks or banner protests; commercially available fireworks are occasionally used.

Left-wing extremists continue to stick to their own issues, but frequently publicise these in reaction to current events. These issues are constantly being combined in new ways, with the focus differing from region to region. For example, in connection with ‘Reclaim the Streets’ events, left-wing extremists have campaigned for more ‘free spaces’ and linked this to their fight against ‘repression’. They have also demonstrated against ‘repression’ in connection with criticism of ‘racism’ and ‘nationalism’, issues which can also be linked to ‘migration’ and ‘anti-fascism’. Left-wing extremists see ‘anti-fascism’ as the struggle not just against the extreme right, but against the capitalist system per se, and the protest against ‘refugee deportation jails’ links the issues of ‘migration’ and ‘repression’.

Opportunities for protests and attacks were provided by events including various referenda, military operations in Kobane (Syria) and in the Gaza Strip (Palestinian territories), the Miss Switzerland contest in Bern and a speech by the Fifa President at the University of Zurich, as well as court hearings against members of left-wing extremist groups.

The World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos GR continues to be a target for left-wing extremists, but its importance as a target has diminished as the broader anti-globalisation movement has lost momentum. Nonetheless, there have been a number of violent actions relating to the WEF, and on 21 January 2015 IEID attacks were carried out on a company in the defence technology sector and on a company in the security technology sector. Left-wing extremists had previously been focussing their attention on the meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council in early December 2014 in Basel. The authorised rally on the final day of the Ministerial Council meeting was followed by rioting; it was only thanks to the massive security presence that the event itself did take place without disturbances. The clearance of the Labitzke site in Zurich led to protests and campaigns, mainly in the summer months of 2014. Whereas in the case of the OSCE criticism focussed on ‘imperialism’ and ‘repression’, in the case of the Labitzke site the focus was on its use as an ‘free space’. Exactly one week after the rally against the OSCE in Basel, a ‘Reclaim the Streets’ dem-
onstration in Zurich provided an opportunity for spray-painting, looting and setting fire to cars and containers. The demonstration is thought to have been organised by Zurich-based left-wing extremists; calls to attend it were sent out covertly immediately beforehand via SMS. At the demonstration, police officers were among those attacked with laser pointers, stones, fire-crackers, flares and bottles – seven police officers were injured, and two were lucky to escape unhurt after a demonstrator threw a burning torch into a patrol vehicle.

Targets of attacks and protests included police stations, prisons, bank branches and consulates, e.g. the Spanish consulate in Zurich in connection with migration. The Riding School in Bern remains a rallying point for violent actions in the federal capital.

**International integration**

The two international skinhead groups Blood & Honour and Hammerskins are still active, and members of the Swiss groups affiliated with these travel to meet contacts elsewhere in Europe. The same is true of events like skinhead concerts: these are attended by Swiss right-wing extremists, not just in the countries neighbouring Switzerland but throughout Europe. Swiss right-wing extremists occasionally make appearances as speakers at events organised by right-wing extremist groups. However, the contacts are limited to the individuals concerned, and there is scarcely any evidence of structures extending beyond these. The group Combat 18 France is a cross-border organisation operating in French-speaking Switzerland and in France, but its development has stalled due to prison sentences imposed on members. While it has to be noted that some individual German right-wing extremists have switched their place of residence to Switzerland in recent years, it has not yet been established that this was connected to their violent extremist views or that German right-wing extremist groups have transferred structures to Switzerland.

International cooperation is more structured on the left-wing extremist side. Secours Rouge International (SRI) maintains two general secretariats, one in Belgium and the other in Switzerland. Revolutionärer Aufbau Zürich (RAZ) is seen as the driving force here and is particularly involved with Greek and Italian activists. In addition, it still maintains personal links with Italy, e.g. with Federazione Anarchica Informale. The latter was responsible for the last major attacks in Switzerland and against Swiss
interests abroad, but has been somewhat weakened by the successes of the Italian criminal prosecution service. The violent environmental activist and anarchist Marco Camenisch, who is serving a prison sentence in Switzerland for murder until 2018, remains a rallying point for left-wing extremists in Switzerland and abroad. Swiss left-wing extremists are also supporting the ‘No TAV’ campaign against the construction of the high-speed rail link between Turin (Italy) and Lyon (France), which will pass through the Susa valley, and the campaign against the airport project at Notre-Dame-des-Landes in France. There is also evidence that Swiss animal rights extremists who are prepared to use violence have links with Swiss left-wing extremists and anarchist activists abroad, particularly in northern Italy. Finally, the protest by left-wing extremists under the banner of ‘Kobane’ (the Syrian town on the border with Turkey being defended by Kurds) also showed that links with left-wing extremist groups in Turkey and with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) still exist and that joint actions are a possibility, at least under certain circumstances.

Animal rights extremism

Paint attacks and the destruction of hunting high seats are evidence that unknown perpetrators are continuing, in the name of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), to carry out unlawful actions against the hunting of animals and to fight against the exploitation of animals and for their liberation. Such attacks are rare in Switzerland, but are encountered in all areas in which use is made of animals, whether for food, clothing, research or entertainment. Outside this general context, actions carried out by animal rights extremists are usually linked to specific campaigns. Specific targets are designated and a course of action is sought that is as effective as possible: as part of the Gateway to Hell campaign, for example, airline companies worldwide are being attacked in the fight against vivisection. The airline companies designated as targets are alleged to be shipping animals from breeders to laboratories. Where the identity of the perpetrators of actions conducted as part of such campaigns is revealed, the actions usually remain within the bounds of legality, whereas unlawful actions by unknown perpetrators are usually carried out under the ALF banner. Individuals from Swiss animal rights extremist circles who are prepared to use violence also take part in actions by violent far-left groups and maintain links with the leaders of these groups.
Right-wing extremism

The far-right scene remains turned in on itself. Although there are points on which it connects, its ideas do not resonate with the public. It abandoned attempts to gain a foothold in institutionalised politics some years ago. In society, as in economic life, right-wing extremism meets largely with rejection: far-right extremists are able to stage events for which logistical support from outside is required only covertly or by masking their identity, and they have to have an alternative plan ready. These restrictions are reflected in their behaviour, since right-wing extremists, if they are recognised as such, stand to suffer personal consequences up to and including losing their job or training position. Right-wing extremists respond to this situation by behaving clandestinely, shying away from publicity and organising themselves on the Internet via social media, mainly in closed groups. Their world view combines fantasies about power with the fear of downfall, from which they are unable to arrive at any comprehensive strategies. The decrease in the number of incidents recorded is evidence of this. At the same time, however, the current situation also shows that right-wing extremists are still active and retain considerable potential for violence. In particular, violent actions remain a likely outcome when they are on the streets under the influence of alcohol.

Left-wing extremism

The criminal prosecution successes of recent years and the fact that the propensity for violence in political disputes in Switzerland is generally assessed as being lower than in many countries in Europe have probably contributed toward the currently quiet situation in the area of left-wing extremism. The organization Revolutionärer Aufbau Schweiz, in particular its Zurich section, RAZ, continues to dictate matters within left-wing extremist circles. Since one of the central secretariats of SRI is run by RAZ, the violent left-wing extremist scene in Switzerland maintains links with developments abroad, principally elsewhere in Europe. Marco Camenisch continues to provide a motive for attacks in Switzerland or against Swiss interests abroad, one which could also provoke actions by foreign left-wing extremist groups. This is important insofar as violent left-wing extremists in Switzerland no longer carry out many...
IEID attacks, let alone particularly serious acts of violence such as the use of parcel bombs. RAZ, as the dictating force, can spur the movement on to carry out actions – including violent actions – but it cannot influence at will the readiness of individuals to commit acts of violence. However, the potential for violence in left-wing extremist circles remains.

Left-wing extremist circles are not expected to change their priorities: they continue to cultivate their own agenda and link their world view to current events or trends, but their resonance with the wider public remains modest. There are currently no signs of any development that could lead to the formation of a social movement which might be used as a platform or exploited for its own ends by the left-wing extremist scene. Urban development and the commercialisation of leisure culture, which are triggering criticism and protests and are linked to the calls for ‘free spaces’, remain the one exception to this statement. Opportunities that present themselves in this regard will be exploited by left-wing extremist circles firstly as a platform for self-promotion and possibly for violent actions, and secondly as a means of recruiting new blood.

Animal rights extremism

In Switzerland, there is still a small circle of animal rights extremists who are prepared to use violence. With the exception of a group in Ticino which has far-right leanings, these groups have predominantly far-left views and have links to the left-wing extremist scene. While this may mean that they frequently meet with solidarity in left-wing extremist circles, and in individual cases may even be supported personally, they have been unable to shape the views of the left-wing extremist scene with their concerns and their objectives. The small numbers of animal rights extremists generally conduct their campaigns, both those that are specifically Swiss and their international campaigns, using mostly legal means.

Propaganda disseminated after the riots in Zurich on 12 December 2014
Potential for violence

There are no signs that the situation in any of the violent extremist movements will change in the foreseeable future, especially as far as the use of violence is concerned. The quiet situation is judged to be essentially the same as in previous years, which also means that the potential for violence still exists and may be unleashed at any time without prior warning. So the potential for serious criminal offences among groups in Switzerland remains lower than in corresponding groups abroad; the term ‘serious criminal offences’ refers here to the use of firearms or explosives or the direct and specific threat of violence against persons. Particularly among left-wing extremists, there currently appear to be virtually no exponents of violence carrying out attacks using IEIDs, as was commonplace a few years ago. However, outbreaks of violence remain a possibility in emotionally charged situations, for example in the context of demonstrations. These may be spontaneous brawls, but also planned violent actions which are committed from within the safety of the crowd. Encounters between right-wing and left-wing extremists always hold considerable potential for violence, which may be exacerbated by input from other violent extremist and terrorist groups such as the PKK or Salafists and (suspected) supporters of ‘Islamic State’. Individuals, small groups or organisations may respond to a terrorist attack by taking more or less spontaneous violent action. Such attacks are directed against persons, institutions or symbols which are associated with the (suspected) perpetrators of the attack. Despite the fact that Swiss citizens have occasionally been identified at ‘Hooligans against Salafists’ demonstrations involving right-wing extremists – some of which passed off violently – in Germany, there are no signs to indicate that such things are likely to occur in Switzerland. In this country, there is little overlap between right-wing extremist and hooligan circles.

Right-wing extremism

The right-wing extremist scene in Switzerland remains nebulous; its conspiratorial behaviour, absence from the public arena and lack of strategic objectives make it hard to pin down. Most right-wing extremists will continue to try to avoid attracting attention, so as not to have to face serious consequences such as losing their job or training position. The scene as a whole will also seek to remain below the public awareness threshold, but at the same time has to ensure that it does not disappear altogether. Under these conditions, right-wing extremism will

Items confiscated from a participant in a left-wing-extremist demonstration in February 2014 in Solothurn – bike chain and pepper spray
manifest itself every now and then. The authorities therefore need to remain vigilant. On the one hand, right-wing extremists could, given an opportunity, be tempted to take provocative action, make their presence felt or at least harass individuals they disapprove of, and on the other hand, decreased levels of vigilance could result in right-wing extremism growing again.

Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West) is a larger movement which has emerged in a number of cities in Germany, but one whose continuation remains uncertain and which, despite some overlap in terms of ideas and adherents, can only to a certain extent be regarded as a right-wing extremist movement and cannot be classified as prepared to use violence. Right-wing extremists’ diffuse ideological mixture of xenophobia, racism, feelings of superiority and powerlessness, conspiracy theories and anti-Semitism could, however, be given a fresh focus in the shape of Islamophobia. Moreover, individual Pegida supporters in Switzerland have spoken out in social media in favour of violence against Muslim institutions, which have repeatedly come under attack elsewhere in Europe. Nothing illustrates the current confused situation more clearly than the fact that, during the most recent war in Gaza, even jihad-motivated Internet users drew on right-wing extremist propaganda to mobilise support against Jews in Switzerland and against Israel. In Switzerland, however, the various calls on the Internet for violence to be taken onto the streets have so far failed, and there is no concrete evidence to suggest that this might change. Should Pegida prove to be more than just a short-lived phenomenon, however, the impact on right-wing extremism is still completely unpredictable – on the one hand, Pegida could provide a boost to or serve as a source of recruitment for the (possibly altered) right-wing extremist scene, but on the other hand, it could restrict the size of the latter by absorbing potential new recruits. In addition, public appearances by Pegida may lead to violent confrontations with violent left-wing-extremist counter-demonstrators.

Left-wing extremism

Violent left-wing extremism in Switzerland continues to face a generational problem; it is still not the younger generation which is dictating matters. Whereas criticism of ‘capitalism’ or of the ‘system’ definitely does resonate, this is not at all the case when it comes to having ‘communism’ as a goal. The ‘anarchy’ camp contains individuals who are highly disposed to use violence, but otherwise can at best offer
ideas of autonomy that are not up to the complexity of the modern world. If objectives are defined only in negative terms as criticism of the system, this can result in anarchist violence being linked to individual issues, for example to environmental objectives or to animal rights. The overall picture that emerges from these findings is that in violent left-wing extremist circles, autonomous anarchistic ideas could in future gain ground at the expense of communist or Marxist-Leninist ideas. A consequence of this could be that the targets of attacks become even more diverse and also that an increase in acts of sabotage has to be expected. However, in the short term at least, no rise in violence or in the number of serious attacks is anticipated. Besides the previously mentioned clashes with right-wing extremists, events requiring a major security presence offer particular potential for the use of violence and violent confrontations. These include not only events which are in some cases held regularly, but also events organised by the ‘free spaces’ movement, which itself is non-violent. However, some members of the ‘free spaces’ movement may possibly take part in confrontations.

Animal rights extremism

The Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty campaign was ended in August 2014. The campaign, which was launched in the UK, and the violent animal rights extremists supporting it had at the time been responsible for violent actions in Switzerland. The successes of criminal prosecution authorities, principally in the UK, are one of the reasons why, in this country, Swiss animal rights activists prepared to use violence on the one hand have usually pursued their goals by lawful means, and on the other have exercised their potential for violence only within the context of left-wing extremist objectives. This dependence on abroad means that for the foreseeable future Swiss animal rights extremists will probably not conduct any violent campaigns on their own initiative, but could support foreign activists ready to use violence, if they were to take action in Switzerland within the context of a larger campaign.

Propaganda calling for an attack on a police station in Bern, February 2015
Proliferation

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems is one of the great problems of our time and is the subject of ever closer multilateral cooperation. A number of countries are under observation. However, concern still centres on developments in Iran and North Korea. As regards Iran, the International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly voiced its suspicions that this country is not using its nuclear project purely for civilian purposes, but has for years secretly been working to develop a nuclear weapon. In November 2013, Iran and the five standing members of the UN Security Council plus Germany reached an interim agreement, which has been extended twice since then, as a basis for further negotiations on a comprehensive compromise solution. Switzerland takes a decisive stand against proliferation activities. As an innovative and competitive location for manufacturing and business, it has a particular interest in preventing procurement attempts and transactions aimed at circumventing sanctions.
Focus on Iran and North Korea

Where programmes of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and the proliferation of the relevant technologies are concerned, the focus remains on Iran and North Korea. Developments relating to the Iranian nuclear programme continue to give cause for cautious optimism. The states taking part in the talks have a clear interest in resolving the conflict. However, from the point of view of proliferation, unless a robust monitoring regime and a comprehensive political arrangement with Teheran can be achieved, the inherent problem of the Iranian nuclear programme, i.e. the possibility of its being used for military purposes, will remain. This difficult process of negotiations with Iran, which is being conducted by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (USA, UK, France, Russia and China) and Germany, continued in 2014. One positive aspect is that the strained relations between the USA and Russia as a consequence of the Ukrainian crisis have so far not been found to have had any adverse impact on the talks with Iran.

On the Indian subcontinent, arsenals and technologies continue to be developed. Pakistan is still working on nuclearisation of the battlefield and is introducing tactical nuclear weapon systems for its troops. India will in the foreseeable future have an operational intercontinental ballistic missile and is slowly advancing toward a sea-based second-strike capability. Both countries have stated their desire to become members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and to join the group of established nuclear powers.

Iranian nuclear programme: temporarily frozen at a high level

The November 2013 Geneva interim agreement between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (USA, UK, France, Russia and China) plus Germany and Iran
was extended beyond the original term of six months; it is being complied with. The status of the Iranian programme thus remains broadly the same as it was at the end of 2013.

As part of its uranium enrichment programme, Iran has around 19,000 centrifuges. The future limitation of this programme continues to be negotiated. The particularly controversial Fordo plant could be converted from a production facility to a research facility with lower enrichment capacity.

The threshold uranium enrichment level of 3.5 per cent needed for operating civilian reactors for generating electricity has technically been exceeded. However, the interim agreement requires that Iran’s entire stocks of uranium enriched to twenty per cent should either be converted for civilian use or else diluted. Iran is complying with this requirement. Technologically, the possibility of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons is also moving within reach. According to Iran, the heavy water reactor in Arak was intended to commence operation in 2014. The extended interim agreement pushes this date back beyond 2015. With regard to the Arak reactor, a redesign of the reactor core appears to offer a possible solution that is acceptable to both sides.

Iran now has the basic prerequisites for producing (if necessary rapidly) weapons-grade fissile material. Full implementation of the interim agreement, however, increases the time needed to build an explosive device. Relations between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have also been essentially positive, although differences did arise in 2014 concerning the handling of past issues and the authorization of particular inspectors.

**Iranian ballistic missiles: steady expansion**

In 2014, Iran largely refrained from missile testing, probably due to the negotiation process in the nuclear dispute, and restricted itself to announcing new weapon systems. The Iranian space programme, which relies directly on the technology of the military programme, has also made only limited progress. The quantitative expansion of the arsenal of ballistic missiles, particularly of shorter-range systems, such as those used in the Syrian civil war, is continuing. However, no longer-range systems have been introduced since 2012.

The introduction of the new Ashura/Sejil solid-propellant missile (range 2,000 kilometres) will represent a genuine quantum leap in military terms: it is at an advanced stage of development, and the fact that it can be prepared for deployment easily and quickly will bring significant operational advantages. The steady expansion of Iran’s ability to threaten targets in its neighbourhood with ballistic missiles is likely to contribute significantly to regional armament efforts, especially in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

**North Korean nuclear programme: progress on construction of new reactor**

Information about the North Korean nuclear programme remains fragmentary. The new light-water reactor in the nuclear complex at Yongbyon, north of the capital, appears to have been largely completed. The adjacent old re-
actor is likely to have been in operation for a prolonged period in 2014. Few further details have been disclosed about the status of North Korea’s uranium enrichment programme, which was first made public in 2010. However, satellite images show a second, similarly-sized centrifuge hall, which, if fully equipped, would indicate a doubling of the enrichment capacity. Unconfirmed sources say that North Korea has a high level of autonomy in the manufacture of key components for its programmes. This would be of particular significance from the point of view of proliferation.

North Korea has not conducted any further nuclear weapon tests since February 2013. However, the small amount of information that comes out of this closed country appears to point to efforts to improve the quality, in particular, of its military assets.

**North Korean ballistic missiles: steady progress**

The mainstay of missile construction in North Korea is a complete series of liquid-propellant guided missiles which are largely based on the technology of older Soviet Scud series systems. The short- and medium-range missiles developed by North Korea have already been sold on to a number of countries. The longer-range Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2 models are described by North Korea as space rockets, i.e. as part of a legitimate civilian research programme. In 2013, a technologically more advanced liquid-propellant missile was displayed at a parade, but no flight test has yet been observed. However, the propulsion systems are reported to have been tested. If this multi-stage system were to become operational, North Korea would also have an intercontinental-range delivery system at its disposal. In terms of
more modern solid-propellant missile technology, North Korea still lags behind Iran and Pakistan. In total, North Korea tested its guided missiles around 20 times in 2014, firing around a hundred missiles in the process. There were a remarkable number of tests of shorter-range systems and of the KN-02 solid-fuel missile.

**Pakistan and India: optimisation and expansion of stable arsenals**

On the Indian subcontinent, too, the development of technologies and arsenals is proceeding apace. Pakistan has a well-developed arsenal of guided ballistic missiles, including in particular the modern solid-propellant Ghaznavi and Shaheen series (maximum range 2,500 kilometres), all of which underwent routine testing in 2014. All the systems are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Pakistan is currently working on smaller delivery systems and cruise missiles which are suitable for deploying tactical nuclear weapons. The huge expansion in plutonium production capacity at the Khushab site is continuing. It is being accompanied by an expansion in reprocessing capacity.

India also has a mature arsenal of ballistic missiles. The Agni series, in particular, uses modern solid-propellant technology and can carry nuclear warheads. A number of models in this series have been tested in the last twelve months, including the Agni-4, with a range of around 4,000 kilometres. Smaller series models were tested by the armed forces unit which are deploying them. Work appears to have started on an intercontinental Agni-6. By its own account, India is also interested in multiple-warhead technology and would one day like to use this in its long-range missiles. The introduction of such a system would then bring Central Europe, and thus also Switzerland, within range of Indian weapons. India is continuing to work on completion of its nuclear triad (land-, air- and sea-based systems). In 2009, the Arihant-class nuclear submarine was launched. The reported activation of the reactor in 2013 marked an important milestone for India in this long-term programme. It now appears that sea trials commenced at the end of 2014. In parallel with this, sea-based guided ballistic missiles are also being developed. India is continuing to expand not only its civilian but also its military nuclear programme. Its stocks of nuclear weapons are thought to be slightly smaller than those of Pakistan.
Nuclear crisis with Iran: a genuine opportunity?

Development of the nuclear and guided missile programmes referred to above is proceeding apace. In the international context, the Iranian nuclear programme is the most virulent. The crisis has been following a cyclical pattern since 2002. The November 2013 interim agreement and its repeated extension seems to indicate that the peak in the most recent cycle of tension has been passed. However, the cycle will be broken only if a new dynamic between Iran and the USA succeeds in bringing about a comprehensive solution to the nuclear crisis. Iran has so far failed to rebut the allegations which the IAEA has raised regularly and since the end of 2011 with an increasing sense of urgency. Iran is therefore subject to international economic sanctions on a scale close to a complete embargo. The impact of the sanctions on the Iranian economy is immense. The country is finding it extremely difficult to move around any financial resources which it still has and thus to remain solvent. The partial relaxation of sanctions has eased this pressure, but new problems are emerging due to the collapse of the oil price. Despite these difficulties, the Iranian nuclear programme has reached a level which renders illusory the idea of a negotiated return to the level of ten years ago. One key aim of the negotiation process is therefore to keep Iran’s capability to break away from the control regime of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to build an explosive device under the tightest possible control. A nuclear-armed Iran would not only have implications in the region and further afield, but would in particular also shake the foundations of international efforts to curb proliferation, might provoke a new nuclear arms race and could also intensify the conventional arms race in the region.

North Korea: entire range of products for a nuclear weapons programme available

North Korea’s uranium enrichment capabilities are unclear, but in the area of centrifuge technology it could be ahead of Iran. Based on the course of development of the known programme, the existence of another, older, plant seems plausible. In the past, the regime in North Korea has had no qualms about selling its missile technology to numerous customers like Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Egypt and Syria, with no strings attached. It is capable of supplying the entire range of products needed for a nuclear weapons programme, including the production of fissile material (uranium and plutonium), the construction of a simple nuclear explosive device and the delivery systems required.
PROSPECTS

Risks to Switzerland diverse

The flow of European controlled goods and technologies to proliferation-sensitive countries via third countries poses a major challenge for Swiss export controls. Switzerland has excellent industrial capabilities and offers an attractive and, by international standards, open research location. While the mobility of students from the EU has been hampered, the presence of students from states outside the EU, including states that are sensitive from the proliferation point of view, will probably increase. Thanks to Switzerland’s cooperation with other countries and collaboration with industry, the Swiss authorities have been able to thwart and/or expose illegal procurement attempts on numerous occasions.

However, the challenges are mounting. Procurement channels are continuing to be developed and reorganised. Many of these run via Asia. The increasing outsourcing of production abroad is also making it more difficult both for industry and for the authorities to monitor the flow of sensitive goods. In areas relevant to proliferation, there is also a discernible tendency among purchasers to focus on the procurement of subsystems and components. Identifying critical subsystems and withdrawing them from illegal trade is infinitely more difficult than is the case with complete systems, the export of which is subject to tighter and ever more effective international controls.

Metal parts produced with a 3D printer – a new challenge in the fight against proliferation
Illegal intelligence and attacks on information infrastructure

The pace of revelations from the Snowden affair has now slowed, but this does not affect the new security aspects of the affair (which extend beyond illegal intelligence to information security, critical infrastructure protection and product safety). Since cyber espionage, in particular, presupposes the infiltration of systems and networks, it also offers opportunities for manipulation and even sabotage. Cyber espionage is continuing to grow in importance but it does not replace traditional methods of espionage – the two types of espionage complement rather than compete with one another. The aim of espionage remains the acquisition of information for a variety of purposes.
Variety of purposes and targets
Illegal intelligence is carried out in order to obtain information. The perpetrators seek such information in order to improve or to consolidate their position relative to their international political and economic rivals. The information can also be used by a regime for internal security purposes or to help it retain power. In addition, such information can selectively be used to influence opponents or competitors or possibly to damage them directly through data manipulation or destruction – access to data and information must therefore be considered not only from the point of view of illegal intelligence but also from that of sabotage. The German Federal Office for Information Security publicised a striking example of such a scenario at the end of 2014: using spear phishing (targeted attacks) and social engineering (influencing/manipulating individuals through direct contact), perpetrators succeeded in penetrating the IT network of a steel plant in Germany. They then managed to work their way into the production networks. Following the failures of individual control components and of entire systems, the blast furnace was ultimately left in an undefined state. The perpetrators possessed not only IT security expertise but also detailed technical knowledge of blast furnaces.
In Switzerland, illegal intelligence is targeted both at Switzerland’s economic and security interests and at the interests of third parties, i.e. of international organizations and of international companies located in Switzerland. In addition, intelligence activities also target individuals resident in Switzerland who are opponents of the rulers of various countries; this applies mainly to (former) citizens of states in which the democratic decision-making process is restricted and freedom of expression is not guaranteed.

Diversity of methods
Espionage is a covert activity that is not conducted in the public eye. Cases that become public knowledge are mostly cyber espionage attacks, primarily via reports by companies specialising in IT security. It is difficult to determine the perpetrators of such attacks, although the malware used and the target of an operation make it possible to make an educated guess. Remaining undetected is one of the advantages of cyber espionage, which can also be conducted from a country in which even identified perpetrators are protected from arrest and legal consequences. This gives it an advantage over traditional methods of espionage. Nonetheless, such methods are still used where the need for information requires it – and this may sometimes be necessary even in cyber operations, for example to determine an attack vector. The various methods should therefore be seen as complementing one another and not as competing with one another.
Traditional espionage methods include the analysis of publicly available information (open-source intelligence, OSINT) and the recruitment of – and acquisition of information from – informants (human intelligence, HUMINT). HUMINT continues to use traditional resources such as agents disguised as diplomats, journalists, researchers or business people. Nowadays, they also use social media, which makes it easier for them to identify target persons and to establish contact. Anyone who possesses sought-after information or has access to it may be considered as a possible informer, i.e. not just decision-makers themselves but also translators, for example. While it is true to say that cyber espionage is continuing to grow in importance, this statement must be qualified with the observation that the traditional methods of espionage are still being used. Due to gradually increasing awareness of the potential of cyber espionage, and behaviour adapted accordingly, the use of traditional espionage will not disappear.

Findings that have emerged from the Snowden affair

Since mid-2013, the disclosures set in motion by a former employee of a service provider for the National Security Agency (NSA), Edward Snowden, have brought the activities of the NSA, in particular, as well as those of the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), to the public’s attention. While the problems of technical access had previously been discussed among experts, the findings from the Snowden documents lent the issue a whole new dimension. The pace of disclosure has now slowed significantly, but this does not affect the security aspect of the affair. Across the board, intelligence services are procuring confidential information by monitoring communications and actively penetrating IT systems. They may also falsify such information or even manipulate processes or infrastructures. The penetration of communications is deep, systematic and virtually comprehensive, depending on the resources that are used: providers are forced by law to disclose data, covert access has been obtained to the main lines of communication, encryption codes have also systematically been broken or weakened, and even international encryption standards have been affected. An example is the nationwide recording of mobile phone data: under the Mystic programme, of metadata (connected phone numbers, call time and duration, etc.), and under the Somalget programme, also of the content of communications (Bahamas and at least one other country). The suspected cyber attack on one of the largest manufacturers of SIM cards for mobile phones by the NSA and GCHQ, which became public knowledge in February 2015, also fits in with the aspiration of the intelligence services of the Five-Eyes states to intercept as much of the content of communications by potential targets as possible. However, disclosures at the end of 2014 also show that the NSA does not always succeed in cracking encryption codes – at least as things stood in 2012.

Two points should be borne in mind in this context: firstly, the intelligence services of the USA or of the Five-Eyes states (USA, UK,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand) are not the only ones to have – at least potentially – far-reaching electronic monitoring and intervention capabilities. Secondly, there are also voices casting doubt on the benefit of data that has been gathered extensively and retained, which is less often the case with targeted cyber attacks for espionage purposes. However, targeted attack is a tool that is open to very many more players, be they criminal groups, individuals or states; targeted attacks are used not only for espionage purposes but also by criminals for their own enrichment.

**Cyber espionage: advanced persistent threats**

For well over a decade now, we have been seeing electronic attacks which, due to a number of characteristics, are referred to as advanced persistent threats. The attacks are carried out in a targeted fashion, are highly complex, are intended to remain undetected for as long as possible and are made for the purpose of obtaining specific data. Based on these systematically linked characteristics, it must be assumed that states are behind such operations, whether they initiate them directly, commission them, make resources available or simply use the results. The aim of these attacks is espionage, possibly in conjunction with manipulation. A review of the advanced persistent threats identified in the espionage field shows that operations ran, i.e. went undetected, for several years. In each case, traces of malware were detected, from the structure and objectives of which it is possible to draw conclusions as to the perpetrators or initiators that are at least plausible. A variety of different countries were behind the operations specified below. Operations are periodically uncovered by specialist companies, which also give the cases their names – competing names where several companies are working on a case simultaneously.

- In February 2015, the Russian company Kaspersky reported on the Equation Group, a hacking group which has been conducting espionage worldwide for more than ten years using a range of sophisticated malware. Its targets were private individuals, companies from the telecommunications sector, research institutions and government organisations. In Switzerland, according to Kaspersky, private individuals were affected.

- In November 2014, the American company Symantec Corp. uncovered the malware known as Regin. Regin enables penetration both of network infrastructures (routers) and GSM mobile networks. Government organisations, operators of critical infrastructure,
companies, researchers and private individuals are all seen as possible targets. To date, no victims have been identified in Switzerland.

- In February 2014, Kaspersky released information on Operation Careto, which is believed to have been running since as far back as 2007. The victims – some of them in Switzerland – were from both the public sector (governments, diplomatic missions) and the private sector (energy, research, finance).

- Since March 2014, several operations showing an interest in Ukraine (Sofacy, Sandworm, Uroburos-Turla-Snake) have been identified. The malware used in each case is complex, sometimes technically related or known from cybercriminal contexts. The operations were targeted principally at institutions in Europe active in the military sphere, including NATO, and pursued espionage objectives. Switzerland was one of the countries affected.

- Under Operation Newscaster, a hacker group used spear phishing to infect over 2,000 computers during a three-year period. The individuals targeted were primarily senior military and political personnel in the USA and Israel.

- Operation Dragonfly, also known under the names Energetic Bear or Crouching Yeti, has been active since 2011. The malware (Havex, Sysmain, Karagany or Oldrea) is not highly complex, but is constantly being refined and is used in a targeted way. The attackers have operated using e.g. spear phishing or drive-by infections, and they have also succeeded in adding their malware to update-software for industrial control systems. Dragonfly focuses on industrial control systems and research institutions in the energy sector, and Switzerland has been amongst the countries affected. It is suspected that the perpetrators are a state-financed group of criminals. The operation was designed primarily for espionage, but a further aim was to make it possible to carry out acts of sabotage in the target systems and networks at a later date. As far as we know, however, it has not yet been used for purposes other than espionage.
Vulnerability of information technology

In a few countries, policy discussions and initiatives aimed at restricting espionage activity are taking place. The measures under discussion are for the most part limited to strengthening protection of the basic rights of the countries’ own citizens and do not provide for any reduction of espionage activities abroad. Confidence, particularly in ICT companies in these countries, consequently remains dented, and it is to be expected that security concerns will lead to competitive shifts on the international markets. Conflicts are to be anticipated here, perhaps in the form of legal disputes about the award of contracts under the rules of the World Trade Organisation. However, societies and states in today’s world will remain dependent on ICT and thus also on the leading technology countries. These countries with key technological competencies will, provided they also have large intelligence services, continue to be potential sources of extensive espionage activity.

Advanced persistent threats and social engineering

Targeted cyber attacks such as advanced persistent threats require knowledge of the target, at least initially, to install malware in a system. The malware can be distributed via the internet. Here, the attackers have to ensure that the attack is not detected. In the Careto case, for example, spear phishing emails were distributed which contained links to malware that were tailored to the victim and had been generated specially for the attack. The URLs imitated daily newspapers like ‘The Guardian’ or the ‘Washington Post’. Newscaster operated in major social media networks using fake profiles for cover; the malware was sent out by email only after the targets’ trust had been won. However, malware can also be disseminated physically, by an agent obtaining access to a computer that is located in a network and manipulating it. The Snowden data contained a reference to a procedure used by the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations unit: it is said to have intercepted network or peripheral equipment sent by post and to have primed it with espionage technology.

The malware is controlled via botnets or via the control servers in these networks (command and control servers). Botnets link computers infected with malware and are used for criminal purposes or for espionage. The number of command and control servers identified in Switzerland by the Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Assurance (Melani) rose in 2014; infrastructures used for targeted attacks on government organisations have also been identified.

Security vulnerabilities

Countless internet users have been affected directly or indirectly by a vulnerability in the OpenSSL cryptography library. The vulnerability came to light in April 2014, when it had been in existence for two years. Such security vulnerabilities are not only exploited by crimi-
nals for profit purposes, but can also be used by intelligence services for espionage. The NSA has apparently made such use of security vulnerabilities for espionage purposes, and the vulnerabilities were thus not disclosed or their disclosure was delayed. It is hardly surprising that security vulnerabilities are not made public by those – be they criminals or intelligence services – who wish to exploit them. However, commercial interests are also increasingly playing a role in the detection of security vulnerabilities. The detection of a vulnerability has a certain value, since the detector is taking on a task which should really be carried out by the manufacturer. There are already companies which procure such information and then sell it to users and manufacturers. This commercialisation harbours the risk firstly that on cost grounds security vulnerabilities will no longer be fixed, and secondly that knowledge about a vulnerability will fall into the hands of criminals. One way of countering this trend would be a guideline regulating the rights and duties of the detector, as well as those of the manufacturer concerned, and also, for example, presenting possible ways of defining the value of a security vulnerability (responsible disclosure).
Measures against known spies, political considerations

In addition to lengthy and complex criminal prosecution and targeted prevention measures, Switzerland also has the option of using its laws on foreign nationals against known spies. Depending on the circumstances, these tools are used either discreetly or publicly, in order to send an appropriate signal. For example, Switzerland can explain the legal position to the countries of origin of officials engaged in intelligence activity, with the aim of having these officials removed. Known spies can be refused diplomatic accreditation or visas or can have entry bans imposed on them. In the case of diplomats, they may be declared persona non grata. Such measures are regularly taken against individuals from various states. However, they must constantly be balanced against Switzerland’s other political interests. For example, the presence of known intelligence service officers in Switzerland may knowingly be accepted, e.g. in connection with international organisations or with negotiations which are being conducted in Switzerland. The success of such negotiations may be of greater political concern and thus outweigh security considerations.

Important role of prevention

Illegal intelligence against economic, political and military interests will continue to be carried out in future, including in Switzerland. Among the reasons for this are the high technological standard of Swiss industry, its status as an international research location and financial centre, the presence of the UN and other international bodies, and its energy and raw material trade. As investigation and prosecution in the area of illegal intelligence are lengthy and complex processes and are cut off from international legal assistance, prevention plays an important role: potential targets must be aware of the threat and for their part must act responsibly in order to guard against espionage.

The FIS has statutory responsibility for taking preventive measures to counter espionage activities by foreign intelligence services against Swiss interests. Prevention also includes analyses which bring to light correlations between individual events in cyberspace, as these make it possible to detect the threat and then take appropriate measures. Under the Prophylax programme, the FIS, in collaboration with the cantonal intelligence units, has for years been raising awareness...
among companies and research and higher educational institutions of the risks not only of illegal intelligence, but also of proliferation. Whereas companies in proliferation-sensitive high-tech areas have been targeted by Prophylax from the outset, the current focus is on higher education institutions specialising in advanced technology. Technopole is a prevention and awareness-raising programme specifically aimed at research in Switzerland, which collaborates with universities and research institutes in the fight against illegal intelligence, information leaks and proliferation. For the purposes of ‘economic protection’, which includes protection against espionage and crime, efforts are underway e.g. in Germany and Austria to work together more closely across borders in the areas of prevention and awareness-raising among companies.

Finally, in June 2012 the Federal Council adopted a national strategy for the protection of Switzerland against cyber risks (NCS) and a strategy for the protection of critical infrastructure (SKI) and in May 2013 it approved the NCS implementation schedule. The 16 measures in the NCS and the 15 measures in SKI are to be implemented in a coordinated fashion by 2017. In addition, based on a motion by the Council of States, the Federal Council will set up an expert commission on the future of data processing and data security, to run for a maximum of three years.

**Conflicts in cyberspace**

The conflict in Ukraine is also being waged in cyberspace. As well as the espionage attacks mentioned above, attacks have also been targeted at the Ukrainian government, Ukrainian members of parliament and Kremlin and NATO websites. There are numerous examples of conflicts also being waged in cyberspace. Attacks on the availability of websites or the defacing of websites as part of a conflict are common practice; possible attacks such as those referred to in the comments on Operation Dragonfly have a completely different security policy importance.
## List of abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALF</td>
<td>Animal Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQAP</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td>BWIS</td>
<td>Federal Act on Measures to Safeguard Internal Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDFA</td>
<td>Federal Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCHQ</td>
<td>Government Communications Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communications technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEID</td>
<td>Improvised explosive and incendiary devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCS</td>
<td>National Strategy for the protection of Switzerland against cyber risks</td>
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<td>NDG</td>
<td>National Security Act</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<td>OSINT</td>
<td>Open Source Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pegida</td>
<td>Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAZ</td>
<td>Revolutionäer Aufbau Zürich</td>
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<tr>
<td>SKI</td>
<td>Strategy for the protection of critical infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRI</td>
<td>International Red Aid / Secours Rouge International</td>
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<tr>
<td>StGB</td>
<td>Swiss Criminal Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEF</td>
<td>World Economic Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZNDG</td>
<td>Federal Act on Responsibilities in the Area of the Civilian Intelligence Service</td>
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</tbody>
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